In re Sullivan

Decision Date23 May 1914
Citation218 Mass. 141,105 N.E. 463
PartiesIn re SULLIVAN. In re AMERICAN MUT. LIABILITY INS. CO.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County.

Application by William T. Sullivan for compensation for injuries under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Claimant was injured February 7, 1913, and as a consequence his arm was amputated. He was able to work May 31st following, but did not obtain employment until October 25, 1913. The Industrial Accident Board made a finding, which was affirmed by the superior court, that applicant was entitled to compensation as for a total incapacity to work until October 25th, and the insurer appeals. Affirmed.Sawyer, Hardy & Stone, of Boston, for appellant.

James H. Mulcare, of Springfield, for appellee.

SHELDON, J.

This employé sustained an injury which necessitated the amputation of his right arm, and for which it is admitted that he was entitled to compensation. But the insurer contends that on May 31st following the accident he was physically able to go to work and that for this reason his right to be compensated for an incapacity for work ceased on that day, regardless of the question whether he was or was not able to procure work. The facts found by the committee of arbitration, and, on review, by the Industrial Accident Board, are that from May 31st to October 25th he did not work, that he diligently endeavored to secure employment and was unable to obtain work because of the loss of his arm, but that on May 31st he was capable of doing the work which he finally procured, or any work which a one-armed man could ordinarily perform. Upon these facts and as an inference therefrom it further was found that he was in fact unable to obtain any work at which he could earn wages during the period from May 31st to October 25th; and he was awarded compensation for a total incapacity for work during that time.

Our statute provides for a weekly compensation while ‘the incapacity for work resulting from the injury is total.’ St. 1911, c. 751, pt. 2, § 9. The expression ‘incapacity for work’ was taken from the English Workmen's Compensation Act of 1906, in which it was provided that the amount of compensation to be paid ‘where total or partial incapacity for work’ resulted from the injury should be certain weekly payments. Accordingly decisions of the English courts fixing the meaning there to be given to these words are of weight. McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 499, 501,102 N. E. 697.

The same words were used in an earlier English statute; and it was held by the Court of Appeal in Clark v. Gaslight & Coke Co., 21 T. L. R. 184, that the object of the act was to give compensation for an inability to earn wages, and that if an injured employé after repeated efforts could not get an opportunity to earn wages, a finding that his earning power was gone and therefore that he was under an ‘incapacity for work’ was warranted, although he had a physical capacity to work and earn money. The same principle has been affirmed in other English decisions, that an inability to obtain work resulting directly from a personal injury...

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39 cases
  • Pierce, Case of
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • April 20, 1950
    ... ... Sullivan's Case, 218 Mass. 141, 143, 105 N.E. 463, L.R.A. 1916A, 378; Percival's Case, 268 Mass. 50, 54, 167 N.E. 352, 63 A.L.R. 1237; Manley's Case, 282 Mass. 38, 184 N.E. 372; Strycharz' Case, 291 Mass. 212, 216, 197 N.E. 9. In this limited class of cases there is an exception to the general rule that ... ...
  • Pierce, Case of
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • April 20, 1950
    ... ... due directly to his injury but would be further handicapped ... in securing employment during a period of business depression ... due to his visible maimed or crippled physical condition and ... so his inability to earn might in part at least be due to the ... economic situation. Sullivan's Case, 218 Mass. 141, 143, ... 105 N.E. 463, L.R.A. 1916A, 378; Percival's Case, 268 ... Mass. 50, 54, 167 N.E. 352, 63 A.L.R. 1237; Manley's ... Case, 282 Mass. 38, 184 N.E. 372; Strycharz' Case, 291 ... Mass. 212, 216, 197 N.E. 9. In this limited class of cases ... there is an exception to ... ...
  • In re Hummer
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • February 5, 1945
    ... ... The loss of a single member, as a hand, leg or arm, or an organ, as an eye, has sometimes been found as a matter of fact to constitute total incapacity and at other times to amount to partial incapacity in awarding compensation under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 152, 34, as amended and 35. Sullivan's Case, 218 Mass. 141, 105 N.E. 463, L.R.A.1916A, 378;Duprey's Case, 219 Mass. 189, 106 N.E. 686; Lemieux's Case, 223 Mass. 346, 111 N.E. 782;[59 N.E.2d 299]Paterno's Case, 266 Mass. 323, 165 N.E. 391;Percival's Case, 268 Mass. 50, 167 N.E. 352, 63 A.L.R. 1237;Morrell's Case, 278 Mass. 485, 180 ... ...
  • Hummer's Case
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • February 5, 1945
    ... ... an organ, as an eye, has sometimes been found as a matter of ... fact to constitute total incapacity and at other times to ... amount to partial incapacity in awarding compensation under ... G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 152, Sections 34, 35. Sullivan's ... Case, 218 Mass. 141. Duprey's Case, 219 Mass. 189 ... Lemieux's Case, 223 Mass. 346 ... Paterno's Case, 266 ... Mass. 323 ... Percival's Case, 268 Mass. 50 ... Morrell's ... Case, 278 Mass. 485. Hurwitz's Case, 280 Mass. 477 ... Manley's Case, 282 Mass. 38 ... The nature of the inquiry ... ...
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