In re Juvenile Commitment Costs

• Decision Date: 22 June 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 206560.
• Citation: 240 Mich. App. 420,613 N.W.2d 348
• Parties: In re JUVENILE COMMITMENT COSTS. People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, and County of Macomb, Intervening Appellant, v. Matthew Joseph Schumacher, Defendant, and Rodney Schumacher and Sheila Schumacher, Intervening Appellees.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

613 N.W.2d 348

240 Mich. App. 420

In re JUVENILE COMMITMENT COSTS.

People of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, and County of Macomb, Intervening Appellant, v. Matthew Joseph Schumacher, Defendant, and Rodney Schumacher and Sheila Schumacher, Intervening Appellees.

Docket No. 206560.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted January 11, 2000, at Detroit.

Decided April 4, 2000, at 9:05 a.m.

Released for Publication June 22, 2000.

Carl Marlinga, Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert J. Berlin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

Frank Krycia, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Macomb County.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Erica Weiss Marsden, Assistant Attorney General, amicus curiae, for the state of Michigan.

Before: ZAHRA, P.J., and SAAD and GAGE, JJ.

GAGE, J.

The prosecution and intervening appellant Macomb County appeal by leave granted from the circuit court's denial of reconsideration of its order relieving intervening appellees (Rodney and Sheila Schumacher) of responsibility to reimburse intervening appellant for certain costs incurred in the juvenile confinement of defendant, Matthew J. Schumacher, the Schumachers' son. We reverse and remand.

I

At the age of sixteen, defendant pleaded guilty and was convicted of unarmed robbery, M.C.L. § 750.530; MSA 28.798. The circuit court sentenced defendant as a juvenile, ordering his commitment to the former Department of Social Services (now Family Independence Agency [FIA]) for juvenile facility placement. The court further ordered that the Schumachers must "pay expenses of [defendant's] confinement as determined by the Macomb County Reimbursement Office."

After receiving a July 1997 letter from defendant's stepmother that inquired why the Schumachers remained liable for reimbursement of the costs of defendant's care, housing, and supervision when defendant had reached eighteen years of age, the circuit court sua sponte ordered that intervening appellant's reimbursement office show cause why the Schumachers remained responsible. Intervening appellant (hereinafter Macomb County, which reference also encompasses the Macomb County Reimbursement Office) argued that M.C.L. § 769.1(7); MSA 28.1072(7) provided that the Schumachers' reimbursement responsibility should continue as long as defendant remained under the circuit court's juvenile supervision, regardless of whether defendant had reached eighteen years of age, the age of majority. Macomb County further averred that the statute reflected the common-law principle that parents remained liable to support their children who have become public charges even after those children reach the age of majority. According to Macomb County, precluding the state's right to seek parental reimbursement after a child reaches the age of eighteen would adversely affect the ability to sustain juvenile programs, thus contravening the public policy favoring accountability for the utilization of juvenile services.

The circuit court interpreted M.C.L. § 769.1(7); MSA 28.1072(7) as contemplating termination of parents' reimbursement responsibilities when their children within the juvenile system reached eighteen, indicating that statutes providing for parental liability beyond this age were unconstitutional. The court therefore ordered that the Schumachers were not responsible for costs incurred by defendant's placement within the juvenile system after defendant reached eighteen years of age.

Macomb County subsequently moved for rehearing, alleging that the FIA and the State Court Administrator's Office interpreted the parents' reimbursement obligation as continuing through the time their child remained a juvenile living outside the parents' home and under court supervision. Macomb County also suggested that the circuit court's characterization of the reimbursement statute as unconstitutional was unfounded. Lastly, Macomb County argued that because M.C.L. § 769.1(7); MSA 28.1072(7) involved the state's right to parental reimbursement, not the minor child's, the age of majority statute did not apply.

The circuit court found no error with its previous ruling, providing a clearer explanation of its analysis.

Defendant Schumacher's parents are not legally "responsible for the [defendant's] support" after defendant turned 18, and therefore, they are not responsible to Macomb County under the language of M.C.L. § 769.1(7)[; MSA 28.1072(7) ] for reimbursement of costs "during the entire period [defendant] remains in care outside the juvenile's home and under court supervision" once defendant turned 18. Defendant was emancipated from his parents under M.C.L. § 722.4(2)[; MSA 25.244(4)(2) ] beginning May 15, 1996. The 18 year and 19 and 1/2 year age ceilings of M.C.L. § 722.3a[; MSA 25.244(3a)] are inconsistent with Macomb County's position that a parent shall be ordered to pay reimbursement until their child reaches age 21, and none of the circumstances articulated in M.C.L. § 722.3a(2) or (4)[; MSA 25.244(3a)(2) or (4) ] for raising the age ceiling above 18 are or were asserted by Macomb County to support their claim. The Court further notes M.C.L. § 722[.3(1); MSA 25.244(3)(1) ] provides that a court "may" order child support for a child over 18 years of age, and only after meeting specific criteria. No such order has ever entered.

