IN RE MIGUEL A.
Citation | 990 A.2d 1216 |
Decision Date | 25 March 2010 |
Docket Number | No. 2009-63-Appeal.,2009-63-Appeal. |
Parties | In re MIGUEL A. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island |
Aaron L. Weisman, Department of Attorney General, for Petitioner.
George J. West, Esq., Providence, for Respondent.
Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, and ROBINSON, JJ.
This case came before the Supreme Court on March 3, 2010, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. The respondent, Miguel A. (Miguel or respondent), appeals from an adjudication of delinquency entered in the Family Court. The respondent makes numerous contentions on appeal. He argues: (1) that the trial justice erred by precluding two witnesses from testifying; (2) that the trial justice erred by denying his motions for judgment of acquittal; and (3) that his due process right to present a defense was violated because of the vagueness of the state's accusations against him. After reviewing the memoranda submitted by the parties and hearing counsel's arguments, we are satisfied that cause has not been shown, and thus the appeal may be decided at this time. For the reasons set forth below, we deny and dismiss the appeal, and affirm the adjudication of delinquency.
In January 2008, the Providence Police Department filed a delinquency petition with the Family Court, alleging that when Miguel was sixteen years old, he committed three offenses which, if committed by an adult, would constitute first-degree child molestation sexual assault, in violation of G.L.1956 § 11-37-8.1.1
During the delinquency hearing, the state called two witnesses. The first witness was the eight-year-old victim, Pablo,2 who testified that Miguel, whom he had known for many years, was the younger brother of Pablo's mother's ex-boyfriend, Christian. Pablo recalled that during the summer of 2007, when he was only seven years old, he and Miguel accompanied his mother and Christian to a supermarket. Miguel and Pablo stayed in the car while Pablo's mother and Christian went shopping. Pablo said that while they were in the car, Miguel forced him to perform fellatio and then told him not to tell anyone. He testified that during that summer, the same thing happened three additional times, including at Pablo's home and at Miguel's home. Pablo remembered details about some of these incidents, including what type of clothing Miguel was wearing; he also described Miguel's penis. The child testified that he was afraid to tell anyone because Miguel had told him "that something bad was going to happen * * * if I told someone." Finally, Pablo testified that he ultimately told his great-grandmother, Caroline (Caroline), about the molestation, because he was "tired of hiding it."
Caroline also testified; she described the afternoon when Pablo disclosed what Miguel did to him. She testified that she was on the telephone when Pablo came into her bedroom and told her what happened:
Caroline stated that she called the Department of Children, Youth and Families, to report the incident. She also testified that on a separate occasion, Pablo told her about other incidents of abuse by Miguel.
After the state rested, Miguel moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the charges were "lacking in specificity, and are very difficult to defend for that reason." He also argued that Pablo's testimony was vague and inconsistent with Caroline's testimony. The trial justice denied the motion, stating:
The defense proceeded with its case and attempted to call respondent's mother to the witness stand, but the state objected because the witness had not been listed in the discovery response filed in accordance with Rule 10 of the Family Court Rules of Juvenile Proceedings.3 Defense counsel proffered that Miguel's mother would testify about the background history between Miguel's family and Pablo's family, and he argued that if the witness testified, there would be no prejudice to the state's case. Defense counsel admitted that, although he had spoken to the prosecutor previously assigned to the case and had discussed the possibility of calling Miguel's mother, he had not provided written notice to the state, based on Rule 10(a). The trial justice noted that there had been a number of continuances in this case and concluded that the state would be prejudiced by having the witness testify without an opportunity to prepare for cross-examination.
Miguel also testified; he explained, by way of background, where he went to school, and where he worked. He testified that he knew Pablo because Pablo's mother and Christian had dated for a number of years, but he added that he rarely saw Pablo and was never alone with him. He testified that he had never been to the supermarket parking lot, and he denied that he forced Pablo to perform fellatio.
