In re William T. Morse

• Decision Date: 07 October 1924
• Citation: 126 A. 550,98 Vt. 85
• Parties: IN RE WILLIAM T. MORSE
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

126 A. 550

98 Vt. 85

IN RE WILLIAM T. MORSE

Supreme Court of Vermont

October 7, 1924

May Term, 1924.

COMPLAINT for contempt filed in Supreme Court of Caledonia County, charging respondent with intruding himself into the office of an attorney of said Court, and with pretending to practice law as such attorney. Answer containing general denial of charges by respondent, with special pleas summarized in the opinion. Hearing on commissioner's report at the May Term, 1924. The opinion states the case. Respondent adjudged guilty of contempt.

The respondent is, therefore, adjudged guilty of a contempt of this Court.

Jutten A. Longmoore, State's Attorney, for the State.

Present WATSON, C. J., POWERS, TAYLOR, SLACK, and BUTLER, JJ.

OPINION

SLACK

The respondent is charged with contempt of this Court. The complaint alleges, in brief, that he did, on divers days and times, intrude himself into the office of an attorney of this Court, and did pretend to the office of an attorney of this Court, and did wrongfully pretend to practice law as such attorney, and as such attorney did bring, manage, and conduct divers justice trustee suits, and prays that he be adjudged guilty of a contempt of this Court. The respondent, by way of answer, admits that he acted as agent for different parties under proper power of attorney or appointment, but denies that he did more than he had a legal right to do, and denies that he ever pretended or represented himself to be an attorney at law either of this or any other court, and denies the right of this Court to try him in a summary manner for the offense charged, but insists that he is entitled to a trial thereon by a jury in the Caledonia county court, and insists that if what he did amounted to contempt it was contempt of the court before which he acted and not contempt of this Court. The case was sent to a commissioner to find and report the facts, and is now before us on his report.

The facts found, which are here material, are these: The respondent has never received the oath of an attorney in any court. During the time of the alleged acts he resided, and maintained an office, at Lyndonville, Vermont. His chief occupation was that of an accountant, but he also did a collection business and advised people about business matters. He advertised his business on his stationery, and otherwise, as follows: "W. T. Morse ACCOUNTANT Auditing-Business Law-Collecting Darling Block Lyndonville, Vt."

He made out justice trustee writs "in many instances" for the purpose of enforcing payment of claims received by him for collection, causing as many as twenty-five or thirty such writs to be served by a single officer during the year 1923. Some of these writs he indorsed as attorney, and some he indorsed as acting attorney. Many of the writs which he indorsed had a "scrawl" or "something" before the printed word "attorney," which he claimed indicated and meant "acting," or "acting as." On September 21, 1923, he brought three trustee suits against one McDowell in favor of three different parties. All of these suits were returnable at his office before a justice of the peace. On the back of the writ in each case, he indorsed his name as attorney, "except for a scrawl which appears under his signature in each instance where his indorsement appears." These writs, which are State's Exhibits 2, 3, and 4, are made part of the report, as are all exhibits herein referred to. On October 17, respondent wrote the defendant concerning these suits as follows: "On one of the cases we are not ready with all our proof just yet, and associate counsel cannot be here Saturday, " etc. Later, the three suits were discontinued. On the back of the writ, State's Exhibit 3, the respondent wrote the following: "Suit herein hereby discontinued this 20th day of Oct. 1923," and signed it "W. T. Morse, Atty. for Plf." The discontinuance of the other two suits is evidenced by State's Exhibit 5, which was written and signed by the respondent, and is as follows:

"S. S. McDowell;

You are hereby notified that the suit of Walter M. Lowney Co. against you, returnable at my office in Lyndonville Oct. 20, 1923, at 1 P. M. is discontinued.

Dated at Lyndon this 20th day of October, 1923. W. T. MORSE, Atty. for Plf.

