In re MacIntyre Fuels, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 June 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-272.,02-272.
• Citation: 833 A.2d 829
• Parties: In re MacINTYRE FUELS, INC. and Vermont Agency of Transportation.
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

833 A.2d 829

In re MacINTYRE FUELS, INC. and Vermont Agency of Transportation.

No. 02-272.

Supreme Court of Vermont.

June 30, 2003.

Motion for Reconsideration Denied August 11, 2003.

Present AMESTOY, C.J., JOHNSON, SKOGLUND, JJ., and FREDERIC W. ALLEN, C.J. (Ret.) Specially Assigned and ERNEST W. GIBSON III, J. (Ret.) Specially Assigned.

ENTRY ORDER

¶ 1. MacIntyre Fuels, Inc., a Vermont corporation engaged in the business of transporting and selling petroleum products, appeals from the Environmental Board's assumption of Act 250 jurisdiction over the company's proposed project to construct an intermodal fuel transfer facility on a spur line adjacent to the main railway line in Montpelier. We conclude that the Board erred in determining that the project is subject to Act 250 jurisdiction under the 1994 rail siding amendment to 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3). We concur, however, with the Board's determination that MacIntyre's project requires an amendment to an existing permit for part of the land upon which the project is located. Accordingly, the matter is remanded for further consideration consistent with this opinion.

¶ 2. In October 2001, MacIntyre obtained site plan approval from the City of Montpelier to construct a facility that would allow the transfer of petroleum products from railroad cars to trucks for local delivery. At the time, MacIntyre operated a network of similar facilities in Vermont and New Hampshire. The proposed project required the relocation of existing track, the laying of a spur line adjacent to the main track, and the installation of a system of fuel tanks, pipes, and pumping equipment. The project also called for the construction of a 30' × 36' canopy and the upgrading of an existing gravel driveway leading into the railroad yard. MacIntyre was to construct the project on land that it leased from the railroad. Most of that property, in turn, had been leased by the railroad from the State of Vermont. A small strip of land (40' × 100') on which the project was to be located, however, had been leased by the railroad from a neighboring property owner, Patrick Malone, under a reciprocal lease agreement. Apparently, that strip of land was needed to accommodate the canopy and a turnaround area. In its entirety, the project would physically alter approximately 58,000 square feet, or less than two acres of land.

¶ 3. In the fall of 2001, MacIntyre sought a declaratory ruling from the district 5 environmental coordinator that an Act 250 land-use permit was not needed for the project. State officials with the Agency of Transportation supported MacIntyre's position that the project was outside of Act 250 jurisdiction. That position was based on a 1994 amendment to 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3) that resulted from an earlier decision by another district coordinator requiring an Act 250 permit for a similar railroad project. The district coordinator in the earlier case determined that an Act 250 permit was needed because, although the project itself would physically alter only a few acres, the railroad line serving the proposed facility comprised more than ten acres. The ruling was based on § 6001(3), which defines "Development," in relevant part, as the "construction of improvements on a tract or tracts of land, owned or controlled by a person, involving more than 10 acres of land within a radius of five miles of any point on any involved land, for commercial or industrial purposes." In response to this ruling, the Railroad Association of Vermont took its case to the Legislature, which then amended § 6001(3) by adding the following sentences:

In the case of a project undertaken by a railroad, no portion of a railroad line or railroad right-of-way that will not be physically altered as part of the project shall be included in computing the amount of land involved. In the case of a project undertaken by a person to construct a rail line or rail siding to connect to a railroad's line or right-of-way, only the land used for the rail line or rail siding that will be physically altered as part of the project shall be included in computing the amount of the land involved.

1993, No. 200 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 (currently codified at 10 V.S.A. § 6001(3)(C)(iv)).

