People v. McIntyre

• Decision Date: 20 December 1974
• Citation: 36 N.Y.2d 10,324 N.E.2d 322,364 N.Y.S.2d 837
• Parties: , 324 N.E.2d 322 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John A. McINTYRE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 837

364 N.Y.S.2d 837

36 N.Y.2d 10, 324 N.E.2d 322

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John A. McINTYRE, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 20, 1974.

Victor J. Rocco, New York City, for appellant.

Eugene Gold, Dist. Atty. (Richard C. Laskey, Brooklyn, of counsel), for respondent.

WACHTLER, Judge.

In connection with a robbery of a Brooklyn grocery store in August, 1966, the defendant John McIntyre, was indicted for murder in the first degree of the proprietress, one Ida Kaplan, and robbery in the first degree. After a jury trial the defendant was convicted and sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment for murder and a term of from 15 to 30 years on the robbery conviction, both sentences to run concurrently. Prompted by evidence adduced at a posttrial hearing the Appellate Division reversed (People v. McIntyre, 31 A.D.2d 964, 299 N.Y.S.2d 88) and ordered a new trial indicating that the image of justice would be better served. The instant appeal stems from events occurring at the second trial.

After the jury had been drawn but not yet impaneled, the defendant, through counsel, asked that he be permitted to try the case himself and that counsel be permitted to sit with him as an adviser. The trial court inquired into the defendant's background. Defense counsel responded by noting that the defendant had attended college for one year and was last employed as a furniture designer. Whereupon the court asked the defendant if he thought counsel was incompetent to defend him. After the defendant answered that counsel was very competent, he was ordered to sit down.

The ensuing portion of the colloquy is revealed in the following excerpt from the record:

'The Court: Of course you know exactly what I mean. You know exactly what's going to happen. The defendant will start questions, there will be an objection, objection sustained. The defendant will start looking at the ceiling and looking at the wall, and he won't know what to do.

'Defendant: I wouldn't.

'The Court: He thinks he's probably the greatest lawyer and God's gift to the legal profession. That comes after talking with three or four jailhouse lawyers. But you and I, Mr. Legum (defense counsel) know that he's not a lawyer.

'Mr. Legum: The defendant asks for permission to speak to you himself as to why he wants to represent himself.

'The Court: No, he can talk through you. He can tell you what he intends to do. He doesn't know at the very outset, I'm being asked to permit a man to defend himself when he doesn't know at the very beginning that he's not under any obligation to defend himself. He said to you and I heard him, that he's under an obligation to defend himself.

'Is the jury on the way?

'Defendant: F * * * the jury. I'm not going to trial. (Whereupon the defendant jumped up, knocked the chair over.)

'The Court: All right, all right. Put the handcuffs on the defendant. Tie him to the chair, please.'

After lecturing the defendant on courtroom decorum and eliciting a promise of good behavior from the defendant, the court formally denied the Pro se motion. The record indicates that the denial was based on the defendant's outburst, the defendant's assertion that assigned counsel was very competent and the court's general inquiry.

The motion was subsequently denied for a second time and the case proceeded without further interruption. The jury found McIntyre guilty of murder and robbery, both in the first degree.

On appeal the Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the trial court was justified in denying the Pro se motion in light of the defendant's inability to maintain self-control. Mr. Justice Hopkins interpreted the record differently and dissented on the ground that the defendant's conduct was a direct reaction to the wrongful denial of his request.

The threshold issue presented in this case is the nature and extent of a criminal defendant's right to conduct his own defense.

In the wake of recent landmark decisions in the Supreme Court (e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158) and the long and uniform recognition of the right to counsel in criminal proceedings by New York courts (e.g., People v. Koch, 299 N.Y. 378, 381, 87 N.E.2d 417, 418; People ex rel. Saunders v. Board of Supervisors, 1 Sheld. 517, 524), an assertion of the right to defend Pro se is ironic and perhaps enigmatic. Nonetheless the right to self-representation embodies one of the most cherished ideals of our culture; the right of an individual to determine his own destiny. This concept was dramatically articulated in United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno (2 Cir., 348 F.2d 12, 15): 'Moreover, even in cases where the accused is harming himself by insisting on conducting his own defense, respect for individual autonomy requires that he be allowed to go to jail under his own banner if he so desires and if he makes the choice 'with eyes open'.'

