Lee v. Lang

• Citation: 192 So. 490,140 Fla. 782
• Parties: LEE, Comptroller, et al. v. LANG, Clerk of Court, et al.
• Decision Date: 28 November 1939
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

192 So. 490

140 Fla. 782

LEE, Comptroller, et al. v. LANG, Clerk of Court, et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

November 28, 1939

Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 1940.

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Leon County; J. B. Johnson, Judge.

Suit by the Lakeland Grocery Company, etc., against J. M. Lee, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, and W. W. Chase as Sheriff of Polk County, Florida, to enjoin the enforcement of a warrant issued for the collection of taxes and penalties. To review an order denying a motion to strike an amendment to the bill of complaint, J. M. Lee, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, and W. W. Chase, as Sheriff of Polk County Florida, opposed by Paul V. Lang, as clerk of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County Florida, and the Lakeland Grocery Company, etc., bring certiorari.

Order affirmed.

THOMAS and CHAPMAN, JJ., dissenting.

COUNSEL

George Couper Gibbs, Atty. Gen., Tyrus A. Norwood Asst. Atty. Gen., and Keen & Allen, of Tallahassee, for petitioners.

J. Lewis Hall, of Tallahassee, and E. C. McClurg, of Lakeland, for respondents.

Richard H. Hunt, of Miami, Waller & Meginniss, of Tallahassee, Hoffman & Robinson, of Miami, B. K. Roberts, of Tallahassee, Mabry, Reaves, Carlton & White, of Miami, Norman E. Cox, of Jacksonville, Calvin Johnson of Tampa, and J. P. Marchant, of Lakeland, amici curiae.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

Writ of certiorari was issued to review an order denying a motion to strike an amendment to the bill of complaint. On the original bill the chancellor granted an injunction restraining J. M. Lee, Comptroller, and others from enforcing a warrant issued for the collection of taxes from Lakeland Crocery Company claimed to be due under Chapter 16848, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1935. The warrant was issued, the original bill was filed and the restraining order entered in January, 1939.

Subsequently the Legislature enacted Chapter 19165, Acts 1939, which we will discuss later, and this act was set out in the amendment to the bill of complaint upon the theory that it was retroactive and that therefore its provisions would affect the suit then pending.

It is the position of the petitioners in this proceeding, defendants in the suit in the circuit court, (1) that the act is prospective only and (2) that if retroactive it is unconstitutional. We approach the questions in this order.

For the purpose of conserving time and space we give only so much of the provisions of section 1 as appears necessary to a proper understanding of the problem before us:

'Whenever any * * * State * * * or Municipal officer * * * annually, for two * * * consecutive years shall have received the taxes * * * for the operation * * * of * * * places of business * * * no such officer * * * shall thereafter prohibit the operation of such places of business * * * nor issue * * * any warrant against the holder of such licenses * * * for any additional license taxes * * *; nor shall any right of action * * * exist * * * for any additional taxes for such places of business * * * for the license years for which such licenses were * * * issued.'

We have italicized the words which must be defined separately and collectively to ascertain the true sense of the provisions.

We pass then to the second problem, whether the law does violence to Sec. 33 of Article III. It inhibits the enactment of a statute 'lessening the time within which a civil action may be commenced on any cause of action existing at the time of its passage.' This, insist respondents, applies because the statute in question, if held retrospective, would interfere with the unpaid tax which there was a right to collect and which was in process of collection under the warrant issued by the Comptroller and involved in the suit at the time the act became effective.

In opposition it is contended that no limitation upon any action was intended and the only purpose was to 'enact into law the doctrine of equitable estoppel.'

We do not think that Section 2927, R.G.S., Section 4647, C.G.L., has any controlling effect in this case because Chapter 19165, supra, is a later legislative enactment and, being in conflict with the former enactment, it takes precedence over the former enactment.

It cannot be seriously questioned that the legislature has the power to suspend or abolish the claim of the State or of its political sub-divisions to a delinquent unpaid excise tax.