¶ 4. Notwithstanding this amendment and the Agency of Transportation's support for MacIntyre's position, the district coordinator in the present case concluded in her November 9, 2001 jurisdictional opinion that MacIntyre was required to obtain an Act 250 permit. She found Act 250 jurisdiction by including as involved land the entire fourteen-mile-long railroad right of way running from Montpelier to Graniteville. In her view, the 1994 amendment did not apply because the project entailed more than just constructing a spur track. She further concluded that, even if the railroad right of way was not considered as one contiguous property for jurisdictional purposes, the entire Malone property, approximately 100 acres, would have to be considered as involved land because a small part of the project was located on that property.

¶ 5. MacIntyre appealed the district coordinator's decision to the Environmental Board and submitted a statement of stipulated facts, which was joined by the Agencies of Transportation and Natural Resources. The Board held a hearing on April 17, 2002, but no oral argument took place because MacIntyre's position was unopposed. Instead, Board members directed questions to MacIntyre's attorney. On May 21, 2002, the Board issued its decision upholding the district coordinator's ruling that the proposed project required an Act 250 permit. The Board concluded that because MacIntyre was not a railroad, and because components of the proposed project were neither rail lines nor rail sidings, the land to be considered in determining Act 250 jurisdiction was all contiguous parcels—including the fourteen-mile railroad right of way and the entire Malone parcel—and not merely the two acres or so that was to be physically altered. On appeal to this Court, MacIntyre argues that (1) certain Board findings are clearly erroneous; (2) the Board erred in concluding that the 1994 amendment to § 6001(3) exempted only that portion of the proposed project involving the laying of track; and (3) with respect to both the railroad right of way and the Malone property, the Board should have considered only the land that was to be physically altered in determining whether an Act 250 permit was required.

¶ 6. Because we need not address MacIntyre's challenge to certain Board findings to resolve this appeal, we move directly to the central question in this case: Did the Board err in concluding that the 1994 amendment to § 6001(3) exempts from Act 250 review only the component of a proposed project involving the laying of track—and not the construction of attendant facilities—when the project is undertaken by someone other than a railroad? MacIntyre argues that the phrase "project undertaken by a person to construct a rail line or rail siding to connect to a railroad's line or right-of-way" should not and cannot be construed as exempting only the track component of proposed rail siding projects. To do so, it argues, would effectively negate the amendment because tracks are never built without attendant facilities, and would undermine the purpose of the legislation to put shippers transporting goods by rail on equal footing with shippers transporting goods by highway. In response, the State argues that the term "rail siding" has a narrow, technical meaning that refers only to the track itself and cannot be expanded to cover attendant facilities.

¶ 7. Although we generally defer to the Board's interpretation of Act 250 and its "special expertise in determining whether it has jurisdiction over a particular development," In re Stokes Communications Corp., 164 Vt. 30, 35, 664 A.2d 712, 715 (1995), we do not abdicate our responsibility to examine a disputed statute independently and ultimately determine its meaning. When interpreting a statute, our fundamental objective is to discern and implement the intent of the Legislature. See Green Mountain Power Corp. v. Sprint Communications, 172 Vt. 416, 420, 779 A.2d 687, 691 (2001); Perry v. Med. Practice Bd., 169 Vt. 399, 406, 737 A.2d 900, 905 (1999). If the statutory language is absolutely clear and unambiguous, we generally restrict ourselves to the plain meaning of that language, but if any question remains as to the intent underlying the statute, we also look at "the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, and the legislative policy it was designed to implement." Perry, 169 Vt. at 406, 737 A.2d at 905. Indeed, if "the plain meaning of statutory language appears to undermine the purpose of the statute, we are not confined to a literal interpretation, but rather must look to the broad subject matter of the statute, its effects and consequences, and the purpose and spirit of the law to determine legislative intent." Town of Killington v. State, 172 Vt. 182, 189, 776 A.2d 395, 401 (2001); see Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Bd., 148 Vt. 47, 49, 527 A.2d 227, 228 (1986) ("the letter of a statute or its literal sense must yield where it conflicts...