In re Sparks

• Decision Date: 20 November 1936
• Citation: 101 S.W.2d 194,267 Ky. 93
• Parties: In re SPARKS.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

101 S.W.2d 194

267 Ky. 93

In re SPARKS.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

November 20, 1936

Rehearing Denied Feb. 19, 1937.

Proceeding in the matter of Sam J. Sparks, an attorney at law, based on the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners recommending his disbarment.

Report of bar commissioners confirmed, and disbarment of respondent ordered.

A. W Mann, of Ashland, and B. M. Vincent, Atty. Gen., for complainants.

J. F Stewart, Woods, Stewart & Nickell, and Charles Prater, all of Ashland, for respondent.

STITES Justice.

This is a proceeding based on a report of the Board of Bar Commissioners recommending the disbarment of Sam J. Sparks an attorney at law. Four separate complaints were investigated by the Board, and the recommendation of disbarment is based on the findings made under three of the complaints, known in the record as the S. A. Bowman count the Creech count, and the Ham Newman count.

The Board of Bar Commissioners appointed two of its members as a trial committee for the purpose of investigating and reporting to it on the charges against the respondent Sparks. The trial committee submitted a written report to the Board, to which no exceptions were filed. Thereupon the matter was heard by the full Board, and the report of the trial committee was approved and made a part of the findings submitted by the Board to this court. No exceptions have been taken to the findings of fact. The respondent has simply demurred to the charges on the ground that "neither of said charges state facts sufficient to support or constitute an offense as to the conduct or demeanor of an attorney at law and because section 101 and subsections thereof of the Kentucky Statutes and the rules of this court adopted in pursuance thereof are unconstitutional and void and have no force or effect."

It is argued that section 110 of the Constitution of Kentucky, providing (in part) that "the court of appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction only," renders section 101-1 et seq. of the Kentucky Statutes invalid in so far as it seeks to authorize an original proceeding in this court to discipline or disbar an attorney. Section 101-1, to the extent that it relates to our duties in dealing with the professional conduct of attorneys at law (the only point here involved), gave this court no power which it did not already possess. In Capps v. Gore, 231 Ky. 185, 21 S.W.2d 266, 267, it was shown that charges had been made against a circuit judge in regard to his actions in a case pending in this court. An independent investigation of the alleged misconduct of the judge was ordered, and, in exonerating him of the charges, it was said: "At the outset we are confronted with a contention that this court is without jurisdiction to conduct the investigation or to institute any disciplinary proceedings, if deemed appropriate under the facts developed by the investigation. It is said the proceeding is not embraced by Section 110 of the Constitution because it is no part of the appellate jurisdiction or within the authority to issue such writs as may be necessary to maintain a general control over inferior jurisdictions. ***

"We need not consider whether the matter proposed may not be necessarily incidental to the appellate jurisdiction of the court, since we are convinced that it may be maintained on a broader ground. We do not doubt the power of this court to make the investigation or to take such measures as might be required by the facts developed. The right of self-preservation is inherent in the court, and is not derived from, or dependent upon, any act of the Legislature, or any express provision of the Constitution. It inheres in the court as such, and is necessary to vindicate its authority and to maintain its integrity. In re Woolley, 11 Bush, 95. In the case of People of the State of N.Y. ex rel. v. Charles W. Culkin, Sheriff, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487, 493, 60 A.L.R. 851, the question is reviewed at length.

"The power and duty of a court to conduct an inquiry into the conduct of its officers, and to administer such discipline as may be deemed necessary to maintain the authority and integrity of the court, is fully supported by authorities long honored. *** It is a power resting in the court by which it may protect itself and vindicate its integrity by punishing any conduct calculated to undermine or impair its authority or dignity. If an investigation should develop evidence of crime, it may be referred to the appropriate tribunals for action; but there may be conduct not amounting to crime calling for discipline by this court, and for which no other remedy may be available. *** The administration of justice must be maintained in its purity, and, 'if the house is to be cleaned, it is for those who occupy and govern it, rather than for strangers to do the noisome work.' The power must reside where the responsibility rests, and no Supreme Court of a sovereign state could justify the toleration of conduct or practices impairing its dignity, its integrity, or its authority on the supine ground that it was helpless to preserve, protect, and defend itself against such evils. 2 R.C.L. 939; In re Woolley, 11 Bush 95; Rubin v. State, 194 Wis. 207, 216 N.W. 513."

In conclusion, the court considered the propriety of taking disciplinary steps suo motu against the appellants and their attorney anent the unfounded charges asserted against the circuit judge, but determined on the facts--not because of lack of power--to take no action. Clearly, this case is authority for the proposition that this court possesses an inherent power to deal with matters such as that now before us. In Commonwealth ex rel. Ward v Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W.2d 53, decided November 6, 1936, the validity of section 101-1 et seq., in so far as it applies to disciplinary proceedings in this court, was expressly upheld. It was pointed...