In re Martin M.

Decision Date21 December 2009
Docket NumberNo. 2 CA-JV 2009-0080.,No. 2 CA-JV 2009-0081.,2 CA-JV 2009-0080.,2 CA-JV 2009-0081.
Citation221 P.3d 1058
PartiesIn re MARTIN M. and Rene N.
CourtArizona Court of Appeals

Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By James M. Coughlin, Tucson, Attorneys for State.

Robert J. Hirsh, Pima County Public Defender By Julie M. Levitt-Guren, Tucson, Attorneys for Minors.

OPINION

HOWARD, Chief Judge.

¶ 1 In these consolidated appeals by the State of Arizona, we are asked to decide whether A.R.S. § 28-3320 requires the juvenile court to notify the Motor Vehicle Division of the Arizona Department of Transportation (MVD)1 when a minor has been adjudicated delinquent based on the offense of possession of marijuana, a class one misdemeanor, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3405(A)(1), or whether the court may, in the exercise of its discretion, choose not to notify MVD of the adjudication. We hold the juvenile court is not required to notify MVD under these circumstances. Additionally, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in these two delinquency proceedings in choosing not to notify MVD that the court had adjudicated the minors delinquent after finding they had committed the offenses of possession of marijuana.

Background

¶ 2 Martin M., now fifteen years old, was adjudicated delinquent after he admitted possessing marijuana in April 2009. Rene N., also fifteen years old, was adjudicated delinquent after he admitted possessing marijuana on two occasions in May 2009. It is undisputed that no motor vehicles were involved during the commission of these offenses.

¶ 3 At Martin's disposition hearing, the state asked the court to send a copy of the disposition minute entry to MVD, arguing that § 28-3320 requires the juvenile court to notify MVD if a juvenile has been adjudicated based on the commission of any offense specified in the statute, which includes possession of marijuana. Martin opposed the request and asked the court to take into account that the offense had not involved the use of a motor vehicle. He noted further that he was not yet old enough to drive. The court declined to send the adjudication record to MVD, noting that Martin's prior referrals to the juvenile court had not been drug-related and that the current offense was not a driving offense. Similarly, at Rene's disposition hearing one day later, the state asked the same judge to notify MVD of Rene's adjudication. Rene objected on the ground that the offense was not driving-related, and the court denied the state's request. The juvenile court placed both minors on six months' probation.

Juvenile Court's Obligation to Report

¶ 4 The state contends the juvenile court erred in both cases because it was required to transmit to MVD the minors' adjudication records. Relying on § 28-3320(A)(6), the state argues that the legislature intended that the driver licenses of minors who have been adjudicated delinquent based on possession of marijuana be suspended or refused. We review a juvenile court's disposition order for an abuse of discretion. In re Themika M., 206 Ariz. 553, ¶ 5, 81 P.3d 344, 345 (App.2003). "An abuse of discretion includes an error of law." State v. Gonzalez, 216 Ariz. 11, ¶ 2, 162 P.3d 650, 651 (App.2007), quoting State v. Rubiano, 214 Ariz. 184, ¶ 5, 150 P.3d 271, 272 (App.2007). And, we review de novo questions of law, such as the meaning and interpretation of statutes. In re Aaron M., 204 Ariz. 152, ¶ 2, 61 P.3d 34, 35 (App.2003).

¶ 5 Section 28-3320 pertains generally to the suspension of the driver license of persons under the age of eighteen. The statute specifies the circumstances that require MVD to suspend or refuse to issue a driver license. Section 28-3320(A)(6) provides, "on receiving the record of . . . conviction for a violation of any provision of title 13, chapter 34 [drug offenses]," MVD must immediately suspend or refuse to issue a juvenile's driver license until the juvenile reaches the age of eighteen. Section 28-3320(E) includes juvenile adjudications as "convictions" for purposes of that statute.

¶ 6 Our primary purpose in interpreting a statute is to determine and effectuate the legislature's intent, mindful that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the statute. See Bobby G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 219 Ariz. 506, ¶ 9, 200 P.3d 1003, 1006 (App.2008); see also Washburn v. Pima County, 206 Ariz. 571, ¶ 9, 81 P.3d 1030, 1034 (App.2003) (central goal in interpreting statutes "is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent"). The legislature's intent with respect to § 28-3320(A)(6) is to discourage juveniles from using illegal substances by exposing them to the loss of their driving privileges, even when the offense may be completely unrelated to driving. Cf. In re Brandon H., 195 Ariz. 387, ¶¶ 10, 12, 988 P.2d 619, 621 (App. 1999) (legislative intent of § 28-3320(A)(3) to discourage juveniles from committing crimes through potential loss of driving privileges, even when offense not driving-related); In re Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JV-114428, 160 Ariz. 90, 93, 770 P.2d 394, 397 (App.1989) (court held, for different statute, legislature could have intended to deter juvenile drug abuse through loss of driving privileges even when offense not driving-related).

