In re S.M.

Decision Date26 September 2012
Docket NumberNo. 08–11–00288–CV.,08–11–00288–CV.
Citation389 S.W.3d 483
PartiesIn the Interest of S.M., a Child.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Thomas E. Stanton, El Paso, TX, for Appellant.

Patrick A. Lara, Law Office of Patrick Lara, Michael J. Shane, Gordon & Mott, P.C., Marina Chavez–Soto, El Paso, TX, Susan M. Wolfe, Office of General Counsel, Austin, TX, for Appellee.

Before McCLURE, C.J., RIVERA, and ANTCLIFF, JJ.

OPINION

ANN CRAWFORD McCLURE, Chief Justice.

In this accelerated appeal, Appellant (Raul) challenges an order terminating his parental rights to S.M. and appointing the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services as S.M.'s sole managing conservator. He brings five issues for review, four of which relate to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. The remaining issue attacks the denial of a motion for continuance. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

S.M. was born on July 16, 2009. Raul has been incarcerated all of S.M.'s life and has never met his daughter. On February 2, 2010, at approximately 3 p.m., S.M.'s mother left the infant alone in a motel room. S.M. was not quite seven months old at the time. A neighboring motel guest heard the baby crying and discovered her alone on the bed. The neighbor took her to another motel resident who knew S.M.'s mother. Around 2 a.m. on February 3, 2010, S.M.'s mother “strolled back in, intoxicated.” An altercation occurred between S.M.'s mother and the resident caring for S.M. The police were dispatched to the motel and the Department was called. The police arrested S.M.'s mother for child endangerment, and the Department caseworker placed the baby in foster care.

The following day, the Department filed its original petition for protection of a child, seeking conservatorship of S.M. and termination of the parental rights of both parents. The motion was accompanied by an affidavit from the caseworker detailing the events leading to removal. On February 5, 2010, the trial court entered temporary orders appointing the Department as temporary sole managing conservator. The mother's rights were terminated prior to trial, which was scheduled for September 20, 2011.

At trial, the Department introduced judgments from Raul's four prior convictions. Three of the convictions involved assault and one involved possession of cocaine. In May 2001, Raul pled guilty to assault of a police officer. He was placed on probation for five years, but less than seven months later, his probation was revoked for failing to meet with his probation officer as required. Raul admittedly absconded to Florida to try to get a job and to “start a new support for [his] family.” As a result of violating the terms of his probation, Raul was incarcerated for three years. He evidently was released early because on December 22, 2003, he was convicted for possession of cocaine and ordered to serve 180 days. Finally, the Department introduced evidence of two separate convictions of family violence assault causing bodily injury. Both were committed against S.M.'s mother. Raul pled guilty to the first offense and was sentenced to seventy-five days in the El Paso County Jail. He also pled guilty to the second offense and was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

At trial, Raul admitted he pled guilty to each and every offense, but claimed he was actually innocent of all charges. For example, he testified that because of his experiences with drugs, he's a good role model for S.M. and is “educated enough to tell her, Look, don't be doing this.” However, the following question and answer session followed:

Q. [BY COUNSEL FOR S.M.]: You didn't learn that after your first assault conviction?

A. [BY APPELLANT]: No, I did not learn that, because it was simply not an assault. The police officer assaulted me.

Q. Okay. You didn't learn that after your conviction for possession of cocaine or a cocaine pipe?

A. It wasn't possession of cocaine.

Q. You pled guilty to possession of cocaine?

A. I pled guilty. I was not competent in the field of law. If I was competent in the field of law, I would have won all those cases.

Q. You still didn't learn from being incarcerated, a second time, that you shouldn't do stuff against the law; correct?

A. It was—correct. Yes. I kept on doing it and doing it.

Q. But you're testifying before the Court now that you've learned your lesson now and you don't intend to commit any crime?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Even though you assaulted a family member?

A. It was not an assault. Of course, under the law, even if I raise my voice to her and she feels threatened, that is considered assault.

Q. But you physically touched her; correct?

A. Yes, I physically touched her.

Q. After being incarcerated for assault once, incarcerated for cocaine once, you still broke the law with an assault on a family member?

