In re A.R.
| Decision Date | 06 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 06-22-00065-CV |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF A.R., B.R., JR., AND B.R., CHILDREN |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Date Submitted: January 18, 2023
On Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas Trial Court No. FA-21-45542
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Based on allegations of abuse and neglect, the Department of Family and Protective Services filed a petition to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights to their children, ten-year-old Anna, nine-year-old Ben, and five-year-old Brynn.[1] The children's maternal grandmother Tanya, and her common-law husband, Aaron, intervened and asked to be named as the children's sole managing conservators. A Fannin County jury found that Mother's and Father's parental rights should be terminated and that neither Tanya nor Aaron should be named as conservators. Consequently, the trial court entered a judgment that terminated parental rights, dismissed the petition in intervention, and appointed the Department as the children's permanent managing conservator.
On appeal, Mother and Father challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's findings that (1) they knowingly placed or allowed their children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, as described by Ground D of the parental-rights termination statute; (2) they engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being, as described by Ground E;[2] and (3) termination of parental rights was in the children's best interests. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). Tanya and Aaron also filed a notice of appeal and argue in their appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant their oral motion to continue the jury trial and by denying their motion for a directed verdict.
We conclude that sufficient evidence supported the jury's Ground E findings that Mother and Father engaged in conduct or knowingly placed Anna, Ben, and Brynn with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. Because we also find that sufficient evidence supported the best-interest findings, we affirm the judgment terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights. As to the petition in intervention, we find no error in the trial court's decision to deny Tanya and Aaron's motions for a continuance and directed verdict. As a result, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
"The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional dimensions." In re E.J.Z., 547 S.W.3d 339, 343 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (quoting Horlick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985)). "Indeed, parents have a fundamental right to make decisions concerning 'the care, custody, and control of their children.'" Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). "Because the termination of parental rights implicates fundamental interests, a higher standard of proof-clear and convincing evidence-is required at trial." Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 502 (Tex. 2014)). This Court is required to "engage in an exacting review of the entire record to determine if the evidence is . . . sufficient to support the termination of parental rights." Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500). "[I]nvoluntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent." Id. (quoting In re S.K.A., 236 S.W.3d 875, 900 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, pet. denied) (quoting Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20)).
Termination of parental rights requires "clear and convincing evidence[] that the parent has engaged in at least one statutory ground for termination and that termination is in the child[ren]'s best interest." Id. (citing Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re E. N.C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Tex. 2012)). "'Clear and convincing evidence' is that 'degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.'" Id. (quoting Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007) (citing In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009)). "This standard of proof necessarily affects our review of the evidence." Id.
"In our legal sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings to determine whether the fact-finder reasonably could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the grounds for termination were proven." In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 920 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 846 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2011, no pet.)). We presume that the jury, "acting as fact-finder, resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding, if a reasonable fact-finder could do so, and disregarded evidence that the fact-finder could have reasonably disbelieved or the credibility of which reasonably could be doubted." Id. (citing In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573).
"In our review of factual sufficiency, we give due consideration to evidence the [jury] could have reasonably found to be clear and convincing." Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam)). "We consider only that evidence the fact-finder reasonably could have found to be clear and convincing and determine '"whether the evidence is such that a fact[-]finder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the . . . allegations."'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002))); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264, 266 (Tex. 2002). "If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable fact[-]finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a fact[-]finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient." Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). "'[I]n making this determination,' we must undertake 'an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the constitutional interests at stake.'" Id. (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26)). "We also recognize that the . . . fact-finder . . . is the sole arbiter of a witness' demeanor and credibility, and it may believe all, part, or none of a witness' testimony." In re A.M., No. 06-18-00012-CV, 2018 WL 3077784, at *3 (Tex. App.-Texarkana June 22, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 109).
"Despite the profound constitutional interests at stake in a proceeding to terminate parental rights, 'the rights of natural parents are not absolute; protection of the child[ren] is paramount.'" In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 920 (quoting In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 361 (Tex. 2003) (quoting In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 195 (Tex. 1994))) (citing In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 547 (Tex. 2003)). "A child's emotional and physical interests must not be sacrificed merely to preserve parental rights." Id. ().
Termination of parental rights under Ground E considers "what the parent[s] did both before and after the child was born." In re M.C., 482 S.W.3d 675, 685 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016, pet. denied) (). As a result, we examine the entire family history in our review.
Mother was fourteen when she met Father. Even though Father was twenty or twenty-one at the time, Tanya allowed Mother to visit him. Mother and Father testified that they began dating and engaged in sexual activity when Mother was just sixteen years old. While Tanya wanted to file criminal charges against Father, she decided not to after Father enrolled in the military and left town. At trial, she described Father and Mother's relationship as appropriate even though Mother was a child and Father was an adult. When Mother was eighteen, Father left the military to be with her, and Tanya allowed him to move into her home until Mother and Father found their own home. After Anna was born in 2011 and Ben was born in 2012, the couple married in 2013. Mother and Father divorced in 2021 under circumstances discussed below.
By all accounts, Father was a hard worker and the breadwinner for the family. He worked twelve hours a day in the oil fields and was gone for three weeks at a time while Mother stayed home.
The jury, however, also heard testimony of drug use by both parents. Mother testified that, while she was home taking care of their kids, Father would buy drugs that they would use together. Mother stated that Father would purchase methamphetamine and use it with her, though, more often, cocaine was his drug of choice. While Father admitted to cocaine use before the children were born and marihuana use in 2013, he denied using drugs with Mother. Even so, Father was aware that Mother struggled with a methamphetamine addiction and that she used drugs when the children were left in her care, although not in their presence. Mother testified that Father moved his cousin, who was a drug dealer, into their home and that the cousin supplied methamphetamine to them, which they all used.
The record also showed that the couple began arguing. In 2016 Father testified that Ben witnessed an incident of domestic violence. In an ...
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