Jackson v. State

Decision Date03 June 2004
Docket NumberNo. 2-02-446-CR.,2-02-446-CR.
Citation139 S.W.3d 7
PartiesVickie Dawn JACKSON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Appeal from the 235th District Court, Cooke County, Jerry Wayne Woodlock, J Michael B. Curtis, Wichita Falls, for Appellant.

Janelle M. Haverkamp, Dist. Atty., and Brent Hill, Asst. Dist. Atty. of Cooke County, Gainesville, for State.

PANEL A: CAYCE, C.J.; HOLMAN and GARDNER, JJ.

OPINION

ANNE GARDNER, Justice.

Appellant Vickie Dawn Jackson pleaded guilty to theft between $1,500 and $20,000, a state jail felony, and was assessed a one-year sentence in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. With the trial court's permission, Appellant raises five points on appeal concerning her guilty plea. We will affirm.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

On July 16, 2002, Appellant was charged with two counts of capital murder in Montague County, Texas.1 On July 19, 2002, Appellant was indicted in Cooke County, Texas for the state jail felony offense of theft of over $1,500 but less than $20,000. The 235th District Court of Cooke County appointed James Martin to represent Appellant in the theft case. Martin, however, did not represent Appellant in any capacity in the Montague County cases. On August 23, 2002, Appellant pleaded guilty to the Cooke County theft offense, and the court sentenced her to a one-year term of confinement in state jail. Prior to being sentenced, Appellant signed written admonishments, waivers, and a judicial confession.

Soon thereafter, Appellant's court-appointed Montague County attorneys, Bruce Martin and Michael Curtis, filed a motion for new trial in the Cooke County theft case asserting that her plea of guilty was not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that James Martin had rendered ineffective assistance in the plea proceedings. Appellant attached an affidavit to her motion for new trial alleging that, despite James Martin's knowledge of the capital murder charges, "[he] did not advise me against entering a plea of guilty," and "[he] did not advise me of the consequences that entering a guilty plea and receiving a felony theft conviction would have in regard to my pending Capital Murder case[s]." Appellant further alleged that if James Martin had advised her "that a plea of guilty and a conviction could be used against me in the Capital Murder cases, I would never have entered a plea of guilty."

James Martin also signed an affidavit, which was attached to Appellant's motion for new trial.2 He stated that he was Appellant's court-appointed attorney in the Cooke County case and that he knew "that she was the nurse accused of Capital Murder in ... Montague County, Texas." Martin alleged that he "did not advise her of the consequences that entering a guilty plea and receiving a felony theft conviction would have in regard to her Capital Murder cases." Further, Martin stated that he did not advise her against entering a plea of guilty and did not "even think about the consequences of such a plea." According to Martin's affidavit, "[h]ad [he] given real thought to such consequences, [he] should have, and would have, advised her against entering her plea of guilty in this case."

On October 29, 2002, the court conducted a hearing on the motion for new trial.3 During the hearing, Appellant subpoenaed two witnesses: James Martin and Tim Cole, the District Attorney for the judicial district that encompasses Montague County. While the clerk's record also indicates that the trial court issued a bench warrant to secure Appellant's presence at the October 29 hearing, Appellant did not testify at the hearing. Further, Appellant did not introduce either affidavit attached to her motion for new trial into evidence.

Martin testified that he knew Appellant was accused of capital murder in Montague County. Martin also testified that he did not advise Appellant of the consequences that a guilty plea in the theft case would have on her capital murder cases. Martin stated that the theft charge was a state jail felony and carried a maximum of two years' imprisonment. He said that the State's plea bargain offer was one year, which is the sentence Appellant received. Martin stated that, in his opinion, "she was probably going to be convicted one way or another of the theft charge here prior to the trial in the capital murder." Martin acknowledged that, among other consequences, a felony conviction would prohibit Appellant from filing an application for probation or community supervision in the Montague County cases.4 In hindsight, Martin testified that if he had thought about the consequences of the guilty plea, he would have advised Appellant against entering a guilty plea in the theft case.

