In re Mejia

• Decision Date: 13 November 2018
• Docket Number: E071164
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re BENJAMIN SANDOVAL MEJIA, on Habeas Corpus.

In re BENJAMIN SANDOVAL MEJIA, on Habeas Corpus.

E071164

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

November 13, 2018

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

(Super.Ct.No. RIF1800750)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Emma C. Smith, Judge. Petition granted.

The Rodriguez Law Group and Edward Damas for Petitioner.

Michael A. Hestrin, District Attorney, Emily R. Hanks, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.

Petitioner Benjamin Sandoval Mejia challenges the validity of an amended bail order via this petition for writ of habeas corpus. In an informal response, the People concede that he is entitled to the requested relief. Given this concession, this court may grant relief without issuance of an order to show cause. (People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 740, fn. 7.) Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On February 13, 2018, Mejia was charged with sodomy by force and unlawful bodily injury upon a child under 14 years old (Pen. Code, § 269, subd. (a)(3)¹), committing a lewd and lascivious act by use of force upon a child under 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), and committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a)). The complaint also includes special allegations of kidnapping. (§ 667.61, subds. (d)(2), (e)(1).) At arraignment before Judge L. Jackson Lucky IV the same day,² bail was set at $1,055,000.00 at the People's request. A bond was issued in May 2018 and Mejia was released from jail.

He was arrested and taken into custody again in July 2018 for disobeying a court order. (§ 166, subd. (a)(4).) The People asked the court to reconsider the bail set for the original charges and increase it to "no bail" since Mejia is facing a possible sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Although the original charges had not changed, the People admitted they miscalculated the bail amount in their initial request. Based on the potential maximum sentence alone, Judge Emma C. Smith reset Mejia's bail status to no bail. At the hearing, Judge Smith emphasized that she was not considering new evidence submitted by the People or any new charges pending against Mejia.

Mejia petitioned this court for habeas corpus, contending that Judge Smith acted in excess of her authority in modifying the bail amount set by another trial judge. The People filed an informal response, conceding that Mejia is entitled to the requested relief.

DISCUSSION

Habeas corpus is the proper vehicle by which to question the legality of a bail grant or deprivation. (In re Humphrey (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1006.) We review the trial court's setting of bail de novo when, as here, the issue presents a pure question of law and no factual disputes were resolved by the trial court. (In re Webb (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 44, 48.)

While the amount of bail generally may be later increased or reduced upon a finding of good cause (§ 1289; In re Berman (1930) 105 Cal.App. 270, 271-272), the authority of a judge to reconsider the bail amount set by another judge is limited (In re Alberto (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 421, 427). When a subsequent judge is reconsidering the amount of bail set by a prior judge, the good cause required by section 1289 "must be founded on changed circumstances relating to the defendant or the proceedings, not on the conclusion that another judge in previously setting bail committed legal error." (Alberto, at p. 430.) The same factors relevant to setting bail are relevant to the changed circumstances determination and include "protection of the public (the 'primary consideration'), seriousness of the offense, previous criminal record, and probability of defendant appearing in court." (Ibid.; see § 1275)

Here, Mejia faces a maximum sentence of life without the possibility of parole if convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct in violation of subdivision (b) of section 288 and the attendant kidnapping special allegation is found true (§ 667.61, subd. (j)(1)). Under the current statutory scheme and the Superior Court of California, Riverside County, Felony and Misdemeanor Bail Schedule, Mejia's bail should have been set at the scheduled amount of "no bail" unless there was a finding of unusual circumstances with those facts set forth on the record. (§ 1275, subd. (c); Super. Ct. of Cal., County of Riverside Felony & Misdemeanor Bail Schedule³ (eff. Jan. 1, 2018), at p. 9.) The record does not include anything from the initial bail hearing. We, therefore, express no opinion about whether Judge Lucky's order complied with section 1275, subdivision (c).

We do, however, conclude that Judge Smith erred in resetting Mejia's bail based upon a presumed mistake of law in the initial order by Judge Lucky. While Judge Lucky would have been able to reconsider the original bail amount and increase it based on legal error alone, Judge Smith could not. Contrary to Mejia's assertion, that does not mean Judge Smith was without any authority to reconsider the amount of...