In the Interest of J.L., No. 13-02-044-CV (Tex. App. 12/28/2006)
| Decision Date | 28 December 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-02-044-CV.,13-02-044-CV. |
| Parties | IN THE INTEREST OF J.L., a Child. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4 of Fort Bend County, Texas.
Before Justices HINOJOSA, YAÑez, and WITTIG.
1
Appellant, Bettina Chavez, appeals an adverse jury verdict and judgment terminating her parental relationship with her minor son, J.L., and appointing Chris Edwards, the biological father, as sole managing conservator. This cause is on remand to this Court from the Texas Supreme Court for a factual sufficiency review. In re J.L., 127 S.W.3d 911 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004), rev'd, 163 S.W.3d 79, 80-81 (Tex. 2005). Because we find the evidence to be factually sufficient, we also review appellant's other ten issues. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On review, the Texas Supreme Court found the evidence supporting termination of the parent-child relationship to be legally sufficient. In the Interest of J.L., a Child 163 S.W.3d 79, 80-81 (Tex. 2005). Both the Supreme Court's opinion and our prior opinion delineate the background and many of the significant facts underlying the jury's findings, both supporting and not supporting the termination of parental rights of appellant. Id. at 85-88; see also In re J.L., 127 S.W.3d at 914-15.
In proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship, the petitioner must establish one or more of the acts or omissions enumerated under subdivision (1) of chapter 161.001 of the family code and must also prove that termination is in the best interest of the child. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1), (2) (Vernon Supp.2006); Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1984). A list of factors that may be considered by the court in determining whether the termination is in the best interest of the child is found at section 263.307 of the family code. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. 263.307 (Vernon 2005); see also Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1976).
The parent-child relationship is recognized and protected by law to such a degree that it is of federal constitutional dimensions. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982) (). The termination of parental rights is final and ends all legal ties between the parent and child, except the child's right of inheritance. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(b) (Vernon 1996); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Because termination of parental rights is such a drastic remedy and is of such weight and gravity, due process requires the petitioner to justify termination by a heightened burden of proof of "clear and convincing evidence." See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001 (Vernon 1996); In re A.D.E., 880 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
When the standard of proof at trial is elevated, the standard of appellate review is also elevated. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex. 2004); see also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266-67 (Tex. 2002). In a factual sufficiency review, we must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Our inquiry must be "whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations." Id. We should consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved that disputed evidence in favor of its finding. Id. If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually insufficient. Id.
The trial court found that the Department had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Bettina had (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.L. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed J.L. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered J.L.'s physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 161.001(1)(D), (E). The trial court also found that the termination of Bettina's parental rights was in the best interest of J.L. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2). Thus the necessary findings were made to terminate parental rights. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)-(2).
Appellant, sometimes referred to as "Bettina," testified that Frank Chavez, her husband, would fly off the handle, lose his temper, and be too rough with Hallie and J.L., his stepchildren. She and Frank had arguments about how he disciplined Hallie and J.L. Frank's rough discipline included spanking J.L. with a belt two or three times, once leaving a red mark on the child's hand. In another incident, Frank angrily lifted Hallie by one arm, threw her into the seat of the car, and later either kicked or pushed her into the residence with his foot following an incident at a store. This incident resulted in a physical confrontation between Frank and Bettina with Frank shoving Bettina. Hallie was in Frank's care when she met her untimely demise. Her death was ruled a homicide.
In another earlier episode prior to Hallie's death, Bettina delayed getting Hallie medical treatment for many days. Once treated, Hallie was diagnosed as having had a stroke.
Before Hallie died, Bettina delayed treatment for five days because she was worried about getting in trouble with CPS. She did not call 911 until the child had vomited multiple times, turned blue, and stopped breathing. Hallie previously had asthma, a stroke, seizures, E. coli bacterial infection and obviously required more than normal medical attention.
Hallie's autopsy and other medical evidence showed she died as a result of complications from blunt trauma to the abdomen while in Frank's care. Hallie had several internal injuries of varying ages. Mature fibrous adhesions in the small intestine were older than six weeks. The adhesions suggested previous injury or infection. She had blood in the abdominal tissues. Her ribs were fractured approximately fourteen to thirty days before death. Her back had a yellowish bruising believed to have been incurred five to seven days prior to death. More recent bruises on her back were a few days old or less. There was evidence of hemorrhages in several different places in Hallie's abdomen of recent origin. There were also hemorrhages in the liver and around the pancreas, right kidney and adrenal gland. These hemorrhages were in the area of her perforated intestine.
Appellant denied Frank was violent, although she admitted she hit and probably kicked Frank.
According to expert testimony, Hallie's homicide was cause by blunt force trauma to the stomach equivalent to a fall from a ten-story building. Appellant's expert disagreed because there were no marks or bruises on the child's stomach but conceded that Hallie suffered some traumatic event to her stomach which caused her death.
The guardian ad litem recommended appellant's parental rights be terminated based upon the autopsy report and the previous investigation surrounding Hallie's stoke in 1998.
We also review evidence that does not support the jury's finding that Bettina endangered J.L. under sections 161.001(1)(D) and (E). Again, we will not reiterate all of the evidence found in the two prior opinions involving appellant.
Contrary evidence suggested Hallie's stomach injury leading to her death could have been caused by the administration of CPR. Frank maintained Hallie fell out of bed and drank bath water. She also had a fall down the stairs. Two prior CPS investigations concerning the belt spanking and Hallie's stroke could not determine whether or not the child had been abused. Hospital records indicated Hallie's stroke and seizures were not caused by abuse. After Hallie's death, there were no bruises on Hallie's abdomen. Two doctors testified Bettina may not have been alerted to Hallie's need for medical care before her death. Chris, J.L.'s natural father, was friendly toward Bettina and expressed his desire that Bettina still see J.L. Chris also thought Bettina was a good mother and met the children's emotional needs.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and recognizing that the jury is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of witnesses, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that Bettina (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed J.L. to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered his physical or emotional well-being; and (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed J.L. with persons who engaged in conduct that endangered J.L.'s physical or emotional well-being. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)(D), (E). In light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of these finding is not so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction in the findings made and thus the clear and convincing standard is met. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266-67.
We also evaluate the evidence in support of the jury's finding that the termination of appellant's parental rights was in J.L.'s best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(2). The jury charge instructed that some factors to consider in determining the best interest of the child were: the desires of the child; the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; the parenting ability of the individuals seeking custody; the...
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