In re Marriage of Bloomquist
| Decision Date | 08 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 21-1631 |
| Parties | IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF SUE A. BLOOMQUIST AND ROBERT L. BLOOMQUIST Upon the Petition of SUE A. BLOOMQUIST, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning ROBERT L. BLOOMQUIST, Respondent-Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie Vaudt Judge. Robert Bloomquist appeals from a dissolution decree. AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Matthew G. Sease of Sease &Wadding, Des Moines, and Roger J. Hudson II of R.J. Hudson Law Firm, P.C., West Des Moines for appellant.
Kent A. Balduchi of Balduchi Law Office, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
After forty-two years, Robert and Sue Bloomquist's marriage was dissolved by the district court's decree following trial. Robert appeals. He claims the property division was inequitable, he was awarded insufficient spousal support, and he should have been awarded trial attorney fees. He also seeks appellate attorney fees. Sue responds by asking that the decree remain unchanged and that she be awarded appellate attorney fees.
The parties married in 1978. They have two adult children. At the time of trial, Robert was seventy-one years old and had been retired for about ten years. Sue was sixty-three years old, and she was still working for her employer of forty-two years. Both parties had accumulated retirement funds as well as an assortment of other assets and debts.
Following trial, the district court divided the parties' property. As part of the division, Robert received the house and responsibility for the mortgage indebtedness, with the direction that he remove Sue from the mortgage indebtedness or sell the house. The court also awarded each party the retirement funds in that party's name. However, the court also ordered that $100,000 of Sue's retirement accounts be transferred from Sue's accounts to Robert via a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) and that her pension be divided equally using the Benson formula. See In re Marriage of Benson, 545 N.W.2d 252, 255-56 (Iowa 1996) ().
The court also ordered Sue to pay Robert spousal support of $1000 per month "until Sue retires in two years or until her death, or until Robert remarries, whichever event first occurs." The court declined to order either party to pay any of the other party's attorney fees.
As noted, Robert raises three issues on appeal. We address each in turn.
We review dissolution-of-marriage proceedings de novo. In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671, 676 (Iowa 2013). We examine the record and determine anew property distribution. Id. We give weight to, but are not bound by, the findings of the district court and only disturb its ruling when it fails to achieve equity. Id.
Like property division, we review issues of spousal support de novo, but "we accord the trial court considerable latitude." In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 406 (Iowa 2015) (quoting In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005)). We only disturb the district court's ruling if it fails to do equity. Id.
We review the decision to award or not award trial attorney fees in dissolution actions for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 255 (Iowa 2006).
In Iowa, property is to be divided equitably at the time of dissolution. In re Marriage of Miller, 966 N.W.2d 630, 635 (Iowa 2021). We determine what is equitable by considering the factors listed in Iowa Code section 598.21(5) (2020). Id. Equitable division of property does not require property be divided equally, although equal division is often most equitable. In re Marriage of Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d 696, 703-04 (Iowa 2013).
A key property-division issue in this case surrounds the value of Robert's individual retirement account (IRA). There were competing themes on this issue at trial. Robert's theme was that the IRA should be valued at the balance remaining at the time of trial, which was just over $11,000. Sue's theme was that the IRA should be valued at the balance the account had when Robert retired, although she did not know what that balance was. The district court seemed to accept Sue's theme by rejecting Robert's, but, in doing so, the court did not make specific findings of value or how the value affected the property division. On appeal, Robert contends the property division is inequitable because the total marital net worth of the parties was not equally valued when the IRA is valued at its time-of-trial balance. Before getting to the merits of this issue, we first address a discovery issue because it is intertwined with the property-division issue.
Fairly early in the case, Sue sent discovery requests to Robert asking for documentation about various assets and debts, including his retirement accounts. As to the retirement account documentation, Robert responded, through counsel,[2]that the answer would be supplemented when the documents were received. Robert never fully complied with his obligation to provide that documentation.
Sue never filed a motion to compel, a motion for sanctions, or any other motion seeking court assistance in gaining compliance with the discovery requests. Instead, after the close of the clerk's office on the night before trial, she filed a motion seeking to preclude Robert from introducing any evidence on any issue covered by her discovery requests that were not fully answered. Although captioned as a motion in limine and objection to trial exhibits, the body of the motion mentioned sanctions as a basis for granting the requested relief.[3]
The court did not grant Sue's motion and received all testimony and exhibits offered at trial subject to Sue's objections that repeated those made in her motion. The evidence, admitted subject to Sue's objection, included testimony and exhibits about Robert's IRA value.
While not expressly excluding any evidence or imposing any sanctions, the court instead found Robert not credible because of his failure to provide discovery documentation. It is not clear how this impacted the court's valuation of assets as it relates to property division, as specific findings about values based on the credibility findings were not made.
On our de novo review, we find the district court's division of property to be inequitable for a number of reasons. First, as noted, the court did not determine a specific value for Robert's IRA different from the undisputed balance at the time of trial. Without a finding of an alternative value and an explanation of how it impacted the property division there is no support for the unequal division ordered by the court. See In re Marriage of Keener, 728 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Iowa 2007) ().
Second, this is not a credibility issue wherein one party is attempting to hide the real value of an asset. Cf. In re Marriage of Williams, 421 N.W.2d 160, 167 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (). There was no dispute that Robert continued to pay his share of the marital expenses, including a significant mortgage payment, and his only meaningful sources of funds were his Social Security benefits and IRA. Sue knew Robert was using his IRA to pay household bills pursuant to their longstanding agreement for division of household bills. After ten years of retirement, it is not surprising that his IRA balance would continue to fall as he tapped it to pay living expenses, and, while Robert's tax returns show a bump up in his IRA distributions during the 2020 tax year (the year the dissolution proceeding was started), it is not a bump that would be unexpected given the split between the parties and the hiring of attorneys.
Third the district court essentially adopted Sue's insinuation that Robert dissipated assets. The dissipation doctrine applies to situations in which a spouse, during the period of separation, engages in conduct that results in the loss of property otherwise subject to division. Kimbro, 826 N.W.2d at 700-01. The evidence does not support a claim of dissipation. To begin with, there is no evidence that Robert made significant expenditures during the period of separation. There is only evidence of expenditures made since Robert retired ten years ago, not since the parties separated. The dissipation doctrine does not apply to these regular pre-separation expenses. Id. (). We imagine that many spouses-whether still married or going through a divorce-are disgruntled with their partners' spending habits, but, if they divorce, we generally do not look back to try to account for past spending. Instead, we simply divide up what's left because marriage does not come with a ledger. See Miller, 966 N.W.2d at 633 ( ); In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 103-04 (Iowa 2007) ( ; In re Marriage of Briggs, 225 N.W.2d 911, 913 (Iowa 1975) ("Husband and wife need not, during happy days, keep a ledger to prove his or her economic value should the marriage later founder."). Robert's purchase...
To continue reading
Request your trial