In re R.R.S.

Citation536 S.W.3d 67
Decision Date25 August 2017
Docket NumberNo. 08–16–00042–CV,08–16–00042–CV
Parties In the MATTER OF R.R.S., a Juvenile, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas

Joshua Cody Spencer, El Paso, TX, for R. R. S.

Ruben Duarte, Jo Anne Bernal, County Attorney, El Paso, TX, for The State of Texas.

Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Palafox, JJ. Rodriguez, J., dissenting

OPINION

GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice

At his adjudication hearing, Appellant R.R.S. stipulated to evidence of guilt and pled "true" to the State's petition of delinquent conduct alleging he committed aggravated sexual assault against his two younger siblings who were under fourteen years old.1 At the time of the charged offense, Appellant was also under the age of fourteen. After retaining new counsel, Appellant requested withdrawal of his stipulation and a new trial, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Appellant asserts he was denied due process as the record indicates legal and factual insufficiency to support a knowing and voluntary plea. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

The State filed a petition of delinquent conduct alleging Appellant intentionally and knowingly committed two counts of aggravated sexual assault of his twin sibling brothers in violation of section 22.021 of the Texas Penal Code. The petition described Appellant as being thirteen years old at the time of the conduct alleged, he was residing with his mother, and his father was listed as deceased. Appellant's mother requested that Appellant receive a court appointed attorney and she provided financial information to qualify. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order of appointment and scheduled a pretrial hearing.

On the day of his pretrial, Appellant appeared with his mother, maternal grandfather, and appointed attorney, and the court proceeded to an adjudication hearing. At the hearing, the State abandoned two paragraphs of the petition and the Appellant then pled true to the remaining two counts of aggravated sexual assault. The prosecutor presented and the court admitted without objection a form titled "Waiver, Stipulation and Admission" signed by Appellant and his attorney. In the stipulation, Appellant admitted the allegations of the petition, confessed that he committed the offense charged, and waived his constitutional rights. The court then ordered the El Paso County Juvenile Probation Department to prepare a pre-disposition report due prior to the later scheduleddisposition hearing. Based on the plea and the written stipulation, the court entered an order of adjudication finding that Appellant, described in the order's caption as a juvenile with a date of birth as September 3, 2001, engaged in delinquent conduct on January 1, and 17, 2015, as alleged in counts 1(a) and 2(b) of the State's petition.

A month following his plea, Appellant retained new counsel and filed a motion to withdraw stipulation and motion for new trial. The motion asserted that Appellant wanted to withdraw his stipulation and plea "to challenge the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence in a Jury Trial." At the hearing that followed, Appellant's attorney stated to the court that there were "mitigating factors that were not presented at the adjudication hearing[,]" and further explained that he was referring to information revealed in the pre-disposition report prepared for the court by Appellant's probation officer. The trial court denied Appellant's motions.

A few weeks later, the court held a disposition hearing receiving testimony from Appellant's probation officer and his mother. Additionally, the State admitted without objection the probation officer's pre-disposition report. After finding Appellant in need of rehabilitation and protection, the court placed Appellant on intensive probation and ordered treatment measures and other delineated conditions. Among other terms and conditions, Appellant's disposition included supervised contact with his siblings as described by a child safety plan, electronic monitoring, and an order to later register as a sex offender in accordance with Article 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, unless otherwise deferred. In concluding the hearing, the court advised Appellant in open court and in writing of his right to appeal both the adjudication and disposition of his case. Appellant thereafter filed this timely appeal. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(n)(1) (West Supp. 2016).

DISCUSSION

In his only issue on appeal, Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions to withdraw stipulation and for new trial on the basis that the record as a whole fails to show by legally sufficient evidence that Appellant entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. The State responds that Appellant entered his plea voluntarily and his request to withdraw his stipulation and for new trial was based solely on the impermissible ground of "buyer's remorse."