¶ 7 But § 28-3320 mandates only what MVD must do when it is informed of an adjudication. Nothing in § 28-3320 requires the juvenile court to transmit to MVD the record pertaining to the delinquency adjudication of a minor that was based on the offenses Martin and Rene admitted here. Nor are we aware of any other statute that imposes this obligation on the juvenile court. "It is a universal rule that courts will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters not falling within its express provisions." Antonio P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 402, ¶ 13, 187 P.3d 1115, 1118 (App.2008), quoting State ex rel. Morrison v. Anway, 87 Ariz. 206, 209, 349 P.2d 774, 776 (1960).

¶ 8 Had the legislature intended to require the juvenile court to transmit to MVD the record in all delinquency adjudications, it readily could have done so. Cf. Schuck & Sons Constr. v. Indus. Comm'n, 213 Ariz. 74, ¶ 26, 138 P.3d 1201, 1207 (App.2006); see also Champlin v. Sargeant, 192 Ariz. 371, ¶ 16, 965 P.2d 763, 766 (1998) (applying doctrine of "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," meaning expression of one item implies exclusion of others). Indeed, the legislature has so provided in other circumstances. Section 28-3305, A.R.S., which is entitled, "Court action on conviction," specifies the court's obligations when a person has been convicted of an offense that requires the mandatory revocation of that person's driver license. The statute provides, in relevant part, "the court that ordered the conviction or judgment shall . . . [f]orward a record of the conviction or judgment to" MVD. § 28-3305(A)(3). The legislature did not include a similar requirement in § 28-3320. Section 28-3304, A.R.S., a companion to § 28-3305, instructs the MVD to revoke the license of certain drivers "on receipt" of a forwarded record of conviction for the enumerated offenses. It uses much of the language in § 28-3320 to provide this direction to MVD. See § 28-3304. It is noteworthy, therefore, that there is no companion statute to § 28-3320 instructing the courts to act. At oral argument, the state insisted that the discretionary language in §§ 28-3320(A)(7) and (B) — the MVD must act "if ordered by the court" — demonstrates the legislature's intent to mandate action in the other sections of the statute. However, the legislature's clearly distinct instructions to the MVD in § 28-3304 and to the courts in § 28-3305 undermine the state's attempt to draw this distinction.

¶ 9 Furthermore, as we made clear in Gonzalez, we cannot rewrite a statute under the guise of divining legislative intent. 216 Ariz. 11, ¶ 10, 162 P.3d at 653.

But it is not within either the trial court's or this court's authority to amend a statute to correct what appears to have been legislative oversight. See State v. Hunter, 137 Ariz. 234, 239-40, 669 P.2d 1011, 1016-17 (App.1983) (refusing to correct legislative oversight in sentencing enhancement statute). Rather, it is the legislature's place to correct any such oversight. See id. at 240, 669 P.2d at 1017; see also State v. Patchin, 125 Ariz. 501, 502, 610 P.2d 1062, 1063 (App.1980) ("[T]his court is not at liberty to rewrite the statute under the guise of judicial interpretation.").

Id. (citation omitted). We think this principle applies with equal force in the juvenile disposition context. Whether the absence of the same requirement in § 28-3320 that exists in § 28-3305 was intentional or an oversight, we will not write it into the statute.

¶ 10 Finally, the legislature has given the juvenile court considerable discretion in choosing the appropriate disposition for each juvenile adjudicated delinquent. See A.R.S. § 8-341. If the legislature had intended to limit or eliminate the court's discretion, we presume it would have done so expressly. Cf. Schuck & Sons Constr., 213 Ariz. 74, ¶ 26, 138 P.3d at 1207. And it is still free to do so. See id.

¶ 11 The state relies on In re Hillary C., 221 Ariz. 78, 210 P.3d 1249 (App.2009), to support its argument that the juvenile court was required to forward to MVD the records of the delinquency adjudications in these cases. But Hillary C. actually illustrates that when the legislature wants to impose such an obligation on the courts, it does so clearly and unambiguously. Id.

¶ 12 As we noted in Hillary C., § 28-3305 and § 28-1559, A.R.S., read together, require the juvenile court to notify MVD when a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent for violating former A.R.S. § 4-244(33),2 which prohibits a person under the age of twenty-one from "driv[ing] or be[ing] in physical control of a motor vehicle" with alcohol in his or her system. Id. ¶¶ 11-14. As we stated, "[l]ike ...

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