S. S. McDowell;

You are hereby notified that the suit of Lowell Bros. & Bailey Co. against you, returnable at my office in Lyndonville at 3 P. M. is discontinued.

Dated at Lyndon this 20th day of October, 1923. W. T. MORSE, Atty. for Plf."

The latter notices refer to suits commenced by writs marked State's Exhibits 2 and 4, respectively. The respondent claimed that he did not wish to sign these notices of discontinuance as attorney for the plaintiff, and did so at the suggestion of the attorney for the defendant, but it is found that defendant's attorney did not advise the respondent in the matter, but merely asked that the suits be discontinued by someone having authority to do so. Findings concerning other suits brought by the respondent are reported, but as they do not affect the situation, need not be noticed. The respondent never told anyone that he was an attorney at law, and the justices, sheriffs, and constables with whom he did business knew that he was not, and so did such witnesses as appeared before the commissioner. One of the justices, when asked by the respondent to sign writs in blank, consulted an attorney before doing so, but later signed and delivered to the respondent a few such writs. All of the writs used by the respondent were signed by, and returnable before, a justice of the peace.

Proceedings for contempt are of two classes, criminal and civil. While an examination of the authorities shows that the line of demarcation between the two classes is often shadowy and does not run true, and that the learning on the question abounds with fine and superfine distinctions, the distinction supported by the weight of authorities, and which we believe to be the correct one, is that a criminal contempt is one committed directly against the authority of the court, tending to impede or interrupt its proceedings or lessen its dignity, while a civil contempt is one which operates mainly to deprive another party to a suit of some right, benefit, or remedy to which he is entitled under an order of the court. In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 54 C. C. A. 622; Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328, 48 L.Ed. 997, 24 S.Ct. 665; Clay v. Waters, 178 F. 385, 101 C. C. A. 645, 21 Ann. Cas. 897; Hurley v. Com., 188 Mass. 443, 74 N.E. 677, 3 Ann. Cas. 757. In the last named case, the court, referring to criminal contempt, said, "The punishment of such an offense is solely for the vindication of public authority and the majesty of the law." Since criminal contempt is directed against the power and dignity of the court, private parties have little, if any, immediate interest in the proceedings for its punishment. Such is the nature of the case before us.

There would seem to be no doubt on the facts reported but that the respondent acted, and held himself out, as an attorney. Indeed, he in effect admits as much by his explanation of the meaning of the scrawl which he used. It "indicated and meant," says he, acting attorney or acting as attorney. And it appears that he so acted, not in a single instance, or occasionally, but in many instances, apparently every opportunity he had, covering a considerable period of time. To the extent of his ability, he was practicing law in the justice courts of this State in every sense of the word; "acting as" attorney regularly in those courts, using the title of attorney in some instances, as we have seen, without any qualification, and in others with a claimed qualification which the commissioner disposes of by merely stating respondent's claim concerning it without any finding either way.

He attempts to evade the effect of his conduct on the ground that he did not pretend or represent himself to be an attorney at law. But this avenue of escape is not available to him. The word "attorney," unless clearly indicated otherwise, is construed as meaning attorney at law. Danforth v. Egan, 23 S.D. 43, 119 N.W. 1021, 139 A. S. R. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 418; Nolan v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co., 19 Okla. 51, 91 P. 1128; People v. Erbaugh, 42 Colo. 480, 94 P. 349; People v. May, 3 Mich. 598; 1 Thornton on Attys. at Law, 11; 6 C. J. 566. The rule is well stated in People v. May, thus: "The word attorney, when used in connection with proceedings of courts, and the authority to conduct business in them, as well as when employed in a general sense with reference to the transactions of business usually and almost necessarily confided to members of the legal profession, has a fixed and universal signification on which the technical and proper sense unite. The legislator and the judge, the lawyer and the layman, understand it alike, as having reference to a class of persons who are by license constituted officers of courts of justice, and who are empowered to appear and prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and...