In re Q.P.W.
| Decision Date | 12 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 475A19,475A19 |
| Citation | 855 S.E.2d 214,376 N.C. 738 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF: Q.P.W. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Mercedes O. Chut, Greensboro, for petitioner-appellee Guilford County Department of Health and Human Services.
Christopher S. Edwards, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Wendy C. Sotolongo, Parent Defender, by Annick I. Lenoir-Peek, Deputy Parent Defender, for respondent-appellant mother.
¶ 1 Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court's orders terminating her parental rights to Q.P.W. (Quentin).1 After careful review, we affirm.
¶ 2 Respondent-mother was the victim of a crime that left her pregnant at the age of thirteen. Respondent-mother was later placed in the custody of Guilford County Department of Social Services (DSS) pursuant to a juvenile dependency petition. Quentin was born to respondent-mother on 8 March 2014. Shortly after he was born, respondent-mother left Quentin in the hospital for two days without informing hospital staff that she was leaving.
¶ 3 On 20 May 2014, Quentin was adjudicated to be a dependent juvenile after the trial court found that respondent-mother was too young to provide proper care for herself and Quentin, that respondent-mother had left Quentin in the hospital, and that respondent-mother was in DSS custody herself. Respondent-mother and Quentin were placed in the same foster home and remained in a joint placement, with only brief interruptions, from May 2014 to November 2017.
¶ 4 Respondent-mother entered into a case plan with DSS on 5 June 2014. Pursuant to her case plan at that time, respondent-mother was required to attend school, complete parenting education and training, attend Quentin's medical appointments, abide by the rules of her placement to avoid disruption, and participate in individual therapy. Quentin's primary permanent plan at that time was reunification. Initially, respondent-mother engaged in her case plan by attending school, participating in therapy, participating in parent education programs, and attending medical appointments with her son.
¶ 5 However, respondent-mother also disobeyed the rules of her placements and ran away from her placements causing several disruptions to her joint placement with Quentin from 2014 to 2016. Eventually, respondent-mother refused to participate in additional parenting classes, stopped attending school, stopped participating in therapy, and continued to disrupt her placement.
¶ 6 On 2 June 2017, the trial court entered an order warning respondent-mother that her failure to comply with her case plan could result in a change to Quentin's primary permanent plan. By then, Quentin had been in over twelve placements.
¶ 7 Respondent-mother turned eighteen in November 2017 and was no longer eligible to continue placement with DSS because she was neither working nor attending school. As a result, her joint placement with Quentin was disrupted. From November 2017 through August 2018, respondent-mother had some contact with Quentin. On 10 August 2018, respondent-mother had her last visit with Quentin, and she failed to confirm a single subsequent visit as required by her case plan.
¶ 8 On 30 August 2018, DSS updated respondent-mother's case plan and identified areas for improvement including obtaining employment, improving her parenting skills, and obtaining stable housing. In October 2018, DSS identified respondent-mother's failure to address her mental health issues, her lack of stable housing, her failure to consistently visit with Quentin, her failure to comply with the recommendations from her parenting evaluation, and her failure to address her parenting deficits by completing parenting classes as barriers to achieving reunification.
¶ 9 On 16 November 2018, the trial court noted that respondent-mother had failed to comply with requests for drug screenings, was not in appropriate housing, had failed to show up to work the previous week, had not attended any of Quentin's medical appointments since the last court date, had failed to attend therapy since 1 August 2018, and she had missed 21 visits with Quentin. The trial court found that respondent-mother was not actively participating in or cooperating with her case plan and found that she was not making adequate progress.
¶ 10 On 23 January 2019, the trial court terminated respondent-mother's visits with Quentin and named several barriers to reunification including respondent-mother's failure to participate in parenting classes, complete a psychological assessment and address her mental health needs, find safe and appropriate housing, and visit Quentin consistently. The primary plan for Quentin was changed to adoption. On 24 May 2019, the trial court found that respondent-mother was still not in compliance with the housing, parenting, and substance abuse portions of her case plan, and was not making adequate progress within a reasonable period of time.
¶ 11 In April 2019 DSS petitioned the trial court to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights (TPR petition) alleging that termination was appropriate under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3), (6), and (7). A hearing on the TPR petition was held on 13 and 14 August 2019. On 16 September 2019 the trial court entered an order terminating respondent-mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3), (6), and (7) (TPR order). Respondent-mother filed a notice of appeal on 18 September 2019.
¶ 12 We have previously explained the standard of review for termination of parental rights appeals as follows:
Proceedings to terminate parental rights consist of an adjudicatory stage and a dispositional stage. At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that one or more grounds for termination exist under section 7B-1111(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes. We review a trial court's adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109 to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law. The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on appeal.
In re K.H. , 375 N.C. 610, 612, 849 S.E.2d 856 (2020) (cleaned up).
¶ 13 In this case, the trial court determined that grounds existed to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights based on neglect, willful failure to make reasonable progress, willful failure to pay a reasonable portion of her child's cost of care, dependency, and willful abandonment. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(3), (6)–(7) (2019). Respondent mother has not contested any findings of fact,2 and thus, they are binding on appeal. In re T.N.H. , 372 N.C. 403, 407, 831 S.E.2d 54 (2019) ().
¶ 14 We begin our review of the TPR order to determine whether the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusion that there were grounds to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), which provides as follows:
The parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile. No parental rights, however, shall be terminated for the sole reason that the parents are unable to care for the juvenile on account of their poverty.
¶ 15 We have previously explained that:
[t]ermination under this ground requires the trial court to perform a two-step analysis where it must determine by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence whether (1) a child has been willfully left by the parent in foster care or placement outside the home for over twelve months, and (2) the parent has not made reasonable progress under the circumstances to correct the conditions which led to the removal of the child.
In re Z.A.M. , 374 N.C. 88, 95–96, 839 S.E.2d 792 (2020).
¶ 16 First, we review whether the findings support the conclusion that Quentin had been willfully left in foster care or placement outside the home for more than twelve months. "[T]he twelve-month period begins when a child is left in foster care or placement outside the home pursuant to a court order, and ends when the motion or petition for termination of parental rights is filed." In re K.H. , 375 N.C. at 613, 849 S.E.2d 856 (quoting In re J.G.B. , 177 N.C. App. 375, 383, 628 S.E.2d 450 (2006) ). Here, DSS filed its TPR petition in April 2019. Therefore, the relevant twelve-month period is from April 2018 to April 2019.
¶ 17 The trial court made the following relevant findings of fact:
These findings demonstrate that Quentin was in foster care and was not sharing a placement with his mother beginning in December 2017—more than twelve months before DSS filed the TPR petition.
¶ 18 Respondent-mother's willfulness can be established by evidence that she possessed the ability to make reasonable progress but was unwilling to make an effort. In re Baker , 158 N.C. App. 491, 494, 581 S.E.2d 144 (2003). The following portions of finding of fact 14 are relevant to respondent-mother's willfulness:
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