In re S.L.S.
| Decision Date | 07 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | A16-0355 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Welfare of: S.L.S., Child |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Hennepin County District Court
Lee M. Orwig, Hallberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Jean Burdorf, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith, John, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Juvenile S.L.S. pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually molesting an 11-year-old girl, and the parties agreed that the district court would stay his adjudication if he succeeded in sex-offender treatment. After S.L.S. failed the outpatienttreatment program, the district court adjudicated him delinquent and ordered him to participate in long-term residential treatment. S.L.S. appeals, challenging the validity of his plea, the adjudication and disposition, the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, and the efficacy of his counsel. Because S.L.S.'s plea was knowing and intelligent, and because the district court did not abuse its discretion by adjudicating him delinquent or denying his plea-withdrawal motion, we affirm in part. But the parties both agree, accurately, that the district court did not make the necessary findings supporting its disposition. We therefore reverse in part and remand. We decline to address S.L.S.'s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Juvenile S.L.S. pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct after an 11-year-old girl he babysat reported that he had digitally penetrated her vagina in October 2014. S.L.S.'s guilty plea followed an agreement in which S.L.S. would plead guilty to one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and under which, "if [S.L.S.] is successful at treatment . . . through the County Home School, [then] he will receive a stay of adjudication." S.L.S.'s attorney questioned S.L.S. on the record and informed him of the trial rights he would waive by pleading guilty. S.L.S. indicated that he understood his rights, had enough time to talk about the matter with his attorney, and wanted to admit to the offense. He admitted that while he was babysitting the victim, he placed her on his lap against her will, stuck his hand down her pants, engaged in skin-to-skin contact, and digitally penetrated her. But no one discussed with him the possible dispositions or consequences on the record, and the record contains no written waiver of his trial rights.
The district court entered an order continuing disposition that, among other things, indicated that S.L.S. had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his trial rights. The district court imposed conditions including that "[S.L.S.] shall fully participate in and successfully complete the County Home School Adolescent and Family Sexual Health Services (AFSHS) outpatient program." (Emphasis added.)
S.L.S. failed in treatment, and his therapist and probation officer reported this to the district court. According to the therapist, S.L.S. fell behind in assignments, did not fully participate in sessions, refused to take responsibility for his offense, saw himself as the victim, questioned whether he harmed the actual victim, and attempted to engender pity. He also disclosed other victims. His therapist opined that S.L.S. advanced only when he was pressured to do so. The clinical team decided to terminate S.L.S. from the outpatient program. The probation officer recommended his placement in the long-term residential treatment program.
The district court conducted a hearing after which it adjudicated S.L.S. delinquent. At the hearing, S.L.S.'s attorney asked for a stay of adjudication. The district court asked whether S.L.S. had anything to say, to which S.L.S.'s attorney responded, "I have spoken for him." The district court placed S.L.S. on supervised probation until February 2018 and conditioned it on his fully participating in the AFSHS long-term residential treatment program. The district court's findings expressly incorporated the county's "report dated 2/2/2016" and made additional findings "including why public safety and the best interests of the child are served by this disposition order, and how this placement meets the needs of the child." The court found that prior programming, treatment, and consequences hadfailed to render S.L.S. law-abiding, that S.L.S.'s behavior put him and others at risk, that if S.L.S.'s treatment needs continued to go unmet S.L.S. and others risked being harmed, and that those needs could not be met without residential care.
S.L.S. appeals.
S.L.S. raises numerous issues on appeal. First, he challenges that his plea was not knowing and intelligent because he was not informed of dispositional consequences and possibilities. Second, he argues that the district court violated the plea agreement by adjudicating him delinquent rather than continuing or staying adjudication. Third, he challenges the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. Fourth, he contends that the district court's order imposing out-of-home placement was not supported by sufficient findings. And fifth, he claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
S.L.S. argues that the district court should not have accepted his guilty plea and should have allowed him to withdraw it. We ordinarily review a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion, Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989), but S.L.S. did not file a motion to withdraw his plea with the district court until after he filed his notice of appeal. This court generally will not decide issues that were not first raised before the district court. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (Minn. 1996). But an offender may challenge the validity of a guilty plea for the first time on appeal if the record provides a sufficient basis for meaningful review. See State v. Anyanwu, 681 N.W.2d 411, 413 n.1 (Minn. App. 2004). The supreme court has also said defendants are"free to simply appeal directly from a judgment of conviction and contend that the record made at the time the plea was entered is inadequate" to establish a valid plea. Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). The record gives us a sufficient basis for review, so we address S.L.S.'s challenge.
S.L.S. argues that the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea because his plea was invalid. A juvenile may withdraw his guilty plea at any time if he shows "that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 8.04, subd. 2(B). A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is invalid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). To be valid a plea must be entered into intelligently, voluntarily, and accurately. State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994). Whether a guilty plea was valid is a question of law we review de novo. Lussier v. State, 821 N.W.2d 581, 588 (Minn. 2012). The defendant bears the burden to establish the invalidity of his plea. Id.
S.L.S. argues that his guilty plea was invalid because he was unaware and was not advised of the dispositional implications and consequences of his plea. Before the district court accepts a juvenile's plea, it must determine that the juvenile understands the charges against him and the factual basis, his trial rights, the court's dispositional powers and future consequences of disposition, his right to counsel, and that the juvenile freely chooses to plead guilty and harbors no claim of innocence. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 8.04, subd. 1(A)-(F). The requirement that the district court must establish the juvenile's understanding of dispositional possibilities and consequences includes the child's understanding of the court's power to place him in an institution, impose a disposition lasting until the child is19, or modify a disposition. Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 8.04, subd. 1(C). The child must also understand any potential future consequences of the disposition. Id. The district court must make this determination "under the totality of the circumstances, and based on the child's statements, whether on the record or contained in a written document signed by the child and the child's counsel[.]" Id., subd. 1. The parties apparently agree that the district court did not hear any on-the-record inquiry or receive any written waiver addressing dispositional consequences and possibilities, and the record supports their agreement.
The state urges us to overlook the district court's failure to satisfy the pre-plea requirements of rule 8.04. It asks us to recognize that failing to strictly comply with the plea-colloquy requirements of Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.01 does not invalidate an adult's guilty plea and that, by analogy, we should apply the juvenile delinquency rule with similar liberality. It identifies two supporting cases. In Doughman v. State, we reasoned that the fact that Doughman "discussed the case, the plea bargain, and other options with his attorney before entering his guilty plea raises the presumption he was informed of his rights." 351 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 1984). In State ex rel. Drysdale v. Tahash, the Minnesota Supreme Court held, "In the absence of any affirmative showing to the contrary, there is a controlling presumption that court-appointed counsel in a criminal case not only has consulted with his client, the accused, but also has advised him in good faith of his rights in entering a plea of guilty or not guilty." 278 Minn. 361, 367, 154 N.W.2d 691, 695 (1967) (quoting State ex rel....
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