In re Sargent
| Decision Date | 23 November 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 55696-1-II,55696-1-II |
| Citation | 499 P.3d 241 |
| Parties | IN RE the Personal Restraint of: Patrick Lee SARGENT, Petitioner. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 3rd Ave. Ste. 610, Seattle, WA, 98101-1683, Washington Appellate Project, 1511 Third Avenue, Suite 610, Seattle, WA, 98101, for Petitioner.
Cowlitz County Prosecuting Attorney - Appellate Division, 312 Sw First Avenue, Kelso, WA, 98626, David Phelan, Cowlitz County Prosecutor's Office, 312 Sw 1st Ave. Rm. 105, Kelso, WA, 98626-1799, for Respondent.
PUBLISHED OPINION
¶ 1 Patrick Lee Sargent seeks relief from personal restraint imposed when the trial court denied him bail following his charges for attempted first degree murder and felony harassment. He argues that the trial court violated article I, section 20 of the Washington Constitution, which allows a trial court to deny bail "for offenses punishable by the possibility of life in prison." Sargent argues that first degree murder is not "punishable by the possibility of life in prison." He further argues that there was not clear and convincing evidence that he had a propensity for violence. We disagree and hold that first degree attempted murder is "punishable by the possibility of life in prison." We further hold that clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's order. Accordingly, we deny Sargent's petition.
¶ 2 On April 6, 2021, the State charged Patrick Sargent with one count of attempted first degree murder and one count of felony harassment. The State alleged that Sargent attacked Olusegun Edema, Sargent's half-sister's partner, with two hammers, a knife, and a teacup. The State alleged that Sargent lived in the same house with Edema and his half-sister, Lauren Powell. After the incident, but before filing charges, the trial court issued domestic violence no-contact orders prohibiting Sargent from contacting Powell or Edema. The trial court also ordered Sargent to surrender all weapons. Sargent filed a declaration of non-surrender and stated he did not have any firearms or other dangerous weapons.
¶ 3 On April 7, the State filed a memorandum in support of detention pending trial. In it, the State argued that Sargent demonstrated a propensity for violence that created a substantial likelihood of danger to the community or any persons and asked that the trial court hold Sargent without bail. The State alleged that Powell told police that Sargent had attacked Edema with a hammer. Edema fought off Sargent and knocked the hammer away, but Sargent produced a second hammer and continued the attack. Edema then knocked the second hammer away, at which point Sargent attacked him with a knife before being overpowered yet again. Sargent then smashed a teacup over Edema's head.
¶ 4 The State further alleged that after the attack, police officers recovered a paper tablet that Sargent had been writing in. On the tablet, in an apparent letter to his brother Jonathan Sargent, Sargent wrote, Pet. Attachment F at 6, 14. Powell told police officers that Sargent had been violent his whole life and had tried to kill her in 2008. Finally, the State alleged that Sargent had previously been kicked out of Jonathan's home and that Jonathan declined to speak to the police because he feared for the safety of his wife and children should Sargent be released from custody.1 Thus, the State argued that Sargent was a danger to the victims and a flight risk, and requested the trial court deny bail.
¶ 5 The trial court held a hearing on April 9. There, the trial court granted the State's motion and ordered Sargent to be held without bail pending trial.
¶ 6 On April 20, Sargent petitioned a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his restraint without bail. Sargent argued that we hear his petition as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, rather than a personal restraint petition (PRP). A commissioner of this court ruled that the Rules of Appellate Procedure superseded the appellate procedure formerly available for a writ of habeas corpus. Personal Restraint Petition of Patrick Lee Sargent, Ruling by Commissioner Schmidt, No. 55696-1-II (May 24, 2021); RAP 16.3(b). Sargent's petition is now before us as a PRP.2 See RAP 16.11.
¶ 7 Article I, section 20 of the Washington Constitution provides:
All persons charged with crime shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident, or the presumption great. Bail may be denied for offenses punishable by the possibility of life in prison upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence of a propensity for violence that creates a substantial likelihood of danger to the community or any persons, subject to such limitations as shall be determined by the legislature .
