In re Timothy M., 1 CA-JV 99-0064.

• Decision Date: 10 February 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-JV 99-0064.,1 CA-JV 99-0064.
• Citation: 4 P.3d 449,197 Ariz. 394
• Parties: In re TIMOTHY M.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

4 P.3d 449

197 Ariz. 394

In re TIMOTHY M.

No. -0064.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department E.

February 10, 2000.

As Amended February 18, 2000.

Review Denied September 26, 2000.

Richard M. Romley, Maricopa County Attorney By Rene Williams, Deputy County Attorney, Phoenix, for Appellee.

Law Office of Richard D. Coffinger By Richard D. Coffinger, Glendale, for Appellant.

OPINION

WEISBERG, Judge.

¶ 1 Timothy M. (the juvenile) appeals the juvenile court's dismissal without prejudice of a delinquency petition filed against him. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 On January 27, 1999, the juvenile's parents reported to the police that the juvenile and an accomplice had stolen their Dodge Caravan and some firearms and had run away from home. A few days later, upon seeing the stolen vehicle, the juvenile's mother called 911 and asked for police assistance in apprehending her son. Two Peoria plain-clothes police officers responded. While trying to flee, the juvenile drove the vehicle directly toward one of the Peoria officers, who was positioned in front of the vehicle with gun drawn, and who commanded "Stop, Peoria Police, Stop." As the van continued to move forward, the officer was forced to move out of its way. The juvenile later was arrested.

¶ 3 On January 30, 1999, the state filed a petition in juvenile court charging the juvenile with multiple delinquency offenses, including aggravated assault of a peace officer, a class six felony. The juvenile denied the charges at the advisory hearing, and the court set an adjudication hearing for March 19, 1999.

¶ 4 In the period between the advisory hearing and the adjudication hearing, the prosecutor spoke with Peoria police and reviewed several hundred pages of material related to the incident. On March 5, 1999, he filed a motion to dismiss the January petition without prejudice because of "[n]ew evidence arising out of the incident [that] came to light after the petition was filed on January 30, 1999." At the same time, he filed an amended petition in juvenile court that elevated the aggravated assault to a class three felony¹ because it was committed with a "deadly weapon or dangerous instrument."

¶ 5 According to the juvenile's attorney, the prosecutor then advised that, with the concurrence of the victim, he would offer the juvenile a plea to the aggravated assault as a class three felony and that the state in return would dismiss the remaining charges. The juvenile's attorney informed the prosecutor that he would "prefer" to enter an admission to the charge of "endangerment of [the officer] as well as all the other counts in the amended petition, but that in order to ensure that the matter would remain in juvenile court, the juvenile would accept the State's plea offer and enter a plea of guilty or no contest to [the aggravated assault charge] of the refiled petition." No written agreement was ever drafted or signed by the parties as a result of these discussions.

¶ 6 On March 9, 1999, the state filed a motion to dismiss the March 5 amended petition² without prejudice because the charges were being pursued as an adult prosecution. The juvenile opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that the previous delinquency petitions showed that he was amenable to treatment in the juvenile system and, further, that he was entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement that had been offered to him by the state. The juvenile court granted the state's motion to dismiss, and it is from that order that the juvenile appeals.

¶ 7 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated (A.R.S.) section 8-236(A) and Rule 24(a) of the Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court.

ISSUES

¶ 8 The juvenile raises three issues on appeal.

(1) Was the juvenile entitled to specific performance of the plea agreement initially offered by the state?

(2) Does A.R.S. section 8-302(C) require the juvenile court to dismiss without prejudice charges pending in the juvenile system when the state files those same charges in the adult system?

(3) Is the juvenile court required to hold a transfer hearing when the state moves to dismiss the charges in juvenile court in order to prosecute the juvenile as an adult pursuant to A.R.S. section 13-501?

DISCUSSION

¶ 9 We will not disturb the juvenile court's disposition unless we find a clear abuse of discretion. See Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JV-110720, 156 Ariz. 430, 431, 752 P.2d 519, 520 (App.1988). Also, although the court has broad powers to dispose of a matter, it may not "misapply the law or a legal principle." Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JV-510312, 183 Ariz. 116, 118, 901 P.2d 464, 466 (App.1995).

