In Re Wayne County Treasurer
| Decision Date | 15 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 249807. |
| Citation | 265 Mich. App. 285,698 N.W.2d 879 |
| Parties | In re Petition by the WAYNE COUNTY TREASURER for Foreclosure of Certain Lands for Unpaid Property Taxes. Wayne County Treasurer, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, v. Westhaven Manor Limited Dividend Housing Association and Michigan State Housing Development Authority, Respondents-Appellees, and Western Wayne Realty, L.L.C., d/b/a Re/Max Synergy, Intervening Party-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Azzam E. Elder, Corporation Counsel, and Ellen E. Mason, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for the Wayne County Treasurer.
Loomis, Ewert, Parsley, Davis & Gotting, P.C. (by Michael H. Rhodes and Kevin J. Roragen), Lansing, for Westhaven Manor Limited Dividend Housing Association.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Matthew H. Rick, Assistant Attorney General, for the Michigan State Housing Development Authority.
Lawrence R. Walker, P.C. (by Lawrence R. Walker), Detroit, for Western Wayne Realty, L.L.C.
Before: NEFF, P.J., and SMOLENSKI and ZAHRA, JJ.
This is a foreclosure case brought pursuant to the General Property Tax Act (GPTA), MCL 211.1 et seq., 1999 PA 123.1 Western Wayne Realty, L.L.C., doing business as RE/MAX Synergy (RE/MAX), appeals by delayed leave granted, MCR 7.203(B), and petitioner, the Wayne County Treasurer, cross-appeals as of right, MCR 7.207(A)(1), the circuit court's postjudgment order vacating its previous order of foreclosure on a parcel of real property2 (the Westhaven parcel) and ordering that the certificate of forfeiture in favor of petitioner, as well as the subsequent quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the Westhaven parcel from petitioner to RE/MAX, be declared null and void. The significant issue in this case concerns the circuit court's subject-matter jurisdiction over its previous judgment ordering foreclosure of the Westhaven parcel under the GPTA. The purpose of the GPTA and the statutory language of its notice provision, MCL 211.78i(2) require that if an interested party's minimum due process rights are violated, any proceeding that affected the interested party's property rights is invalidated and a cause of action may be maintained against the foreclosing governmental unit by the interested party for failure to provide the requisite statutory notice. In such a situation, we hold that the circuit court retains its subject-matter jurisdiction over its previously issued foreclosure judgment. However, because the circuit court applied the wrong standard in determining whether minimum due process was afforded, we reverse the court's postjudgment order dated June 20, 2003, and remand for a determination under the proper analysis.
On June 14, 2001, petitioner filed this foreclosure action in the Wayne Circuit Court concerning several parcels of property in Wayne County, including the Westhaven parcel. The Westhaven parcel housed a government-assisted apartment complex for senior citizens. Westhaven Manor Limited Dividend Housing Association (Westhaven Manor) owned the Westhaven parcel, subject to a mortgage held by the Michigan State Housing Development Authority (MSHDA). Petitioner sought to foreclose on the Westhaven parcel for failure to pay special assessments for drainage improvements of $34.22 for 1997 and $61.15 for 1999, plus interest and fees, totaling approximately $356 when the petition was filed.
On March 4, 2002, the circuit court entered a judgment of foreclosure relating to several parcels of property in Wayne County, including the Westhaven parcel. The judgment vested petitioner with "good and marketable fee simple title to the property, if all the forfeited delinquent taxes, interest, penalties and fees are not paid within 21 days after entry of the judgment." The statutory redemption period expired and, later in 2002, petitioner sold to RE/MAX the Westhaven parcel at a public auction.
On March 3, 2003, Westhaven Manor and MSHDA (respondents) initiated postjudgment proceedings before the circuit court to vacate the March 4, 2002, judgment. Respondents claimed that they did not have notice of the foreclosure action. Their motion raised issues concerning whether statutory notice errors occurred and whether their due process rights were violated. Respondents argued that a "proof of personal visit" that petitioner had filed with the circuit court in support of its request for foreclosure misrepresented that the Westhaven parcel was vacant, and that a notice of foreclosure had not been posted in a conspicuous place.