However, we cannot disregard the countervailing interest of society in the equally powerful ideal that our criminal justice system must determine the truth or falsity of the charges in a manner consistent with fundamental fairness. Any attempt to reconcile these ideals which are inherently antagonistic in this context raises grave constitutional (both State and Federal) statutory and decisional issues. In light of the multifaceted problems generated by a motion to proceed Pro se, the task of the trial court is exceedingly difficult.

At the outset we note that the right to defend Pro se is deeply ingrained in our common law. The constitutional dimension of the right to defend Pro se is evidenced by the fact that it has been sustained by various sections of the Federal Constitution (see, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (correlative right of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); United States v. Plattner, 2 Cir., 330 F.2d 271 (implicit in Sixth Amendment rights, and protected under the liberty clause of the Fifth Amendment due process); compare United States ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 2 Cir., 348 F.2d 12, Supra (the Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment due process right to essential fairness); Cappetta v. State, Fla.App., 204 So.2d 913 (Fla.) (Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process clause) with Juelich v. United States, 5 Cir., 342 F.2d 29 (the right to a fair trial demands representation by counsel)). Additionally, the right to self-representation was codified in the Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, § 35, 1 U.S.Stat. 73, 92) and is presently contained in the United States Code (tit. 28, § 1654). Notwithstanding this plethora of authority, the United States Supreme Court has never specifically determined whether or not the right to conduct one's own defense is constitutionally guaranteed. This question may be resolved shortly in the case of Faretta v. California (No. 73--5773, argued Nov. 19, 1974).

However, our court need not reach the question of whether the right to defend Pro se is founded in the Federal Constitution because the New York State Constitution and criminal procedure statute clearly recognize this right (N.Y.Const., art. I, § 6; Code Crim.Pro., § 8, subd. 2; CPL, Consol.Laws, c. 11A, 170.10, subd. 6 (information or misdemeanor complaint); 180.10, subd. 5 (felony complaint); 210.15, subd. 5 (indictment)). Furthermore, our court has repeatedly acknowledged the defendant's right to conduct his own defense (see, e.g., People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104, 213 N.E.2d 441; People v. Koch, 299 N.Y. 378, 87 N.E.2d 417; People v. McLaughlin, 291 N.Y. 480, 53 N.E.2d 356; People v. Price, 262 N.Y. 410, 187 N.E. 298).

Unlike the right to counsel which by virtue of judicial scrutiny has been well defined in recent years (see, e.g., People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462, 329 N.Y.S.2d 801, 280 N.E.2d 637; People ex rel. Menechino v. Warden, 27 N.Y.2d 376, 318 N.Y.S.2d 449, 267 N.E.2d 238) the limitations, if any, on the right to defend Pro se remain largely undefined. For a variety of reasons we are hesitant to sanction the unfettered exercise of this right. An examination into the factors motivating a defendant to elect to proceed alone will demonstrate some of the dangers inherent in that choice.

Generally, a defendant desires to conduct his own defense for any one or a combination of various reasons. Probably the most common reason is the desire to evoke the jury's sympathy for a lone defendant pitted against the Goliath of the State (see, e.g., People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 238 P.2d 1001; Note, Right of an Accused to Proceed Without Counsel, 49 Minn.L.Rev. 1133). A corollary situation is the Pro se defendant who is influenced by a blind faith belief in his innocence and the infallibility of justice (see, generally, Laub, Problem of the Unrepresented, Misrepresented and Rebellious Defendant in Criminal Court, 2 Duquesne L.Rev. 245).

Frequently, the Pro se defendant is motivated by dissatisfaction with the trial strategy of defense counsel or a lack of confidence in his attorney (e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268, Supra; Burstein v. United States, 9 Cir., 178 F.2d 665). Disagreement over trial strategy is particularly frustrating to a defendant in light of holdings indorsing counsel's view when a difference of opinion arises (e.g., Nelson v. California, 9 Cir., 346 F.2d 73). Another consideration may be a desire to save legal costs when the defendant is of moderate resources and not eligible for assigned counsel (e.g., United States v. Redfield, 9 Cir., 197 F.Supp. 559, 567--568, affd. 295 F.2d 249, cert. den. 369 U.S. 803, 82 S.Ct. 642, 7 L.Ed.2d 550).

Other defendants, particularly those involved in 'political' trials, view counsel as an extension of the oppressive system which they dis...