In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases—Report 2012–07, SC12–2593.

Decision Date04 September 2013
Docket NumberNo. SC12–2593.,SC12–2593.
Citation122 So.3d 302
PartiesIn re STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES—REPORT 2012–07.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREOriginal Proceeding—Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases.

Joseph A. Bulone, Chair, Clearwater, FL, and Jacqueline Hogan Scola, Past Chair, Standard Jury Instruction in Criminal Cases Committee, Miami, FL, and Bart Schneider, Senior Attorney, Office of State Court Administrator, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.

PER CURIAM.

The Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee) proposes several new standard criminal jury instructions and amendments to several existing standard criminal jury instructions. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. We authorize the new and amended instructions for publication and use, except as explained below.

The Committee asks the Court to authorize for publication and use new criminal jury instructions 2.2 (Instruction on Edited Recording); 2.3 (Stipulations); 3.3(h) (Willful Blindness); 3.6(e)(1) (Involuntary Intoxication Negating Specific Intent); 3.6(e)(2) (Involuntary Intoxication Resulting in Insanity); 21.16 (Falsely Personating an Officer); 22.15 (Possession of a Slot Machine); and 23.8 (Selling a Minor into Prostitution). The Committee also proposes amending existing criminal jury instructions 3.6(d) (Voluntary Intoxication); 3.9 (Weighing the Evidence); 3.9(a)-(f) (Expert Witnesses, Accomplice, Defendant Testifying, Defendant Not Testifying, Defendant's Statements, and Eyewitness Identification); 4.4 (Read-back of Testimony); and 23.1–23.7 (Prostitution).

Before filing its report with the Court, the Committee published its proposals for comment, and one comment addressing a proposed change to instruction 3.9 (Weighing the Evidence) was received by the Committee. The Committee did not revise its proposal in response to the comment. The Court did not publish the proposals after they were filed.

The Committee proposes various amendments to instruction 3.6(e)(1) (Involuntary Intoxication Negating Specific Intent), including the addition of the following language at the end of the instruction:

Give when defendant claims involuntary intoxication but lesser-included offenses or other crimes charged are general intent crimes.

A claim of involuntary intoxication to the point where the defendant was incapable of forming [a premeditated design to kill] [the intent to (specific intent charged) ] is not a defense to [ (lesser included crimes) ] [ (crimes charged in additional counts) ].

The Committee states that it was not confident in the correctness of the cases from the district courts of appeal which are the basis for this proposed language. Therefore, having considered the proposal and the Committee's reasoning for the proposed language, we decline to authorize the inclusion of the above language in instruction 3.6(e)(1).

Accordingly, we hereby authorize for publication and use the instructions as they appear in the appendix to this opinion.1 In authorizing the publication and use of these instructions, we express no opinion on their correctness and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting an additional or alternative instruction nor contesting the legal correctness of the instruction. We further caution all interested parties that any notes and comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. New language is indicated by underlining and deleted language is indicated by struck-through type. The instructions as set forth in the appendix shall be effective when this opinion becomes final.

It is so ordered.

POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX

2.2BENCH CONFERENCESINSTRUCTION ON EDITED RECORDING

Members of the jury, you are about to [view] [listen to] a[n] [video] [audio] recording. The Court instructs you that the recording has been edited to eliminate irrelevant portions that would not add to your understanding of the case. The fact that the recording has been edited should not concern you in any way and must not impact the way you [view] [listen to] and consider this evidence.

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 2013.

2.3 STIPULATIONS

When [lawyers] [parties] agree that certain facts are true, that is called a stipulation of fact. You must accept stipulated facts as having been proven. However, the significance of these facts, as with all facts, is for you to decide. In this case, the stipulated fact[s] that you must accept as true [is][are][insert stipulation[s]].

Comment

This instruction was adopted in 2013.

3.3(h) WILLFUL BLINDNESS

Do not give if there is no evidence supporting an inference of deliberate ignorance or if the evidence is consistent only with a theory of actual knowledge.In some cases, the issue to be determined is whether the defendant had knowledge of a certain fact. Florida law recognizes a concept known as willful blindness, which is sometimes referred to as “deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge.”Willful blindness occurs when a person has his or her suspicion aroused about a particular fact, realized its probability, but deliberately refrained from obtaining confirmation because he or she wanted to remain in ignorance. A person who engages in willful blindness is deemed to have knowledge of that fact.