Defense counsel next attempted to call Miguel's psychiatrist, Dr. James Greer (Dr. Greer), as an expert witness. Because Dr. Greer was unavailable, counsel sought a continuance. Defense counsel proffered that Dr. Greer would testify that Miguel was being treated for stress and depression and that there had "never been any evidence Miguel either suffered any sexual or physical abuse or any form of abuse, or a history which suggested he has a history of inappropriate sexual behavior." Arguing that defense counsel, again, failed to provide written notice of the witness and his expected testimony, the state objected to any continuance for Dr. Greer. Additionally, the state argued that the testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 401 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.4 Defense counsel admitted that he did not provide the state's attorney with written notice about this witness or his proposed testimony. The trial justice found that defense counsel violated Rule 10 and, additionally, that Dr. Greer's testimony would be irrelevant to the issues before the court. After this exchange, Miguel rested, and did not renew his motion for judgment of acquittal.
After the two-day hearing, the trial justice found "beyond a reasonable doubt, in fact, beyond any doubt" that Miguel was delinquent on all three charges. In passing on the credibility of the witnesses, the trial justice found that Pablo "was as credible as a witness could possibly be." On October 2, 2008, Miguel was sentenced to the training school.5 Additionally, sex offender treatment and registration were made a condition of Miguel's sentence. This timely appeal followed.
This Court previously has declared that "the deferential standard of review we follow when considering an appeal from an adjudication of delinquency is to review the record to determine `whether legally competent evidence exists therein to support the findings made by the Family Court trial justice.'" In re Andrey G., 796 A.2d 452, 455-56 (R.I.2002) (quoting In re Ryan B., 739 A.2d 232, 235 (R.I.1999)). Additionally, we give great deference to the findings of fact made by the trial justice, and we will not disturb such findings unless he or she overlooked or misconceived material evidence or otherwise was clearly wrong. In re Vannarith D., 731 A.2d 685, 688-89 (R.I.1999).
Evidentiary Rulings
The respondent first challenges the trial justice's rulings precluding his mother and Dr. Greer as witnesses, based upon defense counsel's failure to comply with Rule 10.6 Rule 10(a) provides that the attorney for the state, by written request, may ask the juvenile's attorney to provide a list of witnesses expected to be called to testify on behalf of the respondent and to provide a summary of their testimony. Rule 10(c) governs the trial justice's options when a party or the party's attorney fails to comply with discovery obligations. Rule 10(c) provides:
(Emphasis added.)
It is undisputed that defense counsel failed to provide the state with an appropriate discovery response containing the names of Miguel's mother and Dr. Greer. Miguel argues on appeal, however, that the trial justice failed to find a "willful failure to comply," and thus, the witnesses should have been permitted to testify.
We are mindful that "the admissibility of evidence is placed within the sound discretion of the trial justice whose determination of admissibility will not be disturbed on review `unless a clear abuse of that discretion is apparent.'" In re Vannarith D., 731 A.2d at 689 (quoting State ex. rel. Town of Middletown v. Anthony, 713 A.2d 207,...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Doyle
...an exception to the raise-or-waive rule arises when basic constitutional rights are involved[.]" Id. at 1204 (quoting In re Miguel A. , 990 A.2d 1216, 1223 (R.I. 2010) ). For the exception to apply, "the alleged error must be more than harmless, and the exception must implicate an issue of ......
-
Hudson v. GEICO Ins. Agency, Inc.
...Court's 'raise-or-waive' rule precludes our consideration of an issue that was not raised or articulated at trial." In re Miguel A. , 990 A.2d 1216, 1223 (R.I. 2010) (citing Resendes v. Brown , 966 A.2d 1249, 1254 (R.I. 2009) ); see also Hydro–Manufacturing, Inc. v. Kayser–Roth Corp. , 640 ......
-
State v. Storey, 2009-178-C.A.
...before the trial justice and, therefore, waives his right to suggest the application of Franks v. Delaware to this Court. In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d at 1223 (articulating the raise-or-waive rule); see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) (holding tha......
-
In re B.H.
...‘whether legally competent evidence exists therein to support the findings made by the Family Court trial justice.’ ” In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d 1216, 1220 (R.I.2010) (quoting In re Andrey G., 796 A.2d 452, 456 (R.I.2002) ). In passing on the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant questi......