In Re Wright.
| Decision Date | 17 March 1948 |
| Docket Number | No. 593.,593. |
| Citation | 228 N.C. 584,46 S.E.2d 696 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | In re WRIGHT. |
Appeal from Superior Court, Columbus County; J. J. Burney, Judge.
On petition to rehear.
Petition dismissed.
For former opinion, see 228 N.C. 301, 45 S.E.2d 370.
Harry M. McMullan, Atty. Gen, and Ralph M. Moody and J. E. Tucker, Asst. Attys. Gen, for respondent appellant.
Powell & Powell, of Whiteville, for petitioner appellee.
This cause was here at the Fall Term, 1947, and is reported 228 N.C. at page 301, 45 S.E.2d 370. The Department of Motor Vehicles petitions for a rehearing for that (1) the former opinion is erroneous in that it interprets and applies G.S. § 20-16, whereas the license of Wright was revoked under the terms of G.S. § 20-23; and (2) the interpretation placed on G. S. § 20-25, as applied to a revocation of license under G.S. § 20-16 and G.S. § 20-23, is tantamount to a declaration that the statutory provisions relating to the revocation of drivers' licenses are unconstitutional.
In its brief it challenges the right of the court to review the action of the department in revoking the license of a motorist under G.S. § 20-23. It contends that G.S. § 20-25. as interpreted by the Court, is un-constitutional; that the Court, in reviewing the action of the department as therein authorized, is exercising delegated legislative and administrative authority; that the Act sets up no standards for the guidance of the Court, which is left free to exercise an unbridled discretion; and therefore the statute is unconstitutional in that it delegates legislative authority to the Court without prescribing proper standards for the exercise thereof.
This Court, in the consideration of the merits of the original appeal, did not overlook or fail to consider the provisions of G.S. § 20-23. After a careful examination of the original record in the light of the contentions now advanced, we are constrained to adhere to the conclusion there reached.
However, the present petitioner is a department of our government, charged with the duty of enforcing the licensing provisions of our automobile law, and it now asserts that, for the reasons stated in its petition, the former opinion "is quite misleading and confusing" and leaves the enforcing officers in a state of uncertainty as to their rights and duties in enforcing the automobile law. For that reason, without conceding the validity of the criticism, we brought the case back for amplification and clarification.
G.S. § 20-16 and G.S. § 20-23 are parts of the same statute and relate to the same subject matter. Chap. 52, P.L. 1935, G.S. Chap. 20, art. 2. They must be considered in pari materia. When so considered the two sections have the same connotation as if they read:
"The department shall have authority to suspend the license of an operator or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other satisfactory evidence that the licensee (7) has committed an offense in another state which, if committed in this state would be grounds for suspension, and notice of the conviction of such person in another state of any offense therein which, if committed in this state, would be grounds for the suspension or revocation of the license of such operator or chauffeur, shall be deemed and held to be satisfactory evidence, upon the receipt of which the department may either suspend or revoke the license of such operator or chauffeur."
The language of G.S. § 20-16(7) and G.S. § 20-23 is almost identical. The first is the real source of authority. The latter prescribes a rule of evidence and adds the power of revocation, when G.S. § 20-16(7) is the basis of action.
No right accrues to a licensee who petitions for a review of the order of the department when it acts under the terms of G.S. § 20-17, for then its action is mandatory. The court is granted authority to review only suspensions and revocations by the department in the exercise of its discretionary power. G.S. § 20-25.
The jurisdiction vested in the court by this section does not constitute a delegation of legislative and administrative authority. The review is judicial and is governed by the standards and guides which are applicable to other judicial proceedings.
The court has inherent authority to review the discretionary action of any administrative agency, whenever such action affects personal or property rights, upon a prima facie showing, by petition for a writ of certiorari, that such agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in disregard of law. Pue v. Hood, 222 N.C. 310, 22 S.E.2d 896. G.S. § 20-25 dispenses with the necessity of an application for writ of certiorari, provides for direct approach to the courts and enlarges the scope of the hearing. That the Legislature had full authority to impose this additional jurisdiction upon the courts is beyond question. N.C.Constitution Art. IV, sec. 12.
Surely the failure of the Act to provide standards for the guidance of the courts, which already have their own rules of procedure, does not invalidate the statute or negate the jurisdiction. Any litigant may rest assured that those standards and rules to which the courts adhere give full assurance against any unbridled exercise of discretionary power.
G.S. § 20-24(c) provides that "conviction" shall mean a final conviction, and "aforfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure a defendant's appearance in court, which forfeiture has not been vacated, shall be equivalent to a conviction." It is argued that this provision of the statute applies to notice of conviction in another state and sustains the action of the department. This raises the question of the extraterritorial application of the Act--a question which, on this record, is not presented for decision for the reason it is not made to appear that there was any forfeiture of the bail of the licensee.
"Bail" as here used means security for a defendant's appearance in court to answer a criminal charge there pending. Ordinarily it is evidenced by a bond or recognizance which becomes a record of the court. The forfeiture thereof is a judicial act. 6 Am.Jur. 68; State v. Mills, 13 N.C. 555; State v. Hill, 25 N.C. 398; Clark, Crim.Proc. 84.
The judgment that the bond or bail has been forfeited must be entered in the court and in the cause in which it was filed. State v. Sanders, 153 N.C. 624, 69 S.E. 272; State v. Moody, 69 N.C. 529; Tar Heel Bond Co. v. Krider, 218 N.C. 361, 11 S.E.2d 291; State v. Bradsher, 189 N.C. 401, 127 S.E. 349, 38 A.L.R. 1102.
In the ordinary case the condition is not broken by nonappearance generally, to be proved by any evidence, but only by nonappearance in answer to a call, to be proved by an entry made on...
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...of living, and as a vested right. Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75, 88 A.L.R.2d 1055; In re Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696; Thompson v. Thompson, N.D., 78 N.W.2d 395; Application of Goodwin, 173 Misc. 169, 17 N.Y.S.2d 426. In any event, a permit or li......
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...to operating a motor vehicle at a speed in excess of 75 miles per hour. G.S. § 20--16(a)(10). See also In re Revocation of License of Wright, 228 N.C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696 (1948). Upon suspending the operator's license and driving privilege of a person for any of the causes stated in G.S. § 2......
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... ... § 20--16.2(d) has the right to a 'full De novo review by a Superior Court judge.' Underwood v. Howland, Comr. of Motor Vehicles, 274 N.C. 473, 476, 164 S.E.2d 2, 5. Accord, In re Donnelly, 260 N.C. 375, 132 S.E.2d 904; In re Revocation of License of Wright, 228 N.C. 301, 45 S.E.2d 370; Id., 228 N.C. 584, 46 S.E.2d 696; Annot., 97 A.L.R.2d 1367, 1371. This means the court must hear the matter 'on its merits from beginning to end as if no trial or hearing had been held' by the Department and without any presumption in favor of its decision. In re ... ...
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