In re Worker's Compensation Claim of Shryack

• Decision Date: 07 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-142.,98-142.
• Citation: 3 P.3d 850
• Parties: In the Matter of the WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF Roy SHRYACK, an Employee of Carr Construction Company, Inc.: Roy Shryack, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Carr Construction Company, Inc., Appellee (Respondent), and State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, Appellee (Respondent).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

3 P.3d 850

In the Matter of the WORKER'S COMPENSATION CLAIM OF Roy SHRYACK, an Employee of Carr Construction Company, Inc.:

Roy Shryack, Appellant (Petitioner), v. Carr Construction Company, Inc., Appellee (Respondent), and State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, Appellee (Respondent).

No. 98-142.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

April 7, 2000.

Representing Appellant: Donald J. Rissler of Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming.

Representing Appellee: William U. Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,¹ JJ. THOMAS, Justice.

The significant issues raised by Roy Shryack (Shryack) in this case concern the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings of fact made by the Office of Administrative Hearings in its Order Denying Benefits claimed under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-101—XX-XX-XXX (Lexis 1999) (the Act), for a job-related injury, and Shryack's claim that the decision of the hearing examiner was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Collateral issues are raised with respect to an abuse of discretion by the district court in refusing to remand the case to the Office of Administrative Hearings to receive evidence concerning an earlier injury to Shryack and in refusing to allow discovery of possible misconduct on the part of the hearing examiner. In addition, an issue of unconstitutionality of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-101 (Lexis 1999) is asserted, which is foreclosed in a judicial review of a decision of the Office of Administrative Hearings. We are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the findings of fact made by the hearing examiner, and his decision is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remand the case to the Office of Administrative Hearings for additional evidence relating to a 1994 injury or in refusing discovery of possible misconduct of the hearing examiner. The Order Denying Employee/Petitioner's Appeal in Affirming the Judgment of the Hearing Examiner is affirmed.

In the Appellant's Brief, filed on behalf of Shryack, the issues that are raised are:

ISSUE I

Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to reopen appellant's 1994 injury?

ISSUE II

Did the court abuse its discretion in failing to allow discovery of possible misconduct on the part of the hearing examiner?

ISSUE III

Is W.S. § 27-14-101 constitutional under the Wyoming State Constitution?

ISSUE IV

Did the administrative law judge abuse his discretion by ignoring the clear medical evidence on causation in favor of lay testimony?

ISSUE V

Are the overall findings [of] fact in the hearing examiner's decision of May 15, 1997 supported by substantial evidence?

This Statement of the Issues is found in the Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (Division):

The Employee hurt his back at work in 1994, and, despite his doctor's advice, he declined surgery. In 1996, after one month's work for a second employer, he claimed a similar back injury. The Hearing Examiner found he failed to prove any injury arising from his 1996 job.

A. Was the Hearing Examiner's decision supported by substantial evidence?

In the district court, the Employee applied to present additional evidence to prove (1) his 1996 injury was caused by the 1994 accident, and (2) the Hearing Examiner was biased.

B. Did the district court properly deny the application to present additional evidence?

Shryack injured his back in 1994, while working for a previous employer in Cody. Although his physician presented the option of surgery on that occasion, Shryack opted for conservative treatment and therapy. His treatment for that injury was a covered benefit under the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act, and his benefits, including any disability, were charged to the account of his employer in 1994. After completing the prescribed therapy Shryack returned to work.

On October 10, 1996, Shryack was working as a scraper operator for Carr Construction Co. (Carr). He was operating the lead, or pulling, scraper in tandem with another scraper, in what is called a "push-pull" operation. The purpose of the "push-pull" operation is to permit the two scrapers to combine their engine power while loading the scraper buckets. Shryack asserted that, on at least nineteen occasions that day, the pushing scraper hooked up with his scraper hard enough to jar him, and once so hard that his hand was jolted forward and broke the windshield. At the end of his shift, Shryack told his supervisor that his back hurt from the violent hook-ups.

Shryack went to the job site the next morning, but he told his supervisor that his back hurt too much to work. The supervisor directed Shryack to go to the company office and make out an accident report after Shryack said he planned to see a doctor that day. After several referrals, the treating physician diagnosed a herniated disc at L5-S1 in Shryack's back, which he surgically repaired on November 25, 1996.

Shryack filed a Report of Occupational Injury or Disease on October 11, 1996. Carr stated, in its section of the report, that the "injury may not have occurred as reported." An objection was filed to Shryack's claim, and the day after Shryack's surgery, November 26, 1996, the Division issued a Final Determination denying benefits because Shryack's condition was similar to that reported in a 1994 claim, thus suggesting there was no new injury. The Division did advise Shryack that he could file a claim under the 1994 injury file, but instead Shryack presented an Objection to Denial of Benefits and Request for a Hearing, relying upon the advice of his treating physician that the 1996 injury was a new injury.

The Office of Administrative Hearings conducted a hearing on the case, on April 9, 1997. Shryack testified on his own behalf, and presented the deposition testimony of his treating physician, who testified that in his opinion the herniated disc resulted from the 1996 scraper incident. Carr presented evidence that contradicted Shryack's version of the events of October 10, 1996. Carr further suggested that Shryack was not injured while in its employ, but rather his disc problem was a continuation of his 1994 injury. The hearing examiner issued an Order Denying Benefits on May 15, 1997. The hearing examiner explained that he found the testimony of Carr's witnesses more credible than Shryack's testimony, which led to a finding that Shryack failed to meet his burden of proof. Matter of Fisher, 914 P.2d 1224, 1227 (Wyo.1996); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) (Lexis 1999).

Shryack filed, in the district court, a timely Petition for Review of the Order Denying Benefits. He later filed an Application for Presentation of Additional Evidence, seeking to present evidence relating to his 1994 injury and evidence of bias on the part of the hearing examiner. Both parties submitted briefs, and the district court affirmed the hearing examiner's decision, denying at the same time Shryack's request to present new evidence. The district court ruled that "additional evidence would not be material as to any matters in issue as contemplated by Rule 12.08." This appeal is taken by Shryack from the Order Denying Employee/Petitioner's Appeal in Affirming the Judgment of Hearing Examiner.

In his brief and argument, Shryack earnestly reargues the evidence presented at the administrative hearing, in effect asking this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the hearing examiner. Our review, however, is governed by our usual standard of review in these matters:

A claimant for worker's compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence in the contested case hearing. Martinez v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 619, 621 (Wyo.1996). When an agency decides that the party charged with the burden of proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the "[a]rbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law" language of WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990). City of Casper v. Utech, 895 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo.1995). On appeal the complainant * * * has the burden of proving arbitrary administrative action. Knight v. Environmental Quality Council of State of Wyo., 805 P.2d 268 (Wyo.1991); Wyoming Bancorporation v. Bonham, 527 P.2d 432, 439 (Wyo.1974); Marathon Oil Co. v. Welch, 379 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo., 1963); Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526 (1957). The agency, as the trier of fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility of witnesses. Utech, 895 P.2d at 451, and cases there cited. The deference normally accorded to the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the administrative agency, and the agency's decision as to the facts will not be overturned unless it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Wyoming Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873, 875 (Wyo.1994).

Pederson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997).

In his fifth stated issue, Shryack challenges the sufficiency of substantial evidence to support the overall findings in the decision of the hearing examiner. The hearing examiner concluded that Shryack had failed to meet the burden of proof assigned to him. In such an instance, we will not disturb the decision of the hearing examiner unless Shryack carries his burden of proving arbitrary or capricious agency action, or demonstrates that the findings of...