A. Yes.

...

Q. [BY MR. SHANE]: Sir, earlier you testified that you had pled guilty to hitting [S.M.'s mother] with your hand on her face; correct?

A. No, I did not. I pled guilty, but I did not hit her on the face. It was due to the fact the State does not—if I was to stay in jail, it's three months. It's a Class A misdemeanor. It's three months without—I need to get out, make money, so on. So I pleaded guilty.

Q. You were under oath when you pled guilty; right?

A. Yes, I pleaded guilty under oath.

Q. Just like you're under oath today?

A. Yes.

Q. So you're telling the Court, prior, when you pled guilty under oath and said you did that, you were not telling the truth?

A. I wanted to get out, yes.

Q. You were not telling the truth under oath?

A. We had a complication.

Q. Sir, it's a simple question. Did you lie under oath when you pled guilty?

A. That I hit her on the face? Yes, I lied under oath.

Q. Taking an oath really doesn't mean anything to you whether you're going to tell the truth or not?

A. (No audible response.)

Q. So under oath you lied; correct?

A. Under that day, yes. That day, I did not assault her on the face.

Q. But you lied under oath when you said you did?

A. Right. That day, yes.

Raul also testified regarding his permanency plan for S.M. “My plan for the future is to educate my child, try to keep her away from society.” He emphasized that he does not believe society is a proper role model and that he wants to teach his daughter that the system is corrupt. In fact, he wants S.M. to be brought to the prison to visit him so that she could see what the State is doing to me and other people.”

Raul acknowledged at trial that currently he has no way of supporting S.M. because he is incarcerated, but he has completed a drug course program and is up for parole. Once out of prison he plans to look for a job and to live in a one-bedroom duplex owned by his uncle. His uncle also testified. He was willing to help Raul upon release from prison. The uncle lived in a duplex with a two bedroom unit on one side and a one bedroom unit on the other. The one bedroom unit was unoccupied and Raul could stay there as long as he wanted. But it had been “kind of destroyed” by the previous tenants, and it did not have electricity, a refrigerator, or a stove.

Tanya Berry, a CPS specialist and the on-going caseworker for S.M., testified regarding the Department's plans for S.M. Adoption would be in the child's best interest. Raul's permanency plan was not feasible because:

As [Appellant], himself, testified, he's not sure if he is going to be paroled or not. So that leaves us in a situation where, if we waited around to see if he was going to be paroled, [S.M.] wouldn't reach permanency. She wouldn't reach—she would just be sitting in the system waiting for him.

Berry had been in contact with Raul's sister who is interested in adopting S.M. She is not interested in temporary placement while awaiting Raul's release from prison. The Department had not as yet performed a home study because the sister recently moved, but the investigation was ongoing. Berry also testified that background checks were performed for all the relatives in the home and none had CPS or criminal histories. Berry then explained an alternative plan in the event the child's aunt could not or did not adopt her. S.M. has been with the same foster parents since she was removed from her mother's care in February 2010 and has firmly bonded with them.

Berry described S.M. as a “very active child ... She's a lovable child. Loves to be outside. Loves to run around.” The child has a speech delay but is receiving services and is [v]ery adoptable.”

After hearing all the evidence, the trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of Raul's parental rights under subsections (E) and (Q) of Texas Family Code Section 161.001(1). The trial court also found that termination was in S.M.'s best interest as required by Texas Family Code Section 161.001(2).

DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE

We begin with Raul's third point of error involving the denial of his request for a continuance.

Standard of Review

We review the denial of a motion for continuance for an abuse of discretion. Villegas v. Carter, 711 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex.1986); see Serrano v. Ryan's Crossing Apartments, 241 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2007, pet. denied); Apodaca v. Rios, 163 S.W.3d 297, 301 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.). Absent a clear abuse of discretion, a trial court's action in granting or denying a motion for continuance will not be disturbed. Villegas, 711 S.W.2d at 626;Wilborn v. GE Marquette Medical Systems, Inc., 163 S.W.3d 264, 267 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, pet. denied). A trial court “abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear prejudicial error of law.” Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex.1985).

In determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but decide only whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules...

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