In re Marriage of McBeth, 51076-6-II

• Decision Date: 17 September 2019
• Docket Number: 51076-6-II
• Citation: 10 Wn.App.2d 1020
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: In the Matter of the Marriage of CHARLES McBETH, Appellant, and RUBY E. KETSCHAU, Respondent.

10 Wn.App.2d 1020

In the Matter of the Marriage of CHARLES McBETH, Appellant, and RUBY E. KETSCHAU, Respondent.

No. 51076-6-II

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2

September 17, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

CRUSER, J.

In the marriage dissolution of Charles McBeth and Ruby Ketschau, the trial court accepted Ketschau's claim that prior to the marriage, she and McBeth had been in an earlier committed intimate relationship (CIR). Based on that finding, the trial court characterized McBeth's premarital pension plan earnings as community property, ^[1] which McBeth contends should have been characterized as separate property. McBeth appeals arguing that the trial court erred by failing to consider and accept his statute of limitations defense to the existence of a CIR. McBeth also argues that the trial court violated the appearance of fairness doctrine and requests remand to a different judge.

We hold that the trial court erred in failing to accept McBeth's statute of limitations defense and in failing to dismiss Ketschau's CIR claim as time barred. Therefore, we reverse the dissolution decree and remand this case to the trial court to characterize McBeth's premarital pension earnings as separate property and to reconsider the distribution of property.

Further we hold that the trial court did not demonstrate bias against McBeth. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS

McBeth and Ketschau started dating in late November 2005 and began living together in March 2006. McBeth and Ketschau married five years later on May 28, 2011. Shortly after, on November 30, 2012, McBeth and Ketschau separated. However, McBeth did not file a dissolution petition until October 2015. Ketschau responded to McBeth's petition in February 2016 and claimed the parties had been in a committed intimate relationship for six years prior to the marriage. The trial court found that the parties entered a CIR from December 2005 until they married on May 28, 2011. The trial court further found that the parties' separation date was November 30 2012, noting that their "marital community ended on November 30, 2012. The parties stopped acquiring community property and incurring community debt on this date." Clerk's Papers at 112. The trial court distributed 50 percent of McBeth's pension plan earnings during the period of December 2005 through November 2012 to Ketschau.

At trial and in his posttrial brief, McBeth argued that Ketschau's CIR theory was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. Ketschau did not respond to McBeth's statute of limitations defense, either at trial or in response to McBeth's posttrial brief. McBeth moved for reconsideration and the trial court denied the motion. McBeth appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. Committed Intimate Relationship

McBeth argues that the trial court erred when it found that the parties entered a CIR before marriage. McBeth challenges the trial court's finding that the elements of a CIR were met, and he contends that the trial court erred when it failed to consider his statute of limitations defense and dismiss Ketschau's CIR claim. As a result, McBeth contends that the trial court improperly characterized his pension plan earnings from December 2005 to May 28, 2011 as community-like property. We agree.

A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles

We review the trial court's conclusion of law relating to the existence of a CIR de novo. Whether a CIR existed between the parties presents a mixed question of law and fact. In re Marriage of Pennington, 142 Wn.2d 592, 602-03, 14 P.3d 754 (2000). Although we defer to the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact as well as to challenged findings supported by substantial evidence, we review de novo whether the trial court's legal conclusions properly follow from those findings. Id. With respect to challenged factual findings, evidence is "substantial" if it would '"persuade a fair-minded person of the declared premise.'" In re Domestic P 'ship of Walsh, 183 Wn.App. 830, 841 335 P.3d 984 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gormley v. Robertson, 120 Wn.App. 31, 38, 83 P.3d 1042 (2004)). We "neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses." In re Committed Intimate Relationship of Muridan, 3 Wn.App. 2d 44, 55, 413 P.3d 1072, review denied, 191 Wn.2d 1002 (2018).

We review a trial court's division of property following a CIR for an abuse of discretion. Walsh, 183 Wn.App. at 841. '"A trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable, adopts a position no reasonable judge would take, is based on untenable grounds, or if the judge misapplied the law.'" Muridan, 3 Wn.App. 2d at 54 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Parenting & Support of L.K, 198 Wn.App. 190, 194, 391 P.3d 490 (2016)).

