In re Reiswitz
| Decision Date | 01 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 205903. |
| Citation | 236 Mich. App. 158,600 N.W.2d 135 |
| Parties | In re REISWITZ. Kathy Schuette, Appellant, v. State of Michigan, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Law Office of Jonathan P. Barstow, P.C. (by Jonathan P. Barstow), Menominee, for Kathy Schuette.
Daniel E. Hass, Prosecuting Attorney, and William G. Merkel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Menominee, for the State of Michigan.
Before: WHITBECK, P.J., and MARKMAN and O'CONNELL, JJ.
Appellant Kathy Schuette appeals by leave granted an order of the Menominee Circuit Court affirming a Menominee County Probate Court order that denied Schuette's request for a reduction in a reimbursement order. The probate court ordered Schuette to reimburse appellee State of Michigan for the cost of care and supervision during the placement of her son, Nathan Gerald Reiswitz, with the former Department of Social Services (the DSS). We affirm.
Reiswitz was born on January 29, 1978. In 1993, Reiswitz admitted his responsibility for a charge of larceny in a building, M.C.L. § 750.360; MSA 28.592. The larceny involved Reiswitz' theft of a bottle of arsenic from his high school and was coupled with indications that Reiswitz planned to put the arsenic in Schuette's coffee. At a dispositional hearing in November 1993, the probate court ordered that Reiswitz be placed in the care and supervision of the DSS. Schuette indicated that she understood she would have to pay for her son's care during this placement. The probate court ordered that reimbursement was preserved, directed Schuette to fill out a financial statement, and stated that when the statement was returned, the probate court would schedule a rate for reimbursement. Later that month, the probate court entered an order providing that Schuette pay reimbursement at the rate of $270 a week.
Schuette moved for reconsideration of this reimbursement order, contending that it had incorrectly taken into account her husband's income and that, because her husband had no legal support obligation for her son, his income should not have been considered in determining the rate of reimbursement. At the hearing, the probate court agreed that the husband's income should not have been considered and recalculated the reimbursement rate at $27 a week, a calculation with which Schuette agreed. The probate court therefore entered an amended order of reimbursement providing for payment at the rate of $27 a week.
Schuette then appealed from the amended order of reimbursement to the Menominee Circuit Court. Schuette did not dispute the rate of payment, but instead asserted that the probate court was without jurisdiction to order reimbursement for previously incurred costs once Reiswitz returned to his own home, an event that Schuette asserted would not occur until the end of the school year. Schuette further argued that it was unreasonable to order her to reimburse the state for the total cost of Reiswitz' care where the payments would extend years into the future.
The circuit court appeal was stayed pending resolution by this Court of an appeal in a separate case (also arising out of the Menominee Circuit Court) that presented the same issue. Following this Court's decision in that case, In re Brzezinski, 214 Mich.App. 652, 542 N.W.2d 871 (1995) (hereafter Brzezinski), the parties stipulated to continue the stay pending resolution of an appeal of the decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. After the Michigan Supreme Court summarily reversed this Court's decision for the reasons stated in Judge Griffin's dissent, In re Brzezinski (State of Michigan v. Brzezinski), 454 Mich. 890, 562 N.W.2d 785 (1997), Schuette apparently abandoned her first issue (which had been based on the argument that was ultimately rejected in Brzezinski), and filed a new brief raising the claim that the probate court loses jurisdiction over a child's parents (and hence the authority to continue a reimbursement order) once it loses jurisdiction over the child. Schuette claimed that the probate court had lost jurisdiction over Reiswitz when he reached the age of nineteen on January 29, 1997. Additionally, Schuette reasserted her original second argument: that reimbursement was unreasonable if it required her to continue to repay the cost of out-of-home care well into Reiswitz' adult life.
In July 1997, the circuit court heard oral argument from the parties and ruled that the probate court did have jurisdiction to enforce its reimbursement orders until the reimbursement was paid in full, even after the juvenile was no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the probate court. The circuit court did not address the second issue raised by Schuette. The circuit court entered a written order denying Schuette's request for reduced reimbursement in August, 1997.
The issues in this matter concern questions of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. Yaldo v. North Pointe Ins. Co., 457 Mich. 341, 344, 578 N.W.2d 274 (1998).
