In the Matter of Kathleen K.
| Decision Date | 09 June 2011 |
| Citation | 929 N.Y.S.2d 535,2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 04768,17 N.Y.3d 380,953 N.E.2d 773 |
| Parties | In the Matter of KATHLEEN K., a Child Alleged to be Permanently Neglected.Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent;Steven K., Appellant.(And Two Other Proceedings.) |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
17 N.Y.3d 380
953 N.E.2d 773
929 N.Y.S.2d 535
2011 N.Y. Slip Op. 04768
In the Matter of KATHLEEN K., a Child Alleged to be Permanently Neglected.Suffolk County Department of Social Services, Respondent;Steven K., Appellant.(And Two Other Proceedings.)
Court of Appeals of New York.
June 9, 2011.
[929 N.Y.S.2d 537] Feldman and Feldman, Uniondale (Steven A. Feldman and Arza Feldman of counsel), for appellant.Christine Malafi, County Attorney, Riverhead (James G. Bernet and Ann K. Kandel of counsel), for respondent.Judd & Moss, P.C., Ronkonkoma (Francine H. Moss of counsel), Attorney for the Children.
[953 N.E.2d 775]
OPINION OF THE COURTIn June 2007, child neglect proceedings were commenced, pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, by Suffolk County Child Protective Services against appellant Steven K., the father of Kathleen K. and Rachel K. At a hearing on June 5, 2007, testimony was elicited indicating that Steven K. had subjected his children and spouse to mental and physical abuse. Family Court issued a temporary order of protection directing Steven K. to cease all contact with his children except for supervised visitation. At a subsequent trial on September 7, 2007, Family Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Steven K. had neglected his children. Consequently, in the best interests of the children, the order of protection was made permanent; the children were placed in the foster care of the Suffolk County Department of Social Services (DSS); and Steven K. was ordered to, among other things, undergo a mental health evaluation, attend a parenting skills program, and obtain safe and suitable housing.1
At a hearing on January 22, 2009, after learning that Steven K. had failed to comply with the court-ordered conditions, Family Court concluded that the permanency goal for the children should be modified to “free [them] for adoption” and directed DSS to file a petition seeking the termination of Steven K.'s parental rights. The mother of the children voluntarily surrendered her parental rights on December 18, 2008, and DSS filed parental right termination petitions on January 22, 2009 against Steven K. on the ground of permanent neglect ( see Social Services Law § 384–b [7] ).
On March 31, 2009, prior to the commencement of trial, counsel for Steven K. made an application to the court “to be [17 N.Y.3d 384] relieved from this case” on the basis that Steven K. had “refused to work with [counsel] to discuss, to prepare for this trial.” The attorney further argued that it was impossible to work with, or provide effective assistance to Steven K. because of his recalcitrant behavior. Family Court inquired about the application directly with Steven K., but in an exchange with the court, his response did not address the application; instead he spoke about personal medical issues, financial issues, and the possibility of an adjournment of the trial. Family Court denied the application. After DSS had called its first witness, the following colloquy occurred between Family Court and Steven K.:
“the court: And you are not in a position to object. You have a lawyer. You cannot object.
“[steven k.]: I asked for the lady to be terminated.
“the court: You're ready to proceed on your own?
“[steven k.]: If I have to.
“the court: You can't proceed on your own. You don't know the law.
“[steven k.]: We went through this already.
[929 N.Y.S.2d 538]
[953 N.E.2d 776]
“the court: Sorry.“[steven k.]: So you're refusing me an assignment of counsel.
“the court: I gave you counsel.
“[steven k.]: I turned it down.”
Additionally, on April 2, 2009, counsel for Steven K. stated that she was renewing her application to be relieved and his application to represent himself. Family Court again denied the motion.
Following the completion of trial, Family Court terminated Steven K.'s parental rights due to his persistent failure to comply with court-mandated conditions and the lack of evidence evincing efforts to adequately provide for his family.2 The Appellate Division unanimously upheld the disposition, holding that Steven K.'s applications to represent himself were not unequivocal and timely ( 71 A.D.3d 1146, 1147, 899 N.Y.S.2d 271 [2d Dept.2010] ). This Court granted leave to appeal (15 N.Y.3d 702, 905 N.Y.S.2d 804, 931 N.E.2d 1060 [2010] ), and we now affirm on the same basis.
It is well settled that a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel concomitantly includes the right to refuse [17 N.Y.3d 385] appointed counsel ( see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 [1975]; People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 324 N.E.2d 322 [1974]; U.S. Const. Amend. VI; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 6). In the seminal case Faretta, the United States Supreme Court explained that the right to defend oneself in a criminal proceeding is a personal right, i.e., it is defendant's right, not counsel's, to be informed of the charges and to confront the witnesses against him. Consequently, a criminal defendant can decline representation, but self-representation is not an unfettered right. The trial court must ensure that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives counsel before permitting the individual to forgo counsel and proceed pro se ( id. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 [the court must ensure that “(defendant) knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open”] ). That a defendant lacks legal skill or knowledge is not a preclusive bar to self-representation so long as the defendant voluntarily waives the right to counsel ( id. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525 [“(T)echnical legal knowledge, as such, was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself”] ).
New York similarly guarantees a constitutional right of self-representation to criminal defendants. This Court has...
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