Pierce, Case of
| Decision Date | 20 April 1950 |
| Citation | 325 Mass. 649,92 N.E.2d 245 |
| Parties | PIERCE'S CASE. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Argued March 10 1950.
P L. Hinckley, Worcester, for Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. insurer.
H. Zarrow Worcester, for employee.
T. J. Donahue, Springfield, E. V. Cashin, Watertown, J. Kimball, Jr., Melrose, for Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS and COUNIHAN, JJ.
The employee suffered a back strain on June 26, 1945, which interrupted his work for a short period, for which he was paid workmen's compensation. He experienced further difficulty with his back on October 11, 1946, caused by lifting while working for another employer. He was prevented from working for nearly a week and resumed work until May 12, 1947, when he was laid off although there was other work in the plant which he could have done but for the condition of his back. He was out of work until October 16, 1947, when he secured work with another employer. The employee filed a claim for workmen's compensation on March 4, 1947, and now seeks compensation for the period he was away from his job in October, 1946, and for the period from May 12, 1947 to October 16, 1947. Shortly after May 12, 1947, he applied for and, after a waiting period, was paid unemployment benefits up to October 16, 1947. The judge without making any decision [1] reported the question whether the employee was entitled to receive workmen's compensation during the period he was receiving these unemployment benefits.
We are met at the threshold with the inquiry whether this case is properly here upon the report of the judge of the Superior Court. The question, so far as we are aware, has not been decided by this court. It was not presented, considered, or decided in Komar's Case, 293 Mass. 405, 199 N.E. 918. We lay that decision to one side. Vigeant v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 260 Mass. 335, 343, 157 N.E. 651, 53 A.L.R. 867. The power of a judge of the Superior Court to report to this court an action at law or a suit in equity is wholly the creature of statute, and the same is true with respect to a probate judge, G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 214, §§ 30, 31; c. 215, § 13; c. 231, § 111; and these statutes prescribe the limitations which must be observed in exercising the power to report a proceeding to this court. For instance, on the law side, a judge of the Superior Court cannot report an interlocutory matter unless he has made an order deciding it, and he cannot report the entire action at law unless there has been a verdict or a finding for one party or the other, or unless the case was submitted upon a statement of agreed facts. In a suit in equity or other proceeding in a Probate Court, the judge cannot report an interlocutory matter unless he has decided it by entering an interlocutory decree or order, nor can he report a part of a suit which he has 'heard for final determination.' Taft v. Stoddard, 141 Mass. 150, 6 N.E. 836; Walters v. Jackson & Newton Co., 231 Mass. 247, 248, 120 N.E. 688; Orth v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 311 Mass. 580, 581-582, 42 N.E.2d 524; Dunlop v. Claussen, 313 Mass. 715, 48 N.E.2d 919; Petition of Curran, 314 Mass. 91, 93-94, 49 N.E.2d 432; National Development Co. v. Gray, 315 Mass. 127, 128-129, 51 N.E.2d 960, 961; Scaccia v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 317 Mass. 245, 57 N.E.2d 761.
The workmen's compensation 'act has a procedure all its own, being neither an action at law nor a suit in equity although resembling the latter in many respects.' Sterling v. Frederick Leyland & Co., Ltd., 242 Mass. 8, 13, 136 N.E. 60, 61. It has frequently been said that procedure under the act is governed in general by the practice in equity. Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N.E. 693, Ann.Cas.1914B, 372; Petition of Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 298 Mass. 75, 9 N.E.2d 718; Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., v. DiLeo, 298 Mass. 401, 10 N.E.2d 251; Duggan's Case, 315 Mass. 355, 53 N.E.2d 90. It has accordingly been held that questions of law arising in the Superiro Court in a proceeding under the workmen's compensation act cannot be brought here by a bill of exceptions. Gould's Case, 215 Mass. 480, 483, 102 N.E. 693, Ann.Cas.1914B, 372; McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 501, 102 N.E. 697, L.R.A.1916A, 306; Keohane's Case, 232 Mass. 487, 489, 122 N.E. 573; Kareske's Case, 250 Mass. 220, 225-226, 145 N.E. 301. On the other hand, it has been often pointed out that the only way to bring a question of law here in a workmen's compensation case is by appeal. Pigeon's Case, 216 Mass. 51, 55, 102 N.E. 932, Ann.Cas.1915A, 737; Cripps' Case, 216 Mass. 586, 588, 104 N.E. 565, Ann.Cas.1915B, 828; Sciola's Case, 236 Mass. 407, 415, 128 N.E. 666; Nagle's Case, 310 Mass. 193, 197, 37 N.E.2d 474. It may not be improper to state that even if the judge in