In re R.J.P.

• Decision Date: 25 October 2005
• Docket Number: No. 14-04-00521-CV.,14-04-00521-CV.
• Citation: 179 S.W.3d 181
• Parties: In the Interest of R.J.P., a Child.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

179 S.W.3d 181

In the Interest of R.J.P., a Child.

No. 14-04-00521-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

October 25, 2005.

Rhonda Amkraut Pressley, Austin, for appellant.

Anita Denise Paul Williams, Shawn Russel Casey, Houston, for appellee.

Panel consists of Justices YATES, ANDERSON, and HUDSON.

PLURALITY OPINION

JOHN S. ANDERSON, Justice.

The Attorney General of Texas appeals the trial court's order modifying a prior order of child support that decreases the monthly child support obligation owed by appellee, Roosevelt P., from $420 to zero. The Attorney General contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence and considering paternity results when it modified Roosevelt's child support obligation because: (1) collateral estoppel and res judicata barred the issue of paternity from being relitigated; (2) the Uniform Parentage Act precluded Roosevelt from rebutting his presumption of paternity; and (3) the paternity results failed to meet the admissibility requirements of the Texas Family Code. We reverse and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Roosevelt married Anita in June of 1988, and they lived together as husband and wife until they separated on March 12, 1991. On July 16, 1991, four months after their separation, Anita gave birth to R.J.P. Anita and Roosevelt remained separated without court ordered child support until 1998. In April of 1998, in cause number 98-14343, the trial court signed an agreed child support order finding Roosevelt to be R.J.P.'s biological father and ordering him to pay monthly support payments of $205.

In January of 2003, as a result of Roosevelt's increased earning capacity, the Attorney General, in cause number 98-14343, sought to modify Roosevelt's monthly child support obligation from $205 to $420. After receiving notice of the requested modification, Roosevelt secured a private paternity test for himself and R.J.P. On March 18, 2003, Roosevelt received the paternity results which he claims prove he is not the biological father of R.J.P. On March 21, 2003, Roosevelt filed an original petition for divorce with the trial court under cause number 03-14736, a different cause number than the Attorney General's motion to modify. On May 19, 2003, the trial court, without receiving a request for a hearing or a response from Roosevelt to the Attorney General's motion to modify, increased Roosevelt's monthly child support obligations from $205 to $420 in accordance with the Attorney General's request.

On June 9, 2003, Roosevelt filed an amended divorce petition seeking to voluntarily terminate the parent-child relationship. Contemporaneously, Roosevelt filed a motion under cause number 98-14343 seeking to terminate child support and withholding based on his claim that he is not the biological father of R.J.P. On November 5, 2003, the trial court consolidated both cause numbers into cause number 98-14343.

At a hearing on the matter, the trial court took judicial notice of the entire contents of the files in the case, including the 1998 order establishing Roosevelt's biological paternity. Afterwards, Roosevelt sought to introduce paternity results establishing he is not the biological father of R.J.P. Over the Attorney General's objections, the trial court admitted the paternity results into evidence.¹ Contemporaneously, the trial court ordered Roosevelt, Anita, and R.J.P. to submit to a court ordered paternity test before the next hearing. In support of its order to obtain genetic testing, the trial court stated:

It think it's very important that we establish, without any doubt, for any party, Mom or Dad or your child, who her father is. There is [sic] good health reasons if she ever needs to have any sort of transplant-type stuff for us to have a bone marrow transplant, it's so important to know that a whole other family might exist to be possible donors of, both, of anything that may be needed from a health standpoint.

At the follow-up hearing, the trial court learned that Anita and R.J.P. failed to obtain the court ordered genetic test, and over objection, the trial court re-admitted the privately secured paternity results into evidence.² On February 20, 2004, the trial court granted the parties a divorce, eliminated withholding, and decreased Roosevelt's monthly child support obligation from $420 to zero without changing Roosevelt's status as R.J.P.'s father.³ To support the modification, the trial court's amended findings of fact and conclusions of law state Roosevelt "may not be the biological father of the minor child."