At a hearing in May 2003, the circuit court determined that respondents were entitled to relief from the March 4, 2002, judgment under MCR 2.612(C). The court granted respondents' respective motions on the basis of its determination that petitioner failed to adhere to the statutory procedures regarding personal visits and placement of the foreclosure notice on the property. The court also noted that, when it ordered foreclosure of the Westhaven parcel, it did not conduct an individual analysis with respect to the property and petitioner's compliance with the statutory notice procedures. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner's actions failed to comport with due process. On June 20, 2003, the circuit court entered its order vacating the March 4, 2002, judgment of foreclosure with regard to the Westhaven parcel. Westhaven Manor was ordered to pay the outstanding special assessments, including penalties and interest, within twenty-one days of the order. The circuit court further ordered that the certificate of forfeiture in favor of petitioner, as well as the subsequent quitclaim deed purporting to transfer the Westhaven parcel from petitioner to RE/MAX, be declared null and void.
The principal issue on appeal is whether the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction over its previous March 4, 2002, judgment of foreclosure on the Westhaven parcel that vested title in petitioner, allowing the court to modify the judgment pursuant to MCR 2.612(C) ().
"Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to review de novo." Davis v. Dep't of Corrections, 251 Mich.App. 372, 374, 651 N.W.2d 486 (2002). Also, the interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo by an appellate court. Parkwood Ltd. Dividend Housing Ass'n v. State Housing Dev. Auth., 468 Mich. 763, 767, 664 N.W.2d 185 (2003).
This case turns on our interpretation of the GPTA. The principles of statutory interpretation are well established. The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. And the statutory language is the best indicator of the Legislature's intent. Neal v. Wilkes, 470 Mich. 661, 665, 685 N.W.2d 648 (2004). Importantly, statutory language should be construed reasonably, keeping in mind the purpose of the act. Draprop Corp. v. City of Ann Arbor, 247 Mich.App. 410, 415, 636 N.W.2d 787 (2001). The rules of statutory interpretation apply equally to the interpretation of court rules. In re KH, 469 Mich. 621, 628, 677 N.W.2d 800 (2004).
In general, subject-matter jurisdiction has been defined as a court's power to hear and determine a cause or matter. Bowie v. Arder, 441 Mich. 23, 36, 490 N.W.2d 568 (1992). The circuit court has "original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law. . . ." Const 1963, art 6, § 13. Further, MCL 600.605 provides:
Circuit courts have original jurisdiction to hear and determine all civil claims and remedies, except where exclusive jurisdiction is given in the constitution or by statute to some other court or where the circuit courts are denied jurisdiction by the constitution or statutes of this state.
Thus, circuit courts are presumed to have subject-matter jurisdiction unless jurisdiction is expressly prohibited or given to another court by constitution or statute. Bowie, supra at 38, 490 N.W.2d 568. Here, the essential question is whether the GPTA, as amended in 1999, divested the circuit court of jurisdiction to correct errors pertaining to tax foreclosure actions after a judgment of foreclosure was entered and the period for redemption expired.
MCL 211.78(2) states:
It is the intent of the legislature that the provisions of this act relating to the return, forfeiture, and foreclosure of property for delinquent taxes satisfy the minimum requirements of due process required under the constitution of this state and the constitution of the United States but that those provisions do not create new rights beyond those required under the state constitution of 1963 or the constitution of the United States. The failure of this state or a political subdivision of this state to follow a requirement of this act relating to the return, forfeiture, or foreclosure of property for delinquent taxes shall not be construed to create a claim or cause of action against this state or a political subdivision of this state unless the minimum requirements of due process accorded under the state constitution of 1963 or the constitution of the United States are violated. [Emphasis added.]
And the GPTA's applicable notice provision provides in pertinent part:
(2) The foreclosing governmental unit or its authorized representative shall determine the address reasonably calculated to apprise those owners of a property interest of the pendency of the show cause hearing under section 78j and the foreclosure hearing under section 78k and shall send notice of [these hearings] to those owners, to a person entitled to notice of the return of delinquent taxes under section 78a(4), and to a person to whom a tax deed for property returned for...
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