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial using an abuse of discretion standard. Webb v. State , 232 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). A trial court abuses its discretion only when it acts in an unreasonable and arbitrary manner, or when it acts without reference to any guiding principles. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007) ; Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004) ; In re C.J.H ., 79 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). That a trial judge may decide a matter within his or her discretionary authority in a different manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. In re L.R. , 67 S.W.3d 332, 339 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2001, no pet.). The trial court's ruling is presumed to be correct, and the burden rests on Appellant to establish the contrary. Jackson v. State , 139 S.W.3d 7, 13 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd).

In Texas, the juvenile justice code provides that juvenile justice courts have exclusive original jurisdiction in "all cases involving ... delinquent conduct ... by a person who was a child[.]" TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.04(a) (West Supp. 2016). A "child" is a person who is ten years old or older and under seventeen years of age. Id . § 51.02(2)(A) (West Supp. 2016). "Delinquent conduct" includes "conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates a penal law of this state or of the United States punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail[.]" Id . § 51.03(a)(1) (West Supp. 2016). A child may be found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision only after an adjudication hearing. Id . § 54.03(a) (West 2014). Texas courts must construe provisions of the juvenile justice code such that "parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights [are] recognized and enforced." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01(6) (West 2014); In re J.S.S ., 20 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2000, pet. denied).

Juvenile delinquency proceedings are "quasi-criminal" in nature and therefore criminal rules of procedure must be looked to for guidance. In re B.L.D. and B.R.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 351 (Tex. 2003). A juvenile charged by petition with delinquent conduct is guaranteed the same constitutional rights as an adult in a criminal proceeding. See In re R.A. , 346 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2009, no pet.). Under the Family Code, juvenile trials are governed by the Rules of Evidence and by Chapter 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.17 (West 2014). The adjudication of delinquency is based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id . § 54.03(f). Standards of review applicable to criminal cases also may apply to a juvenile adjudication. In re A.J.G. , 131 S.W.3d 687, 691 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).

Although juvenile proceedings are civil matters, we review the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a finding that the juvenile engaged in delinquent conduct by applying the standard applicable to challenges of the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases. In re R.R. , 420 S.W.3d 301, 303 (Tex. App.–El Paso 2013, no pet.). The relevant question is not whether there is any evidence to support a state court conviction, but whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788–89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). "[T]he Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt." Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010) ; In re J.A.G. , No. 02-10-00235-CV, 2011 WL 2436756, at *3 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth June 16, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.).

In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence under the criminal standard, we view all evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789 ; Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 612 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). The criminal standard of review is more stringent than the "no evidence" standard applicable in civil cases. In re J.S. , 35 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex. App.–Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). The juvenile adjudication proceeding is prescribed by section 54.03 of the juvenile justice code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03 (West 2014). Before a juvenile may be found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or in need of supervision, the Texas Legislature requires that a court first provide the juvenile and his parent or guardian with admonishments. Id . at § 54.03(b) (listing requirements for proper admonishments given at the beginning of an adjudication hearing). Texas courts recognize that admonishments serve an important protective function. "Admonishments to...

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3 cases
  • Turley v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas
    • March 12, 2020
    ...on the State's petition for review in State v. R.R.S. , No. 17-0819 (Tex. argued Jan. 7, 2020), reviewing In re R.R.S. , 536 S.W.3d 67, 80 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. granted), a case in which the Eighth Court of Appeals in a juvenile proceeding discussed B.W. in concluding that the trial......
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    • Supreme Court of Texas
    • March 27, 2020
    ...the defense that he could not have committed aggravated sexual assault because he could not legally "consent to sex." 536 S.W.3d 67, 80 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017). We disagree that a child's legal inability to consent to sex renders the child legally incapable of committing aggravated sexual ......
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    • Court of Appeals of Texas
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    ...to prosecute children 651 S.W.3d 5 under 14 years of age for offenses that include legal capacity to consent to sex. See In re R.R.S. , 536 S.W.3d 67, 78 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. granted). Aggravated sexual assault is a conduct-oriented, or nature-of-conduct offense. Gonzales v. State ......

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