In re MIW

Decision Date09 November 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-FS-863.,94-FS-863.
Citation667 A.2d 573
PartiesIn re M.I.W., Appellant.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Judith A. Lovelace, Washington, DC, appointed by this court, for appellant.

Sidney R. Bixler, Assistant Corporation Counsel, with whom Garland Pinkston, Jr., Corporation Counsel at the time the brief was filed, Robert R. Rigsby, Deputy Corporation Counsel, and Rosalyn Calbert Groce, Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on the brief, for appellee.

Before STEADMAN, and REID, Associate Judges, and MACK, Senior Judge.

REID, Associate Judge:

Appellant raises four issues on appeal, whether: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to dismiss a petition against a juvenile for "social reasons;" (2) certain evidence should have been suppressed under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal after the government's opening statement; and (4) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support a finding of guilt.1 We reverse M.I.W.'s conviction on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to show that he had constructive possession of a machine gun found under the front passenger seat of the car in which he was riding.

I. FACTUAL SUMMARY

On February 23, 1994, the District of Columbia filed a juvenile Petition against M.I.W. based upon events which took place on February 22, 1994. M.I.W. was charged with: (1) unlawful possession of a machine gun in violation of D.C.Code § 22-3214(a) (1989), (2) possession and control of a firearm without a valid registration certificate for a firearm in violation of D.C.Code § 6-2311(a) (1989), and (3) possession of ammunition without a valid registration certificate for a firearm in violation of D.C.Code § 6-2361 (1989).

At approximately 10:30 P.M. on the evening of February 22, 1994, M.I.W. was in the back seat of a two-door Hyundai car which was traveling south on 6th Street, N.W. About the same time, two United States Park Police officers, Officers Neider and Richard were driving north on 6th Street, N.W. They noticed that the Hyundai did not have a front tag and had a temporary rear D.C. tag. The officers made a U-turn to stop the vehicle; the Hyundai turned onto "O" Street and pulled to the curb. Officer Neider testified that the occupants, three males, "jumped out of the vehicle." Two had been seated in the front and M.I.W. in the back of the car. Officer Neider "thought they ... were going to run." At this point M.I.W. had almost reached the front of the car. Officer Neider ordered the three "back to the vehicle" and they obeyed the command. Officer Richard testified that "the vehicle pulled quickly to the side of the road and all the occupants quickly stepped from the vehicle." He described the event as follows:

I remember it pulled very suddenly as the vehicle made a left from Sixth onto `O' and then just sort of jerked to the curb — pulled quickly to the curb and the car came to a stop very quickly. As a matter of fact, I specifically recall that all three occupants of the vehicle including Mr. W., who was a back seat passenger, were out of the car before I could get my door open and even start to get out myself — it was very quickly how fast they were out of the car.

Officer Richard confirmed that the three males returned to the vehicle upon command.

Officer Neider patted down the three occupants. He found "a fairly large amount of crack cocaine" on the driver, but nothing on M.I.W. The driver of the Hyundai was placed under arrest, and put into a police cruiser. "Larger amounts of crack cocaine ..." as well as "zip lock baggies" were found on the person who had been seated on the front passenger side of the car.

After the driver's arrest, Officer Richard searched the Hyundai. M.I.W. and the other passenger remained outside the vehicle with Officer Neider. Officer Richard searched the car while standing outside and using a flashlight to look in. He "put his head behind" the front passenger seat and saw a "SW-MAC 11 .9 millimeter machine gun." He described his discovery as follows:

I opened the door, I briefly checked the front seat area, as I put my head behind — it was like a bucket seat, head was to the rear of the bucket seat, I was standing outside the car, the very back edge of the gun — the rear storage area, that's the first thing I saw right — as I was in that position. And as I lowered my head and looked down at the seat, I saw the full weapon. The weapon — the handle was laying towards the middle of the car, the barrel was pointing towards the front end of the car ... It was probably ... a little less than an inch of the corner in the rear side area.

As Officer Richard bent over towards the back seat area, "the entire gun became visible, it was ... pretty much barrel straight forward then under the seat."