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, the Attorney General contends the trial court erred when it modified Roosevelt's monthly child support obligation to R.J.P. from $420 to zero because the determination was based on inadmissible paternity results. Specifically, the Attorney General contends the trial court should not have considered the paternity results because collateral estoppel and res judicata bar the issue of parentage from being relitigated because the paternity results contradict a court order almost five years earlier.

A. Standard of Review

In determining questions of child support, the trial court's primary consideration must always be the best interest of the child. Clark v. Jamison, 874 S.W.2d 312, 316 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). Trial judges have wide discretion with respect to child support. Dennis v. Smith, 962 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, pet. denied). Questions concerning the admission and exclusion of evidence are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. City of Brownsville v. Alvarado, 897 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex.1995). We will reverse only if the trial court abused its discretion by acting without reference to any guiding rules or principals or by acting arbitrarily or unreasonably. City of San Benito v. Rio Grande Valley Gas Co., 109 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex.2003); Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex.1990). A trial court has no discretion in deciding what law applies or in applying the law to the facts of the case. In re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 181 (Tex.2003) (orig.proceeding); accord In re D.S., 76 S.W.3d 512, 516 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (failing to analyze or construe law correctly constitutes abuse of discretion). We will not reverse a trial court for an erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See TEX.R.App. P. 44.1(a)(1); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex.1998).

B. Was Biological Paternity Adjudicated in an Earlier Proceeding?

Paternity, although uncontested, was an issue addressed and resolved by the trial court in the 1998 Suit Affecting the Parent Child Relationship. The agreed order establishes Roosevelt and Anita as "the biological parents" of R.J.P. and provides for child support, conservatorship, and visitation. An agreed order "is accorded the same degree of finality and binding force as a final judgment rendered at the conclusion of an adversary proceeding." McCray v. McCray, 584 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex.1979); see TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 160.637(a)(2) (Vernon 2002) (stating a determination of parentage is binding on all parties to an adjudication by a court acting under circumstances satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of Texas Family Code section 159.201). Thus, the finding within the 1998 order that Roosevelt is the biological father of R.J.P. has been adjudicated and has the binding effect of a final judgment rendered at the conclusion of an adversary proceeding.

C. Was the Adjudicated Fact Properly Challenged?

According to section 160.637(e) of the Texas Family Code, Roosevelt can only challenge the adjudicated fact of biological paternity "under the laws of this state relating to appeal, the vacating of judgments, or other judicial review." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.637(e) (Vernon 2002). Roosevelt did not file any motions with the trial court after the 1998 adjudication, did not challenge the 1998 order on appeal, and he did not file a bill of review. See TEX.R. CIV. P. 329b(d), (f). Because Roosevelt did not challenge the 1998 order adjudicating his biological paternity "under the laws of this state," we must determine whether the trial court was barred from relitigating Roosevelt's biological paternity in determining his child support obligation.

D. Was the Trial Court Barred from Relitigating Biological Paternity?

To bar an action on the basis of collateral estoppel, the movant must prove the following elements: (1) the same fact issue from the first suit is sought to be litigated in the second suit; (2) the fact issue was essential to the judgment in the first suit; and (3) the parties were cast as adversaries in the first suit. In re T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d 481, 485 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (citing Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, 962 S.W.2d 507, 521 (Tex.1998)).

The doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of biological paternity in a subsequent suit. See Dreyer v. Greene, 871 S.W.2d 697, 697-98 (Tex.1993) (holding trial court's adjudication of biological paternity within a divorce decree barred any subsequent assertion of parentage to the contrary); In re T.S.S., 61 S.W.3d at 485 (holding collateral estoppel barred father from relitigating a paternity finding in divorce decree with DNA results as a defense to paying child support); Byrd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 275 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding parents of deceased worker were barred from relitigating a paternity finding in divorce decree which found their son had fathered a son during his marriage); see also TEX. FAM.CODE ANN. § 159.315 (Vernon 2002) (providing that "[a] party whose parentage of a child has been previously determined by or under law may not plead nonparentage as a defense to a proceeding under [the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act]"); Baize v Baize, 93...