In the Interest of C.L.B., v. Juvenile Officer

• Decision Date: 18 July 2000
• Citation: 22 S.W.3d 233
• Parties: (Mo.App. W.D. 2000) . In the Interest of: C.L.B., Appellant, v. Juvenile Officer, Respondent. Case Number: WD57240 Missouri Court of Appeals Western District Handdown Date: 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

22 S.W.3d 233 (Mo.App. W.D. 2000)

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

In the Interest of: C.L.B., Appellant, v. Juvenile Officer, Respondent.

Case Number: WD57240

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District

Handdown Date: 07/18/2000

Appeal From: Circuit Court of Jackson County, Hon. Ronald R. Holliger

Counsel for Appellant: Martina L. Peterson

Counsel for Respondent: Donald Lee Cain

Opinion Summary:

C.L.B. was on probation, and under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, at the time he was alleged to have committed a robbery. The Juvenile Officer filed a motion to modify, asking the court to find not just that C.L.B. had violated his probation by committing the crime, but to adjudicate C.L.B.'s guilt of the crime. Accordingly, a trial was held, and the juvenile court found C.L.B. guilty of the lesser-included offense of stealing from a person. Because C.L.B. was already under the court's supervision, the court applied a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof in reaching its determination of guilt. On appeal, C.L.B. argues that, because the trial court actually adjudicated his guilt of the crime of stealing, rather than merely finding that he had violated his probation by stealing, the court was required to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. He further argues that, under either standard of proof, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Division One holds: While it is true that hearings intended to result solely in the revocation of one's probation permit standards of proof less burdensome than requiring a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, here the Juvenile Officer asked the court to actually find C.L.B. guilty of the crime of robbery. As a matter of public policy and due process, an adjudication of the guilt of a juvenile already under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court of an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult must be made based on proof of quilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, counsel for the Juvenile Officer could offer no rationale for distinguishing between the clear and convincing standard of proof he argues in necessary to adjudicate the guilt of a juvenile already under the court's jurisdiction and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof necessary to convict all other persons of a crime. In addition, he concedes that the collateral consequences of finding C.L.B. guilty of this crime are identical to those suffered by a juvenile not under the jurisdiction of the court and adjudicated guilty of the crime. For this reason, the motion to modify procedure cannot be used to provide a forum for an adjudication of guilt of an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult, with all the collateral consequences of a conviction of that offense, unless a beyond a reasonable doubt standard is applied to that aspect of the trial.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, in addition to C.L.B.'s presence at the scene at the time the victim's purse was taken, the victim testified that before and after the incident she saw C.L.B. together with the individual who actually took her purse. She also saw the two meet near a mall across the street where the police later found the purse. However, just as the judge could have inferred from this evidence that C.L.B. was involved in the crime, contrary inferences could have been drawn from the fact that C.L.B., unlike the perpetrator, did not run when the police arrived, did not share the proceeds, and his involvement in distracting the victim was unclear. Because this Court cannot determine on these facts whether the improper application of the clear and convincing evidence standard rather than a beyond a reasonable doubt standard affected the court's judgment, the cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Opinion Author: Laura Denvir Stith, Judge

Opinion Vote: REVERSED AND REMANDED. Ellis, J., and Howard , P.J., concur.

Opinion:

C.L.B. was on probation, and under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, at the time he was alleged to have committed a robbery. The Juvenile Officer filed a motion to modify, asking the court to find not just that C.L.B. had violated his probation by committing the crime, but to adjudicate C.L.B.'s guilt of the crime. Accordingly, a trial was held, and the juvenile court found C.L.B. guilty of the lesser included offense of stealing from a person. Because C.L.B. was already under the court's supervision, the court applied a "clear and convincing evidence" standard of proof in reaching its determination of guilt.

On appeal, C.L.B. argues that, because the court below actually adjudicated his guilt of the crime of stealing, rather than merely finding that he had violated his probation by stealing, the court was required to apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He further argues that, under either standard of proof, the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction.