Wash. Const. art. I, § 20 (emphasis added).
¶ 8 Sargent argues that his restraint is unlawful because attempted first degree murder is not punishable by the possibility of life in prison. He further argues that the trial court erred when it denied him bail because it did not find by clear and convincing evidence that he presented a danger to the community or any persons. The State argues that the trial court acted within its lawful authority and properly denied Sargent bail. We agree with the State.
¶ 9 Sargent argues that the trial court denied him bail in violation of article I, section 20. Sargent's novel argument requires us to analyze two phrases from article I, section 20 to determine (1) whether attempted murder is "punishable by the possibility of life in prison" and (2) whether the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, is a "limitation" on article I, section 20 as "determined by the legislature." We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.
¶ 10 The meaning of the phrases "punishable by the possibility of life in prison" and "subject to such limitations as shall be determined by the legislature" present us with questions of first impression. We review constitutional challenges de novo. State v. Clarke , 156 Wash.2d 880, 887, 134 P.3d 188 (2006). We seek to determine and give effect to the manifest purpose for which a constitutional provision was adopted. State v. Barton , 181 Wash.2d 148, 155, 331 P.3d 50 (2014). We look to the plain language of the constitutional text to accord it its reasonable interpretation, giving words their common and ordinary meaning as they existed at the time they were drafted. Barton , 181 Wash.2d at 155, 331 P.3d 50. We also review the provision's historical context for guidance in interpreting its meaning. Barton , 181 Wash.2d at 155, 331 P.3d 50. We interpret both statutes and the constitution so that no portion is rendered superfluous. Farris v. Munro , 99 Wash.2d 326, 333, 662 P.2d 821 (1983).
¶ 11 In State v. Barton , our Supreme Court explained the history of article I, section 20 :
This provision became the focus of attention in 2009, when Maurice Clemmons shot and killed four police officers in Lakewood. Clemmons committed his murders while out on bail for felony charges that could have resulted in life imprisonment. In response to this tragedy, the legislature proposed a constitutional amendment to article I, section 20 that would make bail more difficult to obtain for a person awaiting trial for a crime that would be punishable by life in prison. ... Voters approved the constitutional amendment on November 2, 2010. Wash. Const. art. I, sec. 20.
181 Wash.2d at 152-53, 331 P.3d 50.
¶ 12 The first sentence of article I, section 20 was in Washington's original constitution. Westerman v. Cary , 125 Wash.2d 277, 289, 892 P.2d 1067 (1994). It was based on similar provisions from the Oregon and Indiana constitutions. Westerman , 125 Wash.2d at 289, 892 P.2d 1067. The current version of the provision with the 2010 amendment is similar to the constitutions of multiple states in that it expands the possibility of bail denial beyond charges only for capital crimes. CAL. CONST. art I, § 12 (); PA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 40 (); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 9 (); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 (). More than 15 states include provisions with a right to bail with exceptions beyond charges for capital crimes. See 4 CRIM. PROC. § 12.3(b) (4th ed., 2020) (listing and analyzing bail provisions of each state constitution). However, the wording of Washington's constitution appears to be unique in its exception for crimes "punishable by the possibility of life in prison."
¶ 13 Sargent argues that his restraint is unlawful because article I, section 20 prohibits the trial court from denying bail for any charges except those for aggravated first degree murder and for persistent offenders. He argues that under the plain language of the constitution these are the only offenses punishable by "the possibility" of life in prison. Br. of Petitioner at 8; Reply Br. of Petitioner at 1-3.3 Sargent bases his argument on an interpretation of the SRA. He argues that given the seriousness level of his charges under the SRA,4 when analyzing the potential sentence he could receive for his charges under the sentencing grid,5 applying any potential aggravating circumstances,6 and multiplying the range by 75 percent as required for...
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...the standard range under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), ch. 9A.94 RCW. In re Pers. Restraint of Sargent, 20 Wn.App. 2d 186, 195, 499 P.3d 241 (2021); see, e.g., State v. Bobenhouse, 143 Wn.App. 315, 331, 177 P.3d 209 (2008) (statutory maximum for first degree child rape is life) (......