In re Maddin, No. 2-08-475-CV (Tex. App. 4/20/2009)

• Decision Date: 20 April 2009
• Docket Number: No. 2-08-475-CV.,2-08-475-CV.
• Parties: IN RE JEFFERY SCOTT MADDIN, Relator.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

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IN RE JEFFERY SCOTT MADDIN, Relator.

No. 2-08-475-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Second District, Fort Worth.

Delivered: April 20, 2009.

Original Proceeding

Panel: CAYCE, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and WALKER, JJ.

WALKER, J. dissents without opinion.

MEMORANDUM OPINION¹

JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.

On November 26, 2008, the trial court confined Relator, Jeffery Scott Maddin, to the Cooke County Jail pursuant to an order holding him in contempt and directing his confinement. On December 11, 2008, Maddin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from the Cooke County Jail, and the next day, this court ordered Maddin released on a $1,000 bond pending the outcome of this original proceeding. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(b)(3).

In this habeas corpus proceeding, Maddin complains that the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding him in contempt and ordering him confined for violating the trial court's September 22, 2008 letter ruling and the November 12, 2008 final decree of divorce; therefore, he contends he is being illegally confined and restrained. We grant his petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Real Party in Interest, Dianna Sue Darby, sued Maddin for divorce on November 15, 2006. On July 11, 2008, the trial court held a final hearing. On September 22, 2008, the trial court notified the parties by letter of its decision regarding the division of property and debts and provided that Darby's counsel was to prepare the divorce decree. Listed among the property to be awarded Darby was the real property located at 321 CR 211, Gainesville, Texas ("the Gainesville property"), a cattle trailer and flatbed, and a John Deere Gator. On October 21, 2008, Maddin entered the Gainesville property and removed the flatbed trailer and John Deere Gator.

The final decree of divorce rendered by the court on November 12, 2008 awarded Darby the exclusive use and possession of the Gainesville property and other property including the cattle trailer, flatbed, and John Deere Gator. On November 13, 2008, Darby filed a second amended motion for enforcement and contempt in which she alleged for the first time that Maddin entered onto the Gainesville property and removed the flatbed trailer and John Deere Gator. Darby argued that Maddin's actions violated the trial court's September 22, 2008 letter ruling and the November 12, 2008 divorce decree. Alternatively, Darby argued that Maddin's actions violated the May 4, 2007 temporary orders which granted her the exclusive use and possession of the Gainesville property and "all of the property of the parties subject to this suit not specifically awarded to [Maddin] while this case is pending."

On November 26, 2008, the trial court found Maddin guilty of violating the court's September 22, 2008 letter and the November 12, 2008 final decree of divorce. The court also found Maddin in contempt and ordered that he be committed to the Cooke County Jail for "a period of 45 days with no credit for good time and . . . thereafter until all the property taken October 21, 2008 is returned."

Maddin first argues that the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding him in contempt and committing him to the county jail for allegedly violating the November 12, 2008 final decree of divorce because the contempt order finds that his actions occurred on October 21, 2008, prior to the entry of the divorce decree.

An original habeas corpus proceeding is a collateral attack on the contempt judgment. See Ex parte Rohleder, 424 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding); In re Bielefeld, 143 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, orig. proceeding) (op. on reh'g). A writ of habeas corpus will issue when the relator has not been afforded due process or when the order requiring confinement is void. In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). We review a petition for writ of habeas corpus to determine if the order of commitment is void, either because it was beyond the power of the court to enter or because the contemnor was not afforded due process. See id.; Ex parte Barnett, 600 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. 1980) (orig. proceeding); In re Mann, 162 S.W.3d 429, 432 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Casillas, 25 S.W.3d 296, 298-99 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Friedman, 808 S.W.2d 166, 168 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, orig. proceeding). Guilt or innocence of the relator is not an issue; the only issue concerns the lawfulness of the relator's imprisonment. In re Mann, 162 S.W.3d at 432.

Among the due process rights accorded an alleged contemnor is the right to reasonable notice of each alleged contumacious act. Ex parte Barlow, 899 S.W.2d 791, 797 (Tex. App.-Houston [14^th Dist.] 1995, orig. proceeding). Texas courts have been very strict in requiring that proper notice be given before a person may be held in contempt for actions done outside the presence of the court. Ex parte Eureste, 614 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, orig. proceeding). When proper notice is not given, then the contempt order is invalid. Id.

If this court concludes that a relator was deprived of his liberty without due process of law, or that the contempt and commitment orders are void, we must order the relator's release. See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d at 596; Ex parte Swate, 922 S.W.2d 122, 124 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding); In re Alexander, 243 S.W.3d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, orig. proceeding).

A contempt order may not be based on an ambiguous order. See Ex parte Price, 741 S.W.2d 366, 367-68 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding). In order for the trial court to punish a party for disobeying a written order, the order itself must be definite and certain. See Ex parte Brister, 801 S.W.2d 833, 834 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding). To be enforceable by contempt, the written order must set forth the terms of compliance clearly and specifically so that the person charged with obeying the order will readily know exactly what duties and obligations are imposed on him. Ex parte Acker, 949 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding); Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding). Thus, to sentence a party to confinement for contempt of a prior court order, that order must have "unequivocally commanded" the party to perform the duties or obligations imposed on him. Ex parte Padron, 565 S.W.2d 921, 921 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding). A written order that is equivocal or susceptible to more than one interpretation is not punishable by contempt. In re Houston, 92 S.W.3d 870, 877 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, orig. proceeding).

The contempt order at issue here clearly finds that Maddin violated the final decree of divorce when he took and retained property on October 21, 2008. However, it was not possible for Maddin to have violated the November 12, 2008 final decree of divorce because it was not in existence on October 21, 2008. A contemnor cannot be held in constructive contempt of cour...