In re MF
| Decision Date | 12 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. SC96883.,SC96883. |
| Citation | 770 So.2d 1189 |
| Parties | In the Interest of M.F. and M.F., etc. R.F., Petitioner, v. Florida Department of Children and Families, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard C. Reinhart of Reinhart & Moreland, Bradenton, Florida, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Dyann W. Beaty, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Respondent.
We have for review In re M.F., 742 So.2d 490 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1999), wherein the district court certified conflict with Denson v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 661 So.2d 934 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), and other decisions of the Fifth District Court of Appeal. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
On May 11, 1998, the Florida Department of Children and Families ("DCF") filed in circuit court a verified shelter petition seeking to remove from L.F. her three natural children, K.F. (age 8), M.F. (age 5), and M.F. (age 3).1 The circuit court granted the petition and ordered the children placed in the grandparents' care.2 DCF filed an amended petition for dependency on July 6 alleging that the children had been subjected to abuse and neglect in their home and seeking to have them adjudicated dependent and placed in the temporary legal custody of the grandparents. DCF further alleged that the children were subject to both prospective abuse and neglect because the father, R.F., was a convicted child molester who was currently imprisoned.3 Only the father challenged the petition,4 and he challenged it only as to M.F. and M.F.5
At the hearing on the petition, the inquiry focused on DCF's allegation that the children were subject to both prospective abuse (i.e., as evidenced by the father's prior conviction for a child sex offense) and prospective neglect (i.e., as evidenced by the father's lengthy prison term).6 The court ultimately entered an order adjudicating M.F. and M.F. dependent as to the father. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that R.F. was a convicted child molester (i.e., he had committed an attempted capital sexual battery against K.F.), that R.F. was currently incarcerated for fifteen years, and that R.F. was unable to care for the children:
-The children's father is incarcerated for a conviction of attempted sexual battery by an adult on a victim under the age of twelve.[7] This crime was committed upon the child [K.F.]. [R.F.] is serving a fifteen year sentence. He is unable to care for his children.
The court concluded as follows:
-The children [M.F.] and [M.F.] are dependent having been at risk of prospective neglect and prospective abuse if placed in the father's care.
The Second District Court of Appeal focused only on the fact that R.F. had been convicted of a child sex offence and found that this conviction, standing alone, was sufficient to support the trial court's ruling. The court framed the issue narrowly:
[W]e address only the issue of whether evidence of sexual abuse of one child is sufficient evidence of abuse or neglect of a sibling to support an adjudication of dependency.
In re M.F., 742 So.2d 490, 491 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999). The court noted that conflict on this issue exists between several of the district courts of appeal:
In cases involving sexual abuse, the Third District has found the act of sexual abuse of a child sufficient in itself to establish a substantial likelihood of future abuse and neglect of a sibling. However, the Fifth District has required additional evidence of a likelihood that the parent will similarly abuse the other children.
Id. (citation omitted). The court then concluded:
In this case, the only evidence the Department of Children and Families presented to support an adjudication of dependency as to M.F. and M.F. was a copy of the Father's conviction for sexual abuse of the stepdaughter. We adopt the holding of the Third District that this evidence alone is sufficient to support an adjudication of dependency as to M.F. and M. F.
Id. (emphasis added). The court certified conflict with decisions of the Fifth District on this issue. R.F. contends that the Second and Third Districts are in error. He claims the following: The simple fact that a parent committed a sex act on a child is insufficient by itself to support a final ruling of dependency as to a different child.
In a dependency proceeding, DCF must establish its allegations by "a preponderance of the evidence."8 A court's final ruling of dependency is a mixed question of law and fact and will be sustained on review if the court applied the correct law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record.9 Competent substantial evidence is tantamount to legally sufficient evidence. The Legislature has explained that a prime purpose of the Florida Juvenile Justice Act (the "Act") is to guarantee to each child in Florida a safe and supportive home environment:
§ 39.001, Fla. Stat. (1997). Coextensive with this purpose is a second equally important goal: Preservation of the family.
§ 39.001, Fla. Stat. (1997). The severing of the parent-child bond-even temporarily-is a refuge of last resort for the child. Even though a child's home may be lacking in amenities, the alternative-i.e., removal of the child-oftentimes is more harmful to the child. The benefits of an abiding family life are weighty and well-documented. The purpose of a dependency proceeding is not to punish the offending parent but to protect and care for a child who has been neglected, abandoned, or abused. See § 39.404(2), Fla. Stat. (1997). The Act defines a dependent child as one who inter alia is at risk of imminent abuse or neglect:
§ 39.01, Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis added). "Abuse" and "neglect" are defined as follows:
§ 39.01, Fla. Stat. (1997).
While this Court has not specifically addressed whether a court can issue an order of dependency based on the abuse or neglect of a different child, we have held that a court can enter an order terminating parental rights based on such grounds:
[W]e hold that the permanent termination of a parent's rights in one child under circumstances involving abuse or neglect may serve as grounds for permanently severing the parent's rights in a different child.
Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991) (footnote omitted).10 Unlike the district court ruling in the present case, our ruling in Padgett was based not on any one particular fact but on extensive and wideranging evidence of abuse and neglect.
The narrow question posed in the present case is whether a court can base a final ruling of dependency solely on the fact that the parent committed a sex act on a different child. As noted above, the Second District Court of Appeal in the present case recognized conflict between the Third District and the Fifth District on this issue. See In re M.F., 742 So.2d at 491
. Whereas the Third District has held that such an act standing alone is sufficient to support a ruling of dependency,11 the Fifth District has held that some additional proof of risk to the current child is required.12 In the present case, the Second District agreed with the Third District and adopted that court's per se rule.
We conclude that the flexible approach taken by the Fifth District, rather than the per se rule adopted by the Second and Third Districts, is more consistent with the plain language of the Act. A simple showing by DCF that a parent committed a sex act on one child does not by itself constitute proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to the child's sibling, as required by the statute. See § 39.01(11), Fla. Stat. (1997). While the commission of such an act may be highly relevant, it is not automatically dispositive of the issue of dependency. A court instead should focus on all the circumstances surrounding the petition in each case.13
As noted above, the trial court in the present case made the following findings: R.F. had committed an attempted sexual battery on a child; the crime had been committed against K.F.; R.F. is currently serving a fifteen-year sentence; and he is unable to care for the children. While (contrary to the present district court's ruling) a copy of R.F.'s conviction standing alone would be insufficient to support this order...
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