In this matter, the probate court entered the amended reimbursement order while the probate court had jurisdiction over the parties. However, the probate court has not attempted to exercise jurisdiction over either Reiswitz or Schuette since Reiswitz turned nineteen. Thus, the first issue in this matter is whether Schuette can avoid the requirements of a proper reimbursement order, entered by the probate court at a time when it had jurisdiction, because before Schuette had fully complied with that order, the probate court's statutory jurisdiction over the parties had ceased. We hold that Schuette cannot avoid the effect of a properly entered reimbursement order.
In Yaldo, id. at 346, 578 N.W.2d 274, our Supreme Court summarized the basic standards to be utilized in interpreting a statute:
The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. In determining legislative intent, we look first at the words of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction is not normally permitted. If reasonable minds can differ regarding its meaning, then judicial construction is appropriate. The Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning it plainly expressed. [Citations omitted.]
The probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction. In re Macomber, 436 Mich. 386, 389, 461 N.W.2d 671 (1990). It derives its power from statutory authority. In re Hillier Estate, 189 Mich.App. 716, 719, 473 N.W.2d 811 (1991). In this case, the probate court obtained jurisdiction over Reiswitz under M.C.L. § 712A.1; MSA 27.3178(598.1) and M.C.L. § 712A.2(a)(1); MSA 27.3178 (598.2)(a)(1) as then in effect.1 Pursuant to M.C.L. § 712A.2a(1); MSA 27.3178(598.2a)(1), this jurisdiction terminated on Reiswitz' nineteenth birthday. Accordingly, the probate court obtained ancillary jurisdiction over Schuette until that time. MCL 712A.6; MSA 27.3178(598.6). Schuette contends that the probate court's authority to compel Schuette to pay reimbursement for the cost of out-of-home care ceased when its jurisdiction over Reiswitz terminated. We regard this as an issue of first impression in this state's jurisprudence.
MCL 712A.18(2); MSA 27.3178(598.18)(2) granted the probate court the authority to order reimbursement. At the time of the proceedings below,2 the statute, in relevant part, provided:
An order of disposition placing a child in or committing a child to care outside of the child's own home and under state or court supervision shall contain a provision for the reimbursement by the child, parent, guardian, or custodian to the court for the cost of care or service. The order shall be reasonable, taking into account both the income and resources of the child, parent, guardian, or custodian. The amount may be based upon the guidelines and model schedule created under subsection (6). The reimbursement provision shall apply during the entire period the child remains in care outside of the child's own home and under state or court supervision, unless the child is in the permanent custody of the court.... Collections to cover delinquent accounts or to pay the balance due on reimbursement orders may be made after a child is released or discharged from care outside the child's own home and under state or court supervision.... In cases of delinquent accounts, the court may also enter an order to intercept state tax refunds or the federal income tax refund of a child, parent, guardian, or custodian and initiate the necessary offset proceedings in order to recover the cost of care or service. [Emphasis supplied.]
The plain language of this statute provides the probate court with the ability to order reimbursement for the expenses associated with providing care for a juvenile under court auspices outside the juvenile's home. The statute also ensures that the probate court will obtain reimbursement for the care or service of a juvenile. "[T]he purpose of this statute is to obligate parties to help shoulder the costs the state incurs during the period that a child is ordered into out-of-home placement." Brzezinski, supra at 676-677, 542 N.W.2d 871 (Griffin, P.J., dissenting). The Legislature clearly recognized that the collection of reimbursement ordered pursuant to the statute may be hampered by the inability of the obligor to pay the amount ordered and that accounts may therefore become delinquent. The Legislature, accordingly, provided for the collection of delinquent accounts, even going so far as to provide the probate court authority to intercept state and federal tax...
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...a party of a final judgment for any `reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.' " See also In re Reiswitz, 236 Mich.App. 158, 173, 600 N.W.2d 135 (1999), citing Judge Griffin's discussion of MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). Although Judge Griffin's analysis, which the Supreme Court ad......
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...help shoulder the costs the state incurs during the period that a child is ordered into out-of-home placement.'" In re Reiswitz, 236 Mich.App. 158, 165, 600 N.W.2d 135 (1999), quoting In re Brzezinski, 214 Mich.App. 652, 676-677, 542 N.W.2d 871 (1995) (Griffin, P.J., dissenting).3 Further, ......