We think that an equitable estoppel may be effectuated against the State or its political sub-divisions by legislative enactment. We do not think that the Act here under consideration violates Section 33 of Article III of the Constitution of Florida because the right affected does not constitute basis for civil action. Civil actions have been defined by many courts and generally it may be said that they are actions between citizens to redress private wrongs and enforce individual rights. Some judicial definitions are as follows:

"Civil action' is defined to be * * * 'An action which has for its object the recovery of private or civil rights, or compensation for their infraction." Farnum's Petition, 51 N.H. 376, 383.

'Civil cases are essentially those in which the defendant, or party against whom relief is sought, is a natural person, or corporation, other than the state.' State v. Judge, 15 La. 192.

Civil cases are those which involve disputes or contests between man and man, and which only terminate in the adjustment of the rights of plaintiffs and defendants. They include all cases which cannot legally be denominated criminal cases. Grimball v. Ross, T. U. P. Charlt. (Ga.) 175.

In Cancemi v. People, 18 N.Y. 128, 136, the court said:

'Civil suits relate to and affect, as to the parties against whom they are brought, only individual rights which are within their individual control and which they may part with at their pleasure. The design of such suits is the enforcement of merely private obligations and duties. * * * Criminal prosecutions involve public wrongs, 'a breach and violation of public rights and duties,' which affect 'the whole community, considered as a community, in its social and aggregate capacity.” 3 Bl.Com. 2; Id. 4, 5.

'Concerning the rights of and wrongs to individuals considered as private persons, in contradistinction to criminal or that which concerns the whole political society, the community, state, government: as, civil-action, case, code, court, damage, injury * * * proceeding, procedure, process remedy.' Anderson L. D. (quoting Hockemeyer v. Thompson, 150 Ind. 176, 182, 48 N.E. 1029, 49 N.E. 1059; State v. Frost, 113 Wis. 623, 641, 88 N.W. 912, 89 N.W. 915).

'Civil Action. A civil action has been variously defined as an action to enforce a private or civil right or to redress a private wrong; an action which has for its object the recovery of private or civil rights or compensation for their infraction; an action brought to recover some civil right, or to obtain redress for some wrong not being a crime or misdemeanor.' 1 Corpus Juris 930.

'An action is 'civil' when it lies to enforce a private right, or redress a private wrong.' Rapalje & L.L.D. (quoting Gruetter v. Cumberland Tel., etc., Co., C.C., 181 F. 248, 251).

'The term 'civil action,' as used in statutes, has been held to be 'a proceeding in a court of justice by one party against another for the enforcement or protection of a private right or the redress of a private wrong.' Words and Phrases, vol. 2, [First Series], p. 1183.' Thrift v. Thrift, 30 R.I. 357, 363, 75 A. 484, 487.

'A process for the recovery of individual right or redress of individual wrong.' Stroud's Judicial Decisions 130 (quoting State v. Union Trust Co. of St. Louis, 70 Mo.App. 311, 317).

'A civil action is an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by one party against another, for the enforcement of a private right, or the redress or prevention of a private wrong.' Nelson v. Cowling, 89 Ark. 334, 340, 116 S.W. 890, 893; Jefferson County v. Philpot, 66 Ark. 243, 245, 50 S.W. 453.

'A civil action is one founded on private rights, arising either from contract or tort.' Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 84 Ga. 408, 418, 11 S.E. 396, 399, 8 L.R.A. 189.

'A civil action is a proceeding in a court of justice in which one party, known as the plaintiff, demands against another party, known as the defendant, the enforcement or protection of a private right, or the prevention or redress of a private wrong.' Whitney v. Atlantic Southern R. Co., 53 Iowa 651, 652, 6 N.W. 32, 33; State v. Clarke, 46 Iowa 155, 158. See also In re Bresee, 82 Iowa 573, 577, 48 N.W. 991.

'A civil action is instituted for the purpose of enforcing a private or civil right, or to redress a private wrong, as distinguished from actions instituted to punish crimes, which are known as 'criminal actions." Fenstermacher v. State, 19 Or. 504, 506, 25 P. 142.

'The words 'civil action,' as used in the statutes, include all legal proceedings partaking of the nature of a suit and designed to determine the rights of private parties.' Bryant v. Glidden, 36 Me. 36, 44.

The statute in question created a new defense.

In Pensacola & A. Railroad Co. v. State, 45 Fla....