In re M.H.
| Decision Date | 30 March 2023 |
| Docket Number | 06-22-00072-CV |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF M.H., A CHILD |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Date Submitted: January 9, 2023
On Appeal from the 307th District Court Gregg County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021-1149-DR
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
During a traffic stop of the vehicle Mother was driving, an odor of marihuana emanated from the vehicle, and eleven-month-old M.H.[1] was found unrestrained in the front passenger seat. After an unknown amount of marihuana was found in the vehicle, Mother was arrested, and the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed M.H. from Mother's care on grounds of neglectful supervision. Later, Mother admitted to a Department investigator that she had smoked marihuana before she placed M.H. in the vehicle and that she had removed M.H. from her car seat and put her in the front seat because M.H. was hot, itching, and crying.
Over one year after M.H. was removed from Mother's care, the trial court determined that the termination of Mother's parental rights was in the best interest of M.H.[2] and terminated Mother's parental rights on four grounds set out in Section 161.001(b)(1), subsections (D), (E), (O) and (P), of the Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAM CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (P). On appeal Mother[3] asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings on the statutory grounds and that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in the child's best interest. Because we find that sufficient evidence supports the trial court's finding under statutory ground E and its finding on the child's best interest, we will affirm the trial court's judgment.
"The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions." In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). "Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning 'the care, custody, and control of their children." Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). "Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof-clear and convincing evidence-is required at trial." Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). This Court is required to "engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to support the termination of parental rights." Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500). "[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent." Id. (quoting In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20)).
"In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest." Id. (citing TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001; In re E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). "'Clear and convincing evidence' is that 'degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.'" Id. (quoting TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (citing In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009)). "This standard of proof necessarily affects our review of the evidence." Id.
"In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven." In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). "We assume the trial court, acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted." Id. (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573).
"In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the trial court could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing." Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). "We consider only that evidence the fact-finder reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine '"whether the evidence is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the . . . allegations."'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002))). "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact[-]finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)). "'[I]n making this determination,' we must undertake 'an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.'" Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)). "We also recognize that the trial court, as the fact-finder, is the sole arbiter of a witness' demeanor and credibility, and it may believe all, part, or none of a witness' testimony." In re A. M., No. 06-18-00012-CV, 2018 WL 3077784, at *3 (Tex. App.-Texarkana June 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109).
"Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, 'the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child is paramount.'" In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994))) (citing In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003)). "A child's emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights." Id. ().
Mother asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings under grounds D, E, O, and P. "Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001[b](1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best interest." Id. at 923 (quoting In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d at 362). "Even so, when the trial court's findings under grounds D or E are challenged on appeal, due process demands that we review the evidence supporting the findings under at least one of those grounds when they are challenged on appeal." In re S.A.W., No. 06-21-00116-CV, 2022 WL 1193667, at *3 (Tex. App.-Texarkana Apr. 22, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) ("We hold that due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) of the Family Code."). "This is because termination of parental rights under these grounds may implicate the parent's parental rights to other children." Id. (citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) ().
Under statutory ground E, parental rights may be terminated "if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . engaged in conduct . . . which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). "'[E]ndanger' means to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize." Tex. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). "It is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffer injury." In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 923. "Under subsection (E), it is sufficient that the child's well-being is jeopardized or exposed to loss or injury." Id. (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 367). Nevertheless, "'endanger' means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or potential ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment." In re E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012). In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 923 ; see Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re N.S.G., 235 S.W.3d at 366-67.
"[Statutory ground E] refers only to the parent's conduct, as evidenced not only by the parent's acts, but also by the parent's...
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