Comments

See Desilien v. State, 595 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Hallman v. State, 633 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Hale v. State, 838 So.2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003).

This instruction was adopted in 2013.

3.6(d) VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION

§ 775.051, Fla. Stat.

Give if applicable and if requested and only for offenses occurring on or after October 1, 1999. If there was evidence of involuntary intoxication, give instruction 3.6(e)(1) or (2), if requested and applicable.

Voluntary intoxication resulting from the use of [alcohol] [or] [a controlled substance] is not a defense to a crime. Evidence of a defendant's voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration to show that [he] [she] lacked the specific intent to commit any crime. A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she knowingly consumed a substance that he or she knew or should have known could cause intoxication.

Give only for offenses occurring before October 1, 1999.See section 775.051, Florida Statutes.

A defense asserted in this case is voluntary intoxication by use of [alcohol] [drugs].

The use of [alcohol] [drugs] to the extent that it merely arouses passions, diminishes perceptions, releases inhibitions, or clouds reason and judgment does not excuse the commission of a criminal act.

However, where a certain mental state is an essential element of a crime, and a person was so intoxicated that [he][she] was incapable of forming that mental state, the mental state would not exist and therefore the crime could not be committed.

As I have told you, [the intent to (specific intent charged) ] [premeditated design to kill] [ (other mental state) ] is an essential element of the crime of (crime charged).

Therefore, if you find from the evidence that the defendant was so intoxicated from the voluntary use of [alcohol] [drugs] as to be incapable of forming [the intent to (specific intent charged) ] [premeditated design to kill] [ (other mental state) ], or you have a reasonable doubt about it, you should find the defendant not guilty of (crime charged).

Give when other applicable crimes are general intent crimes.

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to (lesser included crimes) (crimes charged in additional counts).

Comment

This instruction was adopted inMay 1987 , and amended in 2006 [939 So.2d 1052 ] and 2013.

3.6(e)(1) INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION NEGATING SPECIFIC INTENT

§ 775.051 Fla. Stat.

Voluntary intoxication is not a defense. A person is voluntarily intoxicatedif he or she knowingly consumed a substance that he or she knew or should have known could cause intoxication.

However, a defense asserted in this case is that the defendant was involuntarily intoxicated to the point that [he][she] could not form [a premeditated design to kill] [the intent to (specific intent charged) ]. This defense applies when:

Give a or b as applicable.

a. § 775.051 Fla. Stat.; Lucherini v. State, 932 So.2d 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Cobb v. State, 884 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

1. (Defendant) was lawfully prescribed [ (name of Chapter 893 substance) ] by a practitioner.

2. (Defendant) [used] [consumed] [injected] [ (name of Chapter 893 substance) ] as it was prescribed and directed by the practitioner.

3. As a result of taking [ (name of Chapter 893 substance) ] as prescribed, (defendant) was so intoxicated that [he][she] could not form [a premeditated design to kill] [the intent to (specific intent charged) ] at the time of the offense.

b. Carter v. State, 710 So.2d 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

1. (Defendant), without any fault on [his][her] part, [unknowingly ingested an intoxicating liquor, drug, or other substance] [knowingly ingested an intoxicating liquor, drug, or other substance because of force, fraud, duress, or trickery].

2. As a result, (defendant) was so intoxicated that [he][she] could not form [a premeditated design to kill] [the intent to (specific intent charged) ] at the time of the offense.

Give if applicable.

In determining the issue of involuntary intoxication, you may consider the testimony of expert and non-expert witnesses.

§§ 775.051, 893.02(21) Fla. Stats.

“Practitioner” means a physician licensed pursuant to chapter 458, a dentist licensed pursuant to chapter 466, a veterinarian licensed pursuant to chapter 474, an osteopathic physician licensed pursuant to chapter 459, a naturopath licensed pursuant to chapter 462, or a podiatric physician licensed pursuant to chapter 461, provided such practitioner holds a valid...

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