In re Rylan G.
| Decision Date | 28 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. E2016-02523-COA-R3-PT,E2016-02523-COA-R3-PT |
| Parties | IN RE RYLAN G., ET AL. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Claiborne County
This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant/Mother's parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; and (3) severe child abuse. Because Appellee, Tennessee Department of Children's Services, did not meet its burden to show that it exercised reasonable efforts to assist Mother in obtaining suitable housing, we reverse the trial court's finding as to the ground of abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home. The other grounds for termination of Mother's parental rights are met by clear and convincing evidence, and there is also clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the best interests of the children. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; and Remanded
KENNY ARMSTRONG, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., and W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JJ., joined.
Jordan Chandler Long, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ariel G.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter, and W. Derek Green, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children's Services.
This case involves three minor children, Rylan G.1 (born March 2011), Myka G. (born August 2012), and Adisyn G. (born September 2013) (collectively, the "Children"). The Children's mother is Ariel G. ("Mother," or "Appellant"), and their father is Edward G. ("Father"). In February of 2014, the Tennessee Department of Children's Services ("DCS," or "Appellee") became involved with the family. On or about February 24, 2014, Adisyn was taken to the emergency room of East Tennessee Children's Hospital. She exhibited seizure-like behavior and had bruises on her scalp, forehead, and eyes. Mother and Father reported that Adisyn had accidentally hit her head on a toy; however, medical personnel examined the injuries and determined that the injuries could not have occurred in the manner reported by the parents. Dr. Marymer Perales, a forensic pediatrician, opined that the injuries were caused by trauma.
On February 27, 2014, DCS filed a petition for a restraining order against Mother and Father in the Juvenile Court of Claiborne County ("trial court"). On February 28, 2014, the trial court entered a restraining order against Father, ordering no contact between Father and the Children and removing Father from the home. The trial court's order also required that Mother allow no contact between Father and the Children. The trial court also appointed a guardian ad litem for the Children. In August or September of 2014, the Children, Mother, and Billy D. (Mother's paramour) moved into the home of the maternal grandmother. On March 23, 2015, a DCS case manager contacted Mother because Billy disclosed to police that he spanked Myka and bruised her. DCS cautioned Mother to monitor Billy's discipline of the Children.
On November 18, 2015, Mother left the Children with Billy while she was at work. When Mother returned home, she found Myka's face bruised and swollen. Mother testified that Billy told her that Myka hit her head while at a doctor's appointment earlier in the day. Mother took a photograph of Myka's injuries. The next morning, on November 19, 2015, Mother noticed that the bruising had worsened, and she took Myka to the emergency room at Claiborne County Hospital. Myka had significant bruising on her scalp, forehead, eyes, and left underarm; her face was puffy, and her left eye was swollen shut. The same morning, Myka was transferred to East Tennessee Children's Hospital for further treatment. She was diagnosed with a subgaleal hematoma and required several months of recovery to reduce the swelling on her face and scalp. Billy admitted to law enforcement that he punched Myka, and he pled guilty to aggravated child abuse and neglect.
On November 20, 2015, DCS filed a dependency and neglect petition on the ground of severe child abuse; DCS also requested an emergency protective custody order. On November 23, 2015, the trial court entered a protective custody order, finding the Children dependent and neglected due to an immediate threat to the Children's health or safety. The Children were placed in foster care.
On December 9, 2015, Mother, Father, and DCS entered into a permanency plan, which required Mother and Father to complete: (1) alcohol and drug assessments; (2) mental health assessments; (3) clinical parenting assessments; and (4) domestic violence classes. The plan also required Mother and Father to address environmental concerns to create a suitable home.
On April 14, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother and Father's parental nights.2 DCS averred the following grounds in its petition as to Mother: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial non-compliance with the permanency plan; and (3) severe child abuse. The trial court heard the petition to terminate Mother's parental rights on October 13 and 14, 2016. By order of November 30, 2016, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; and (3) severe child abuse. Mother appeals.
Mother raises four issues for review, which we restate as follows:
Under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, a parent has afundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his or her child. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Nash-Putnam v. McCloud, 921 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tenn. 1996). Thus, the state may interfere with parental rights only when a compelling interest exists. Nash-Putnam, 921 S.W.2d at 174-75 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982)). Our termination statutes identify "those situations in which the state's interest in the welfare of a child justifies interference with a parent's constitutional rights by setting forth grounds on which termination proceedings can be brought." In re W.B., Nos. M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT, M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)). A person seeking to terminate parental rights must prove both the existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination and that termination is in the child's best interest. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c); In re D.L.B., 118 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tenn. 2003); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002).
Because of the fundamental nature of the parent's rights and the grave consequences of the termination of those rights, courts must require a higher standard of proof in deciding termination cases. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769. Accordingly, both the grounds for termination and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interest must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113(c)(1); In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d at 546. Clear and convincing evidence "establishes that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable... and eliminates any serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence." In re M.J.B., 140 S.W.3d 643, 653 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Such evidence "produces in a fact-finder's mind a firm belief or conviction regarding the truth of the facts sought to be established." Id. at 653.
On appeal, we review the trial court's findings of fact "de novo on the record, with a presumption of correctness of the findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise." In re Taylor B.W., 397 S.W.3d 105, 112 (Tenn. 2013); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). We then make our "own determination regarding whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, provide clear and convincing evidence that supports all the elements of the termination claim." In re Bernard T., 319 S.W.3d 586, 596-97 (Tenn. 2010). We review the trial court's conclusions of law de novo with no presumption of correctness. In re J.C.D., 254 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
As noted above, the trial court relied on the following statutory grounds in terminating Appellant's parental rights: (1) abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; and (3) severe child abuse. Although only one ground must be proven by clear and convincing evidence in order to terminate a parent's rights, the Tennessee Supreme Court has instructed this Court toreview every ground relied upon by the trial court to terminate parental rights in order to prevent "unnecessary remands of cases." In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 251 n.14 (Tenn. 2010). Accordingly, we will review all of the foregoing grounds.
The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that Mother's parental rights should be terminated on the ground of abandonment by failure to provide a suitable home, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-113(g)(1), as defined at Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 36-1-102(1)(A)(i). In pertinent...
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