In re M.L.P.

• Citation: 228 S.W.3d 139
• Decision Date: 30 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. E2006-01492-COA-R3-PT.,E2006-01492-COA-R3-PT.
• Parties: In re M.L.P.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Tennessee

228 S.W.3d 139

In re M.L.P.

No. E2006-01492-COA-R3-PT.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section, at Knoxville.

Submitted on Briefs December 6, 2006.

January 30, 2007.

Permission to Appeal Denied by Supreme Court April 30, 2007.

Brandy Slaybaugh, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, B.R.P.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, and Amy T. McConnell, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the Appellee, State of Tennessee, Department of Children's Services.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, P.J., and CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., joined.

B.R.P. ("Father") was sentenced to serve eighteen years in prison when his daughter was six years old. The trial court terminated his parental rights based on Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6), which provides for the termination of parental rights of a person who is incarcerated under a sentence of ten years or more if that person's child is under the age of eight at the time of sentencing. In this appeal, Father argues that Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) is inapplicable because Father might not have to serve his entire sentence if he obtains postconviction relief. He also maintains that termination of his parental rights is not in the best interest of his daughter. After careful review of the evidence and applicable authorities, we hold that the possibility of postconviction relief is irrelevant to a trial court's determination of whether the requirements of Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) have been met. We further hold that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interest of his daughter. Therefore, we affirm.

I. Background

This case involves the termination of the parental rights of Father to his daughter, M.L.P., born January 29, 1996.¹ M.L.P. was removed from the home of her Mother, K.G.W., by a consent decree entered on October 7, 2003.² In the October 7, 2003, order, the juvenile court found M.L.P. to be dependent and neglected and placed her in the temporary custody of her cousin, A.J.

At the time of M.L.P's removal from her mother's residence, Father was serving a six-year sentence for voluntary manslaughter as punishment for a crime he committed when M.L.P. was less than one year old.³ Father was released from prison before serving his complete sentence; however, he was arrested while on probation. On August 21, 2002, a jury found Father guilty of violation of the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act, evading arrest, and two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon.⁴ M.L.P. was six years old at the time of her father's conviction on these charges. Father received an effective sentence of eighteen years at his sentencing hearing on November 7, 2002.⁵ He was transferred to Brushy Mountain Correctional Complex to serve his sentence, and Father was residing at that facility at the time of his parental termination hearing.

Following a hearing on November 6, 2003, the juvenile court found M.L.P., once again, to be dependent and neglected, based on the presence of an indicated sexual perpetrator in A.J.'s home. The court placed M.L.P. in the custody of the Department of Children's Services ("DCS"), which placed the child in foster care. On November 16, 2004, DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights. A bench trial was conducted, after which the juvenile court entered a Termination of Parental Rights and Final Decree of Complete Guardianship on June 13, 2006. The juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that DCS had proven the existence of grounds for Father's termination pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) based on Father's incarceration for a sentence of ten years or more before M.L.P. was eight years old. Furthermore, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interests of M.L.P. that Father's parental rights be terminated. Father appeals.

II. Issues

The issues raised by Father on appeal are restated as follows:

1. Whether the trial court's ruling that Father's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6) was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

2. Whether the trial court was correct in finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Father's parental rights was in the best interest of M.L.P.

III. Standard of Review

A biological parent's right to the care and custody of his or her child is among the oldest of the judicially recognized liberty interests protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Tenn.1993); Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 731 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2001). Although this right is fundamental and superior to claims of other persons and the government, it is not absolute. State v. C.H.K., 154 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Tenn. Ct.App.2004). This right continues without interruption only as long as a parent has not relinquished it, abandoned it, or engaged in conduct requiring its limitation or termination. Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 141 (Tenn.2002). Although "parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children," this right is not absolute and parental rights may be terminated if there is clear and convincing evidence justifying such termination under the applicable statute. In re Drinnon, 776 S.W.2d 96, 97 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988) (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)).

Termination proceedings are governed by statute in Tennessee. Parties who have standing to seek the termination of a biological parent's parental rights must first prove at least one of the statutory grounds for termination. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(1). Secondly, they must prove that termination of the parent's rights is in the child's best interest. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)(2). Because the decision to terminate parental rights has profound consequences, courts must apply a higher standard of proof in deciding termination cases. Therefore, to justify termination of parental rights, the party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence the ground (or grounds) for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn.2002).

The heightened burden of proof in parental termination cases minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions. In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2000); In re M.W.A., Jr., 980 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tenn.Ct.App.1998). Evidence satisfying the clear and convincing evidence standard establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable, State v. Demarr, No. M2002-02603-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 21946726, at *9 (Tenn. Ct.App. M.S., filed Aug. 13, 2003), no appl. perm. filed, and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002); In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d 632, 639 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004); In re J.J.C., 148 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). It produces in a fact-finder's mind a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be established. In re A.D.A., 84 S.W.3d 592, 596 (Tenn.Ct.App. 2002); Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.3d 726, 733 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001); In re C.W.W., 37 S.W.3d at 474.

In a non-jury case such as this one, we review the record de novo with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's determination of facts, and we must honor those findings unless the evidence preponderates to the contrary. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d); Union Carbide v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993). When a trial court has seen and heard witnesses, especially where issues of credibility and weight of oral testimony are involved, considerable deference must be accorded to the trial court's factual findings. Seals v. England/Corsair Upholstery Mfg. Co., Inc., 984 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tenn.1999). Further, "[o]n an issue which hinges on the credibility of witnesses, the trial court will not be reversed unless there is found in the record clear, concrete, and convincing evidence other than the oral testimony of witnesses which contradict the trial court's findings." Galbreath v. Harris, 811 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tenn. Ct.App.1990) (citing Tennessee Valley Kaolin Corp. v. Perry, 526 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tenn.Ct.App.1974)). The trial court's specific findings of fact are first reviewed and are presumed to be correct unless the evidence preponderates against them. We then determine whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by the preponderance of the evidence, clearly and convincingly establish the grounds for terminating the biological parent's parental rights. In re S.M., 149 S.W.3d 632, 640 (Tenn.Ct.App.2004). The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are accorded no presumption of correctness. Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp., 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn.1996); Presley v. Bennett, 860 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Tenn.1993).

IV. Analysis

A. Ground for Termination

We first address whether the trial court erred in finding that there was a statutory ground for terminating Father's parental rights. As long as one statutory ground for termination is established by the facts in this case and termination is in the best interests of the children, the trial court's decision will be sufficiently supported. In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tenn.2003). In this case, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, one ground for termination of Father's parental rights, based on Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(6). That statute provides the following as a ground for termination of parental rights:

The parent has been confined in a correctional or detention facility of any type, by order of the court...