On cross-examination, Officer Richard responded to questions concerning his discovery:

Q. Now, when you first — when you're using your flashlight in there and you see — you spot some object there and see it's only sticking out about less than an inch, you tell us, is that correct?
A. Correct.
Q. So you can't tell at that point what it is, a gun or anything else, is that correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. Okay, it's only later on — oh, by the way, the front seat — passenger seat, does it move back and forth for egress and exits?
A. I believe — yes, as if to adjust it for leg room in the front? Is that what you mean?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes it does....
Q. Okay, okay now, it isn't until you bent all the way to look down underneath the seat that you notice that it's a gun, is that correct?
A. Yeah, correct, that I notice it's a — in the shape of a gun, that's correct.

At first Officer Richard thought it was a toy. He asked M.I.W. and another one of the three males whether it was real. They said, "they didn't know what it was about." He then secured the two males while his partner looked at the gun. Officer Richard returned to the car and "pulled the gun out." He stated: "Okay, what I did was I slid it out full way under the seat so it could be seen and I really was not sure how to make that weapon safe, or if in fact it was loaded at all."

By this time, a third officer had appeared on the scene. He found that the gun was loaded. The gun was tested later and proved functional. M.I.W. did not have a license to carry the gun, and there was no record of a firearm registered in his name.

At the end of the government's case, M.I.W. moved for judgment of acquittal on the ground of failure to show possession or dominion or control over the gun. The government opposed the motion on the ground that when M.I.W. walked away from the car he manifested "some consciousness of guilt." Further, the government argued, the gun had to be visible to M.I.W. since Officer Richard saw the gun while standing up and looking down, and also saw the whole gun when he bent over.

The trial court denied the motion on the following grounds:

Based on what appeared to be Mr. W.'s attempt to hastily leave a vehicle, while it was obvious that police were coming up to make some type of a stop and a court drawing an inference based on where the gun was, not only could it have been seen by Mr. W.'s — feet literally had to be touching. There's enough evidence there, if I believe it in the end to find Mr. W. guilty....

The defense then rested its case without calling any witnesses. The court found M.I.W. guilty on all of the charges set forth in the petition against him. The court explained its decision as follows:

After that car was stopped, M.I.W., for unknown reasons seemed to be beating a hasty retreat, he did stop when the police called him. He had gotten out of the back seat and for all practical purposes his feet had to be on top of that gun the way it was positioned. There was nothing covering the gun where it's appearance there would have been obliterated to M.I.W. and although there is no evidence whatsoever that M.I.W. — that this court can conclude that M.I.W. had the gun in his hand, M.I.W.'s feet were on top of that gun, he had to know it was there and the attempt to beat a retreat implies to this court that he not only had knowledge, he had an intent to control it when it was there with him. So I find him guilty, I'm satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt the Government has proved all the elements.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

M.I.W. maintains that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the charges set forth in the petition.

We review the sufficiency of the evidence "in a light most favorable to the government, giving it the benefit of all reasonable inferences." Patterson v. United States, 479 A.2d 335, 337-38 (D.C.1984) (citing Morrison v. United States, 417 A.2d 409, 412 (D.C.1980), and Hooks v. United States, 373 A.2d 909, 912 (D.C.1977)). "It is only where the government has produced no evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that this court can reverse a conviction." Gayden v. United States, 584 A.2d 578, 580 (D.C.1990) (quoting Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 371 (D.C.1979)).

Since there is nothing in the record to indicate that M.I.W. ever possessed or owned the machine gun, the government had to prove constructive possession. "Constructive possession of a weapon requires proof that a defendant (1) knew of the weapon's location; (2) had the ability to exercise dominion and control over it; and (3) intended to exercise such dominion and control." Hood v. United States, 661 A.2d 1081 (D.C.1995) and Taylor v. United States, 662 A.2d 1368 (D.C.1995). We focus on the first and third elements. Since the gun was in easy reach of M.I.W., he had the ability to exercise dominion and control over it. However, the critical questions are whether he knew of the gun's location and whether he intended to exercise dominion and control over it.

A....

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