Further, M.C.L. § 722.52; MSA 25.244(52), being part of the Age of Majority Act of 1971, provides that, "notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary," a person turning age 18 after January 1, 1972 is "an adult of legal age for all purposes whatsoever" except as provided by "the state constitution of 1963" and M.C.L. § 722.52(2)[; MSA 25.244(52)(2) ].

* * *

Conspicuous by its absence [within M.C.L. § 722.52(2); MSA 25.244(52)(2) ] is any reference to M.C.L. § 769.1[; MSA 28.1072]. As set forth herein, "[S]ections 722.1 to 722.6 of the Michigan Compiled Laws" do not require defendant's parents' to support him after age 18. MCL 722.52(2) [; MSA 25.244(52)(2) ] supersedes any arguable requirement under M.C.L. § 769.1(7) [; MSA 28.1072(7) ] for defendant's parents to support him through reimbursement payments beyond his reaching age 18.... M.C.L. § 722.52(2)[; MSA 25.244(52)(2) ], "notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary," now supersedes th[e] common law doctrine, providing no support for the position that M.C.L. § 769.1(7)[; MSA 28.1072(7) ] requires a parent to support their child through reimbursement after the child becomes emancipated under law.

The trial court further explained that it had not previously determined the reimbursement statute unconstitutional, but only found a procedural due process problem with Macomb County's interpretation of M.C.L. § 769.1(7); MSA 28.1072(7) because this subsection failed to furnish the Schumachers any opportunity to challenge their continuing reimbursement liability. Accordingly, the trial court denied Macomb County's motion for reconsideration.

On November 30, 1998, this Court granted the prosecution and Macomb County leave to appeal.

II

A

Appellants argue that the reimbursement statute clearly provides that parents owe a continuing reimbursement obligation as long as their juvenile child lives outside the parents' home and under court supervision. The circuit court effectively viewed a juvenile as someone who had not yet reached eighteen years of age. MCL 769.1(7); MSA 28.1072(7) states in relevant part as follows:

If a juvenile is committed under subsection (3) or (4) to an institution or agency described in the youth rehabilitation services act, 1974 PA 150, M.C.L. § 803.301 to 803.309, the written order of commitment shall contain a provision for the reimbursement to the court by the juvenile or those responsible for the juvenile's support, or both, for the cost of care or service. The amount of reimbursement ordered shall be reasonable, taking into account both the income and resources of the juvenile and those responsible for the juvenile's support.... The reimbursement provision applies during the entire period the juvenile remains in care outside the juvenile's own home and under court supervision. The court shall provide for the collection of all amounts ordered to be reimbursed, and the money collected shall be accounted for and reported to the county board of commissioners. Collections to cover delinquent accounts or to pay the balance due on reimbursement orders may be made after a juvenile is released or discharged from care outside the juvenile's own home and under court supervision.

Issues of statutory interpretation represent questions of law that we review de novo. Oakland Co. Bd. of Co. Rd. Comm'rs v. Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich. 590, 610, 575 N.W.2d 751 (1998).

The primary rule of statutory construction is to determine and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marlette Homes, Inc., 456 Mich. 511, 515, 573 N.W.2d 611 (1998). The starting point in every case involving construction of statutes is the statutory language itself. House Speaker v. State Administrative Bd., 441 Mich. 547, 567, 495 N.W.2d 539 (1993). We presume that the Legislature intended the meaning it has plainly expressed. Nation v. W. D. E. Electric Co., 454 Mich. 489, 494, 563 N.W.2d 233 (1997). When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, judicial construction or interpretation is unnecessary and therefore precluded. Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 370, 376, 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992). When reasonable minds can differ concerning the meaning of a statute, however, judicial construction is appropriate. Heinz v. Chicago Rd. Investment Co., 216 Mich.App. 289, 295, 549 N.W.2d 47 (1996). The construing court must look to the object of the statute in light of the harm it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction that will best accomplish the Legislature's purpose. Marquis v. Hartford Accident &...