In re Weisgerber, 96,550.
Decision Date | 26 October 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 96,550.,96,550. |
Citation | 169 P.3d 321 |
Parties | In the Matter of the Appeal of WEISGERBER, James P., from an Order of the Division of Taxation on Assessment of Income Tax. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Mark A. Burghart, of Alderson, Alderson, Weiler, Conklin, Burghart & Crow, L.L.C., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellant James P. Weisgerber.
James Bartle, general counsel, of Legal Services Bureau, Kansas Department of Revenue, argued the cause, and Michael D. Burrichter, of the same office, was with him on the brief for appellee Kansas Department of Revenue.
James P. Weisgerber appeals a decision of the State Board of Tax Appeals (BOTA) upholding an assessment by the Kansas Department of Revenue, Division of Taxation (KDOR) of additional individual income tax, penalties and interest to Weisgerber for tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001, in the total amount of $577, based upon his failure to add back to his adjusted gross income all contributions to the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System (KPERS) that were picked up by his employer. His appeal frames for our consideration a contention that was not within the authorized purview of BOTA — whether K.S.A. 79-32,117(b)(vi), which requires that certain employee contributions to KPERS be added back to adjusted gross income for purposes of Kansas income taxation, is facially unconstitutional. Weisgerber argues this statute violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Kansas Constitutions because certain other public employees are not subject to Kansas income tax on contributions to their retirement plans. We conclude that the statute is constitutional and affirm BOTA's decision upholding the assessment.
The essential facts are not in dispute. The parties filed a joint stipulation before BOTA, and Weisgerber endorsed this stipulation in his live testimony. Although that testimony was apparently intended to explain or elaborate on his constitutional challenge, the parties cite exclusively to the joint stipulation regarding the necessary factual predicate for this appeal. The stipulation includes the following material facts:
Following an evidentiary hearing, BOTA issued an order on March 8, 2006, upholding the assessment and denying Weisgerber's request for relief. Notably, BOTA concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of K.S.A. 79-32,117(b)(vi) and upheld the assessment against the taxpayer. BOTA subsequently denied Weisgerber's petition for reconsideration.
BOTA correctly refrained from considering or deciding Weisgerber's challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, acknowledging that administrative agencies may not rule on constitutional questions. See Zarda v. State, 250 Kan. 364, 368, 826 P.2d 1365, cert. denied 504 U.S. 973, 112 S.Ct. 2941, 119 L.Ed.2d 566 (1992). Although Weisgerber appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. and K.S.A. 74-2426(c)(3), the appeal was transferred to this court on our own motion pursuant to K.S.A. 20-3018(c). We therefore consider the constitutional question in the first instance.
We must grant relief "only if . . . [t]he agency action, or the statute or rule and regulation on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied." K.S.A. 77-621(c)(1). The burden is on the party challenging constitutionality. Blue v. McBride, 252 Kan. 894, Syl. ¶ 1, 850 P.2d 852 (1993). When a party has asserted a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, the question is not whether that statute is authorized by the constitution, but whether it is prohibited thereby. State ex rel. Tomasic v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County/Kansas City, 265 Kan. 779, 787, 962 P.2d 543 (1998).
Kansas statutes are presumed constitutional, and all doubts must be resolved in favor of their validity. Boatright v. Kansas Racing Comm'n, 251 Kan. 240, 243, 834 P.2d 368 (1992). This court "not only has the authority, but also the duty, to construe a statute in such a manner that it is constitutional if the same can be done within the apparent intent of the legislature in passing the statute." State v. Durrant, 244 Kan. 522, 534, 769 P.2d 1174, cert. denied 492 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 3254, 106 L.Ed.2d 600 (1989).
Weisgerber argues that the add-back provision of K.S.A. 79-32,117(b)(vi) violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Kansas Constitutions. K.S.A. 79-32,117 generally itemizes the amounts to be included in an individual's adjusted gross income for purposes of Kansas income taxation. It provides in material part:
. . . .
(vi) Any amount of designated employee contributions picked up by an employer pursuant to K.S.A. 12-5005, 20-2603, 74-4919 and 74-4965, and amendments to such sections." K.S.A. 79-32,117(a), (b)(vi).
In its inclusion of such contributions pursuant to K.S.A. 74-4919, the add-back statute applies generally to all KPERS participants, and its inclusion of K.S.A. 12-5005, K.S.A. 20-2603, and K.S.A. 74-4965 specifically requires an add back by participants in certain local police and firemen pension plans, judges, and participants in the Kansas Police and Firemen's Retirement System. Weisgerber correctly asserts that there are other public employees who are not subject to the add-back statute, specifically employees of the Kansas City, Kansas Board of Public Utilities (K.S.A.13-1246a), the Kansas Board of Regents (K.S.A.74-4925), and employees of certain cities of the first class (K.S.A.13-14,103), none of whom are participants in KPERS.
Weisgerber argues that in requiring an add back to adjusted gross income for KPERS participants, while excluding any such add back for similar contributions to tax deferred plans for other public employees, the statute has impermissibly discriminated against KPERS participants in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the state and federal Constitutions.
The Equal Protection Clause of the United States...
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