A CIR "is a 'stable, marital-like relationship where both parties cohabit with knowledge that a lawful marriage between them does not exist.'" In re Meretricious Relationship of Long, 158 Wn.App. 919, 925, 244 P.3d 26 (2010) (quoting Connell v. Francisco, 127 Wn.2d 339, 346, 898 P.2d 831 (1995)). Based on equitable principles, a CIR protects the interests of unmarried parties who acquire property during their relationships by preventing the unjust enrichment of one at the expense of the other when the relationship ends. Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 602.

Factors establishing a committed intimate relationship include, but are not limited to: (1) continuous cohabitation, (2) duration of the relationship, (3) purpose of the relationship, (4) pooling resources and services for joint projects, and (5) the intent of the parties. Connell, 127 Wn.2d at 346 (citing In re Marriage of Lindsey, 101 Wn.2d 299, 304, 678 P.2d 328 (1984)). A relationship that develops into marriage was not necessarily preceded by a committed intimate relationship. Parties who do not continuously cohabitate prior to marriage, for example, do not form a committed intimate relationship. Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 603.

Due to the doctrine's equitable underpinnings, a claim for property distribution based on a CIR is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. RCW 4.16.080(3); In re Matter of Kelly, 170 Wn.App. 722, 735, 737, 287 P.3d 12 (2012). Courts apply the CIR doctrine "only to cases after the parties have ended their relationship, either by choice or death." Id. at 734.

C. Statute of Limitations

McBeth argues that Ketschau's claim was untimely because the statute of limitations began to run when the trial court found the parties separated on November 30, 2012, and Ketschau did not make her claim for property under the committed intimate relationship doctrine until over three years later, in February 2016. The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, and the moving party carries the burden of proof.^[2] CR 8(c); Haslund v. Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 620-21, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976). Whether a statute of limitations applies to bar an otherwise valid claim is a question of law, but the trier of fact must decide the underlying factual questions unless the facts are only susceptible to one reasonable interpretation. Goodman v. Goodman, 128 Wn.2d 366, 373, 907 P.2d 290 (1995).

1. The Statute of Limitations on a CIR Action Accrues When the Parties Separate

Our first task is to determine when the statute of limitations on Ketschau's CIR claim began to run. Division Three of this court held that because courts apply the CIR doctrine "to cases after the parties have ended their relationship, either by choice or death," a CIR action begins to accrue when the CIR ends. Kelly, 170 Wn.App. at 734. However, unlike this case, the parties in Kelly entered a CIR but did not marry. Id. at 727. Washington courts have not resolved when the statute of limitations begins to run on a CIR claim when a CIR is followed by a marriage. Therefore, we are presented with the question of when a committed intimate relationship "ends" for parties who marry.

'"A cause of action accrues when a party has the right to seek relief in the courts'" or when '"the plaintiff also knows or should knowthe relevant facts ... to establish a legal cause of action.'" Kelly, 170 Wn.App. at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crownover v. Dep't of Transp., 165 Wn.App. 131, 141, 265 P.3d 971 (2011)); Gilbert v. Sacred Heart Med. Or., 127 Wn.2d 370, 381, 900 P.2d 552 (1995)). The purpose of the CIR doctrine is to equitably dispose of property when parties go their separate ways. Kelly, 170 Wn.App. at 734; Pennington, 142 Wn.2d at 602. Unmarried parties to a committed intimate relationship who later marry have no reason to bring an equitable claim for property distribution because they have not separated and remain committed to their relationship. Nor do they have an interest during the marriage in distributing property acquired during the premarital relationship. Additionally, a party would only know or have reason to know of the relevant facts to establish a CIR claim once one party seeks to terminate the marriage.

We hold that when parties to a committed intimate relationship marry, the statute of limitations for a property distribution claim based on the committed intimate relationship doctrine begins to run on the date the parties separate and the marital community ends.^[3]

2. Ketschau 's CIR Claim Is Barred Under the Statute of Limitations

Here the underlying factual questions are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation. Goodman, 128 Wn.2d at 373. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that McBeth and Ketschau separated, and their marital community ended, no later than November 30, 2012. McBeth filed a dissolution of marriage petition in October 2015. Ketschau first pleaded her claim for property...