Ariz. City Sanitary Dist. v. Olson

• Decision Date: 16 April 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2 CA-SA 2010-0016.,2 CA-SA 2010-0016.
• Citation: 230 P.3d 713,224 Ariz. 330
• Parties: ARIZONA CITY SANITARY DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, Petitioner,v.Hon. Robert Carter OLSON, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pinal, Respondent,andPinal County, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; Pinal County Board of Supervisors, a body politic; Pete Rios, Bryan Martyn and David Snider, in their capacities as members of the Pinal County Board of Supervisors; Pinal County Elections Department, a department of Pinal County; Steve Kizer, in his official capacity as the Director of the Pinal County Elections Department; Laura Dean-Lytle, in her official capacity as the Pinal County Recorder; ACSDR2, a political action committee; and William Miller, Richard Autry and Joanne McKenzie, in their official capacities as directors of the Arizona City Sanitary District, Real Parties in Interest.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

224 Ariz. 330

230 P.3d 713

ARIZONA CITY SANITARY DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, Petitioner,v. Hon. Robert Carter OLSON, Judge of the Superior Court of the State of Arizona, in and for the County of Pinal, Respondent,andPinal County, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona; Pinal County Board of Supervisors, a body politic; Pete Rios, Bryan Martyn and David Snider, in their capacities as members of the Pinal County Board of Supervisors; Pinal County Elections Department, a department of Pinal County; Steve Kizer, in his official capacity as the Director of the Pinal County Elections Department; Laura Dean-Lytle, in her official capacity as the Pinal County Recorder; ACSDR2, a political action committee; and William Miller, Richard Autry and Joanne McKenzie, in their official capacities as directors of the Arizona City Sanitary District, Real Parties in Interest.

No. 2 CA-SA 2010-0016.

Court of Appeals of Arizona,

Division 2, Department A.

April 16, 2010.

Law Offices of Curtis, Goodwin, Sullivan, Udall & Schwab, P.L.C. By William P. Sullivan, Kelly Y. Schwab, and Michelle Swann, Phoenix, Attorneys for Petitioner.

James P. Walsh, Pinal County Attorney By Chris M. Roll and Joe A. Albo, Florence, Attorneys for Pinal County Real Parties in Interest.

McCarville Law Offices, P.L.C. By Thomas L. Schoaf and Thomas A. McCarville, Litchfield Park, Arizona, Attorneys for Real Party in Interest ACSDR2.

Francis J. Slavin, P.C. By Francis J. Slavin and Daniel J. Slavin, Phoenix, Attorneys for Real Parties in Interest William Miller, Richard Autry, and Joanne McKenzie.

OPINION

ESPINOSA, Presiding Judge.

¶ 1 This special action arises from a complaint filed by petitioner Arizona City Sanitary District (the District) challenging Pinal County's acceptance of petitions for a second election to recall three members of the District's Board of Directors who had been the subject of a previous, unsuccessful recall election in May 2009. We are asked to decide whether there must be a finding that the first recall election was valid and had satisfied the relevant requirements of Title 19, A.R.S., before a party seeking a subsequent recall election of the same directors may be required to pay the cost of the first one, as required by article VIII, part 1, § 5 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 19-202(B). We accepted jurisdiction of the District's special action and granted relief on March 31, 2010, with a decision to follow. This is that decision.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 The relevant facts are undisputed. In 2008, the Arizona City Sanitary District Recall Committee (the Recall Committee), a political action committee, filed recall petitions against District directors Joanne McKenzie, William Miller, and Richard Autry. The District called a special recall election, which was held on May 19, 2009, and all three Directors were retained. Real party in interest Pinal County Board of Supervisors approved the canvass of the District's recall election on June 4, 2009. The District incurred and paid election costs of at least $10,370. The validity of the election was never challenged.

¶ 3 At the end of 2009, the Recall Committee sought to file an application for petitions to conduct a second election to recall the same directors. The Pinal County Elections Department informed the Recall Committee that § 19-202(B) required the Committee to pay the cost of the May 2009 recall election when it filed the application for petitions to recall the same Directors. The Recall Committee asked the interim director of the Elections Department to find the 2008 petitions had been defective, the election therefore invalid, and the Recall Committee consequently exempted from paying the cost of the 2009 election, but the director refused. The Pinal County Attorney's office subsequently issued a memorandum opining that the May 2009 election improperly had been called by the District rather than by the Pinal County Board of Supervisors and that “it would not be in the interest of justice, free and open elections or the interest of the public to require the payment of the costs of the first election by petitioners associated with a second recall petition.” The petitions were processed and the Pinal County Board of Supervisors ordered the special election, which has been called for May 18, 2010.