disposing of the instant case had the same power to deal with it as if he were hearing a suit in equity, he would have no power to report the case in the manner in which he attempted to report it. Petition of Curran, 314 Mass. 91, 93-94, 49 N.E.2d 432; National Development Co. v. Gray, 315 Mass. 127, 128-129, 51 N.E.2d 960. The act makes no express provision for making a report, excepting only in accordance with St.1949, C. 61. SECTION 11[2] of the act clearly defines the duty of a judge of the Superior Court in a workmen's compensation case. Upon the presentment of certified copies of an order or decision of a reviewing board, 'The court shall thereupon render a decree in accordance' with the law, and 'Such decree shall have the same effect, and all proceedings in relation thereto shall thereafter [3] be the same, as though rendered in a suit duly heard and determined by said court, except that there shall be no appeal therefrom upon questions of fact,' nor shall there be an appeal from decrees relative to certain matters not now material. It is the duty of the judge under this section, if the decision of the reviewing board is complete and adequate to support a decree, to enter the appropriate decree required by the law upon the facts reported by the reviewing board unless it appears that the findings are not supported by the evidence or that the proceeding before the board is in some way vitiated by an error of law. Walsh's Case, 281 Mass. 228, 183 N.E. 421; McCarthy's Case, 314 Mass. 610, 612, 51 N.E.2d 113; Willand's Case, 321 Mass. 677, 678, 75 N.E.2d 431. The decre which the act contemplates shall be entered in the Superior Court shall have the same effect as a decree in equity, and appellate proceedings thereafter taken are to conform to the practice in equity except that questions of fact shall not be open to review as they are in the ordinary appeal in equity. Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 178, 52 N.E.2d 27. In other words, it was not optional with the judge to decide the present case and enter a decree, or to decline to make a decision on the merits and report the case to this court. 'The statute requires a final decree from which the party aggrieved can appeal to this court.' Keohane's Case, 232 Mass. 487, 489, 122 N.E. 573, 574. Whether or not he shall either enter a decree or report the case is not governed by equity practice. But once a decree has been properly entered and an appeal taken, the steps for perfecting, and entering the appeal in this court are to be performed in accordance with the practice prevailing in equity. We therefore are constrained to conclude that the judge was without power to report the case and that consequently there is nothing before this court.
The determination of the question of law sought by this report has been fully argued by the parties. A previous attempt to raise this question failed in Demetre's Case, 322 Mass. 95, 101, 76 N.E.2d 140. A decision will assist the Industrial Accident Board in the performance of its duties, as this question of law is certain to be presented soon if it is now left without decision. It is an important question and is of general public interest. Without meaning to establish a precedent, we think it appropriate to express our opinion on the merits of this question. Moore v. Election of Commissioners of Cambridge, 309 Mass. 303, 35 N.E.2d 222; Wellesley College v. Attorney General, 313 Mass. 722, 731, 49 N.E.2d 220; Massachusetts Charitable Mechanic Association v. Beede, 320 Mass. 601, 609, 70 N.E.2d 825.
What is now the employment security act, G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 151A, stems from the original c. 151A, inserted by St.1935, c. 479, § 5. The constitutionality of this chapter was sustained in Howes Brothers Co. v. Massachusetts Unemployment Commission, 296 Mass. 275, 5 N.E.2d 720, as an exercise of the police power, designed, it was said, 296 Mass. at page 282, 5 N.E.2d 725, 'to afford relief to those who have been employed in the selected kinds of business since the effective date of that law when they are thrown out of work through no fault of their own.' See also Farrar v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 45, 48, 84 N.E.2d 540; Moen v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 324 Mass. 246, 250, 85 N.E.2d 779, 8 A.L.R.2d 429.
The original c 151A by § 19(e) provided that no benefits were to be paid to an employee who was receiving benefits under the workmen's compensation law, 'provided, that if he is receiving only partial compensation under said chapter one hundred and fifty-two, which is less than the benefits which would otherwise be due him hereunder for unemployment, he shall receive such unemployment benefits reduced by the amount of such partial compensation.' This original chapter was superseded by a new c. 151A, contained in St.1937, c. 421, § 1, which in turn gave way in St. 1941, c. 685, § 1, to another chapter entitled 'Employment Security.' This...
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