On cross-examination, the State questioned Martin about the timing of the theft indictment and his appointment. When Martin could not remember the exact dates and said he needed to see the records, the State said it "could just skip this area" if the court would take judicial notice of "not only the specific items mentioned, but the court's entire file." The court stated, "All right. I'll take judicial notice of my file."

The State resumed its cross-examination and inquired about the scope of Martin's representation of Appellant and the nature of the theft charges against her. Martin testified that he was appointed to represent Appellant only in the theft case. Martin agreed that the evidence in the theft case was "essentially overwhelming," in that she was accused of stealing $5,000 in cash from her employer, Wal-Mart, had confessed to the police, and had led the police to the money in her home, where it was recovered. He said that Appellant repeatedly instructed him, starting at her arraignment, that she was guilty and wanted to enter a guilty plea.

Martin also agreed on cross-examination that any strategy in "chang[ing] this case from a guilty plea into a trial would have essentially been for nothing but the purpose of delay" because "[b]arring some unforeseen circumstance, [Appellant] was going to be convicted." On redirect examination, however, Martin testified that it probably would have been better "for [Appellant] to be able to file the application for probation based on the possibility and likelihood of her getting a lesser included instruction on murder in the Montague County case[s] than ... to run one year off her time on the state jail felony case."

Cole, the district attorney in Montague County, testified that Appellant was indicted on two counts of capital murder in Montague County in July 2000 before she was indicted on the theft offense in Cooke County. Cole stated that when he found out about the guilty plea and the motion for new trial in the theft case, he became concerned about how ongoing proceedings in the theft case would affect the pending capital murder cases, especially "if some appellate court should decide that [Appellant] received ineffective assistance."

Consequently, Cole made an agreement with Appellant's Montague County attorneys that he would not use Appellant's final conviction in the capital murder trials. For example, Cole stated that Appellant would not be impeached as a convicted felon should she decide to testify, and he would have "essentially treat[ed] her as a non-convicted person for purposes of that trial." Through subsequent conversations with the Montague County lawyers, Cole realized that Appellant would be unable to file an application for probation in the capital murder cases without committing perjury and that the trial court would not be bound by the non-use agreement. Cole stated that, as a result, Appellant would not be able to request probation or to voir dire the jury in the capital cases on the issue of probation, which could have been at issue if a lesser included offense of murder were submitted to the jury and the jury convicted her on that charge.

When asked whether he had an opinion concerning James Martin's representation of Appellant in the theft case, Cole said that he hesitated to call another attorney ineffective. Cole then stated, "I believe a reasonable attorney probably would not have made that plea at the time that they did it, and I certainly would not have." Cole later testified that he had never practiced as a criminal defense attorney but also stated, "I would never make a plea in any case without considering the other charges that have been filed or [are] pending against a defendant at the time they make a plea."

During cross-examination, Cole also testified that he was unaware of "the line of cases that says a lawyer doesn't have to consider anything at all except the case that's before them when they decide to plead somebody to a case." On redirect examination, Cole was asked, "And do you think that the gaining of a one-year jail sentence is really collateral to the effects that the guilty plea would have in a capital murder case?" Cole responded, "I don't think in this case that it is collateral. I think it might be in some other situations.... I think it's a very important matter in this case."

After hearing and considering all of the evidence and testimony presented, the court denied Appellant's motion for new trial. Subsequently, Appellant sought the court's permission to appeal its ruling denying her motion for new trial, and on November 13, 2002, the trial court granted Appellant's request. See TEX.R.APP. P. 25.2(a)(2)(B).

II. Points on Appeal

On appeal, Appellant challenges the denial of her motion for new trial in five interrelated points. Appellant's general contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for new trial because her guilty plea was invalid. In support of this position, Appellant asserts that her plea of guilty was not free, knowing, and voluntary because neither the trial court nor her trial counsel informed her of the...

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