The Plea Agreement

¶ 10 The juvenile maintains that the oral exchange between his attorney and the prosecutor following the March 1999 petition constituted his acceptance of a plea agreement. He argues that, because he "accepted" the state's plea offer before it was revoked by the state and before the state filed its motion to dismiss, it was binding on both parties. Therefore, he continues, the juvenile court erred in dismissing the petition and in not requiring specific performance of the plea agreement. In support of his argument, the juvenile cites "general principles of contract law" on offer and acceptance, and argues that the Rules of Criminal Procedure in general, and Rule 17 in particular, do not apply to juvenile pleas. We, however, disagree.

¶ 11 As a preliminary observation, we note that it is not entirely clear from the record that there was a real understanding as to what the parties were to have "agreed upon" following the prosecutor's offer of a plea to the class three aggravated assault. For example, the juvenile's attorney states that he informed the prosecutor that the juvenile would "prefer" to plead to all the "other counts" in the March 1999 petition and to the reduced charge of endangerment, but that he told the prosecutor that the juvenile would admit to the class three aggravated assault as charged, if that was necessary, to keep the action in juvenile court. In addition, the juvenile's motion opposing the dismissal of the March petition stated that the prosecutor had informed the juvenile that he would "consider" allowing the juvenile to enter a no contest plea to the aggravated assault charge, "but that he would have to receive authority from his supervisors to do so." The prosecutor, however, subsequently denied even agreeing to "consider" a no contest plea. To us, these exchanges seem more akin to negotiations rather than a final agreement between the parties. Nonetheless, even assuming offer and acceptance, we hold that there was no legally binding plea agreement.³

¶ 12 The juvenile argues that, once he accepted the state's offer, the plea agreement became binding under general principles of contract law and that the state could not then revoke its offer. Other than referring to the general contract provisions related to the termination of offers and formation of contracts found in the " `Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Second' by the American Law Institute," the juvenile cites only the United States Supreme Court's holding in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971), as applying general contract rules to require the specific performance of a plea agreement. We, however, find that case to be inapplicable here.

¶ 13 The distinction between Santobello and this case is that in Santobello the plea agreement was binding because it had been accepted by the trial court. See id. at 258, 92 S.Ct. 495. Santobello did not even consider whether a plea agreement would be binding without having been accepted by the trial court. In fact, Santobello acknowledges that there is no right to have a guilty plea accepted and that under the federal rules a court may reject an agreement entered into by the parties. See id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. 495.

¶ 14 Our supreme court has similarly held that a criminal defendant's plea agreement is "subject to the approval of the trial court." State v. Morse, 127 Ariz. 25, 31-32, 617 P.2d 1141, 1147-48 (1980). It has also held that a plea bargain "can be revoked by any party at any time prior to its acceptance by the court." Id. at 32, 617 P.2d at 1147 (citing Rule 17 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure) (emphasis added).

¶ 15 Notwithstanding, the juvenile argues that the rules of criminal procedure do not control in juvenile cases. Therefore the juvenile maintains that Rule 17.4(b), which specifically provides that a plea agreement "may be revoked by any party prior to its acceptance by the court," does not control here. Instead, the juvenile would have us apply general contract principles in the juvenile system to make the acceptance of an offer the deciding element in the formation of a binding plea agreement, rather than its acceptance by the trial court as is the case with adult pleas. Once again, we disagree. ¶ 16 We are guided by the tenet that juveniles must be afforded due process in the adjudication of charges against them. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967)

; Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JV-508488, 185 Ariz. 295, 299, 915 P.2d 1250, 1254 (App.1996). And, although the procedures that are followed in adult prosecutions are not uniformly applied to juvenile proceedings, they have been implemented in several areas. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dandoy v. Superior Court, 127 Ariz. 184, 187, 619 P.2d 12, 15 (1980); Matter of Maricopa County No. JV-114857, 177 Ariz. 337, 339, 868 P.2d 350, 352 (App.1993). In particular, criminal rules have been employed in juvenile proceedings when application has been necessary "to protect a juvenile's constitutional rights." JV-508488, 185 Ariz. at 299, 915 P.2d at 1254. Thus, to cite only a few examples, criminal Rule 11 has been applied to juvenile mental competency determinations, see Dandoy,

127 Ariz. at 188,

619 P.2d at 16;...