We agree with C.L.B. that, because he was not just found to have violated his probation, but was adjudicated guilty of the crime of stealing from a person, it was error to apply a clear and convincing evidence of proof; his guilt or innocence of a crime must be determined under a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. Because we believe that an issue of fact exists as to whether the juvenile court would find C.L.B. guilty of stealing from a person if this standard had been applied, we reverse and remand for a new trial on this issue.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 26, 1998, the Juvenile Officer filed a Petition alleging that C.L.B. had committed the class A misdemeanor of stealing, in violation of Section 570.030 RSMo Cum. Supp. 1997, and asking that he be placed under the jurisdiction of the family court pursuant to Section 211.031(3) RSMo 1994. Family Court Judge Jay A. Daugherty found C.L.B. guilty of the offense, and committed him to the custody of the Juvenile Officer. The judge then suspended the execution of the commitment, placed C.L.B. on probation, and returned him to the custody of his father, subject to the supervision of the Juvenile Officer, until further order of the court.

On March 9, 1999, Donald L. Cain, attorney for the Juvenile Officer, filed a three-count Third Amended Motion to Modify, in which he asked the court to modify its previous disposition. Counts I and II alleged behavior injurious to the juvenile's welfare, in that C.L.B. had left home without his parents' permission and had left a halfway house without permission, and alleged that these acts constituted violations of C.L.B.'s probation. Count III alleged that C.L.B. had committed Robbery in the Second Degree, a Class B Felony, in violation of Section 569.030 RSMo 1994.

On April 19, 1999, a hearing was held before Family Court Judge Ronald R. Holliger. C.L.B. admitted the probation violations set out in Counts I and II, but denied he was involved in the robbery alleged in Count III. The parties then presented evidence on Count III, which showed as follows:

On February 20, 1999, Marilyn Walker completed her grocery shopping at the Price Chopper grocery store at 9550 Blue Ridge Boulevard in Kansas City, Missouri and exited the store. At that time, her purse was in her shopping cart in front area where small children usually sit. As Ms. Walker positioned the cart near her car and opened her trunk to load her groceries, she noticed that two young black males walked out of Price Chopper together and were headed down one of the aisles in the parking lot. She had begun to put her groceries in the car when she noticed one of the boys, whom she identified at trial as C.L.B., approaching her. Ms. Walker believed C.L.B. had come too close to her, and began to turn around to see what had happened to the other boy, when the other boy grabbed her purse from the cart and took off running.While the boy who had taken the purse ran away, C.L.B. casually walked away toward some other stores in the parking lot. Ms. Walker finished putting her groceries in her car, locked the car trunk and asked a man whether he could call the police, as her purse had just been stolen. She then yelled at C.L.B. to come back. He replied that he did not take her purse and kept walking. Because she had seen C.L.B. and the other boy together, she believed C.L.B. would know the name of the boy who took her purse. She therefore followed C.L.B., grabbed his arm and demanded that he remain there until the police arrived. In an effort to pull away, he punched her in her side and pushed her. She grabbed him again and he again resisted in similar fashion. At this point, Ms. Walker took the bag of groceries C.L.B. had been carrying, went into the nearby Conoco convenience store, and asked one of the employees to call the police.

C.L.B. followed Ms. Walker into the Conoco store and demanded that she return his groceries. When she would not return them to him, he left. Ms. Wilson testified that after C.L.B. left, she watched him cross to the east side of Blue Ridge Boulevard, near some other stores. She saw him meet up there with the boy who had taken the purse, and observed them walk together toward a bus stop.

The boys were still across the street when the police arrived. The boy who had taken the purse ran away at that point, but C.L.B. remained at the bus stop. He was questioned by police, and admitted that he knew the person who took the purse, but denied having anything to do with the robbery. Ms. Walker's purse was recovered in the same area where she claims to have seen the two boys together.

Defense counsel argued that, in determining whether this evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of Count III, the judge was required to apply a "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof, because C.L.B.'s guilt of the crime of robbery was being adjudicated. The Juvenile Officer argued...