¶ 4 After the County refused the District's request either to direct the Recall Committee to pay to the District the cost of the May 2009 election or to suspend the processing of the recall petitions until that occurred, the District filed the underlying complaint. The County and Recall Committee each filed counterclaims seeking a declaration that the first election had been invalid and that the Recall Committee is not required under Arizona law to reimburse the District for the cost of that election before it may petition for a second recall election. District directors McKenzie, Miller, and Autry filed a separate complaint contesting the May 2010 recall election. The parties filed motions for summary judgment, which the respondent judge denied after a hearing, finding there existed material issues of fact “as to whether the prior recall petition and election satisfied the requirement of Title 19” and setting a trial on that issue. The District sought special action relief in this court; we granted the request to stay the trial, accepted special action jurisdiction, and granted relief.

SPECIAL ACTION JURISDICTION

¶ 5 “It is well settled that a denial of a motion for summary judgment is a nonappealable, interlocutory order that may be reviewed only by special action.” Sonoran Desert Investigations, Inc. v. Miller, 213 Ariz. 274, ¶ 2, 141 P.3d 754, 756 (App.2006); see also Ariz. R.P. Spec. Actions 1 (special action review appropriate when no equally plain, speedy, or adequate remedy available by appeal). This court will accept special action jurisdiction of the denial of a motion for summary judgment, however, “only in exceptional cases.” Sonoran Desert Investigations, Inc., 213 Ariz. 274, ¶ 2, 141 P.3d at 756; see also Citizen Publ'g v. Miller, 210 Ariz. 513, ¶¶ 7-8, 115 P.3d 107, 110 (2005); Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 302-03, 802 P.2d 1000, 1001-02 (1990). This is an election case, and the election set for May 18, 2010, is imminent; special action jurisdiction is often accepted in such circumstances, particularly when the issue is one of statewide importance. See, e.g., Citizens Clean Elections Comm'n v. Myers, 196 Ariz. 516, ¶ 1, 1 P.3d 706, 708 (2000). Additionally, it is appropriate that we accept special action jurisdiction when, as here, the issue is one of first impression and involves a question of law. ChartOne, Inc. v. Bernini, 207 Ariz. 162, ¶¶ 8-9, 83 P.3d 1103, 1107 (App.2004). For these reasons, we have accepted jurisdiction of this special action. For the reasons stated below, we have granted relief.

DISCUSSION

¶ 6 The County and the Recall Committee initially contend in their responses to the District's special action petition that the District lacked standing to file the underlying action. We disagree. The District has standing to challenge the scheduled election because, under the respondent judge's ruling, the District would be required to litigate the validity of the 2009 recall election. And, it would be required to pay for the May 2010 election without reimbursement for the 2009 election if the latter were to be found invalid. Thus, the District will suffer an injury. See Karbal v. Arizona Dep't of Rev., 215 Ariz. 114, ¶ 7, 158 P.3d 243, 245 (App.2007); see also Fernandez v. Takata Seat Belts, Inc., 210 Ariz. 138, ¶ 6, 108 P.3d 917, 919 (2005). That the District may have no interest or stake in whether its Board members are being recalled does not negate the District's standing to file the underlying complaint and challenge the respondent's ruling in this special action.

¶ 7 To decide the remaining issues before us, we must determine the meaning of essentially identical provisions of the Arizona Constitution and § 19-202. The interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions raises questions of law, which we review de novo. State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, ¶ 6, 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007). We are obliged to construe the constitution “ ‘so as to ascertain and give effect to the intent and purpose of the framers and the people who adopted it.’ ” Brewer v. Burns, 222 Ariz. 234, ¶ 26, 213 P.3d 671, 676 (2009) quoting State ex rel. Morrison v. Nabours, 79 Ariz. 240, 245, 286 P.2d 752, 755 (1955). Similarly, in ascertaining the meaning of a statute, we must determine the legislature's intent in drafting it and give effect to that intent. Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, ¶ 8, 136 P.3d 874, 876 (2006). The best indicator of such intent, whether it relates to the constitution or a statute, is the clear language of the provision based on the ordinary meaning of the terms used. See Ward v. Stevens, 86 Ariz. 222, 228, 344 P.2d 491, 495 (1959).

¶ 8 “[W]hen a constitutional provision is clear on its face and is logically capable of only one interpretation, no extrinsic matter may be shown in support of a construction which would vary its apparent meaning.” Id.; see also Cain v. Horne, 220 Ariz. 77, ¶ 10, 202 P.3d 1178, 1181 (2009) (“We do not depart from the language [of the constitution] unless the trainers' intent is unclear.”). Similarly, if a statute is unambiguous and the meaning of its terms is clear, we do not employ principles of statutory construction to determine legislative intent. See State v. Payne, 223 Ariz. 555, 225 P.3d 1131, 561 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 11, ¶ 16 (Ct.App.2009); see also Jones v. Paniagua, 221 Ariz. 441, ¶ 19 & n. 5, 212 P.3d 133, 138-39 & n. 5 (App.2009) (finding reliance on constitutional and legislative history unnecessary to interpret statutory and constitutional provisions in light of provisions' plain meaning).

¶ 9 Article VIII, part 1, § 5 of the Arizona...