In The Matter Of D.S.

• Decision Date: 17 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 273PA09.,273PA09.
• Citation: 364 N.C. 184,694 S.E.2d 758
• Parties: In the Matter of D.S.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

364 N.C. 184

694 S.E.2d 758

In the Matter of D.S.

No. 273PA09.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 17, 2010.

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, 197 N.C.App. 598, 682 S.E.2d 709 (2009), affirming in part and vacating in part adjudication and disposition orders entered 16 April 2008 by Judge James G. Bell in District Court, Robeson County. Heard in the Supreme Court 6 January 2010.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.

Peter Wood, Raleigh, for juvenile-appellee.

HUDSON, Justice.

Here we address whether a Robeson County juvenile court counselor (“JCC”) complied with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1703 when the JCC filed a petition alleging D.S. to be delinquent, and if not, whether the failure to do so deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals determined that the JCC did not timely file the juvenile delinquency petition alleging sexual battery in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1703. In re D.S., 197 N.C.App. 598, ----, 682 S.E.2d 709, 711 (2009). Relying on a prior opinion from that court, which holds that such failure divests the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals “vacate[d] the sexual battery adjudication.” Id. at ----, 682 S.E.2d at 710-11 (citing In re J.B., 186 N.C.App. 301, 303, 650 S.E.2d 457, 458 (2007)). Because we conclude that the JCC here timely filed the juvenile delinquency petition in accordance with N.C.G.S. § 7B-1703, which in any event does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse.

The record tends to show that in September 2007, D.S. and A.A. were fifth grade classmates. It was alleged that during class on 21 September 2007, D.S. touched A.A. multiple times on her buttocks and between her legs with a straw-like candy, known as Pixy Stix. Later A.A. told School Resource Officer Denise Ward (“SRO Ward”) what had occurred.

SRO Ward filed a complaint with Robeson County JCC Chris Britt (“Mr. Britt”) alleging D.S. to be delinquent for committing simple assault by “touching [A.A.] on her butt, [two] times with his hands” on 21 September 2007, in violation of N.C.G.S. § 14-33(a). Mr. Britt received the complaint on 25 September 2007, and on 10 October 2007, he approved the complaint for filing. Based thereon, Mr. Britt filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging simple assault with the clerk of superior court. On 15 November 2007, Mr. Britt received a second complaint from SRO Ward regarding the same 21 September 2007 incident. This complaint alleged D.S. had violated N.C.G.S. § 14-27.5 in that D.S. “for the purpose of sexual arousal or sexual gratification engage[d] in sexual contact, by placing his hand on the buttocks of ... [A.A.], by force and against [her] will.” On 16 November 2007, Mr. Britt approved this complaint for filing and filed a second juvenile delinquency petition with the clerk's office, this time alleging sexual battery.

In April 2008 the District Court in Robeson County entered an adjudication order finding D.S. delinquent for committing both offenses. The court then entered an order imposing a Level I disposition, which placed D.S. on probation for a period of up to twelve months. D.S. appealed the adjudication order to the Court of Appeals.

In the Court of Appeals D.S. argued that the trial court erred by adjudicating him delinquent of both simple assault and sexual battery. The Court of Appeals rejected D.S.'s arguments as to simple assault and affirmed the trial court's delinquency adjudication based on that charge. Id. at ----, 682 S.E.2d at 712. However, the court agreed with D.S. that “the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the second petition alleging sexual battery” because the JCC did not file it within the time period mandated by section 7B-1703. Id. at ----, 682 S.E.2d at 711. The court explained:

In the case before us, the [JCC] received all of the information regarding the allegations against [D.S.] on 25 September 2007, but failed to act swiftly when he filed the second petition over 50 days later. Because it was untimely filed, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the second petition alleging sexual battery. Therefore, the order adjudicating D.S. as a delinquent juvenile on the allegations of sexual battery must be vacated.

Id. at ----, 682 S.E.2d at 711. Having so concluded, the court “vacate[d] the adjudication and disposition orders for D.S. on the allegations of sexual battery.” Id. at ----, 682 S.E.2d at 712.

On 6 July 2009, the State filed a petition for discretionary review with this Court seeking review of the following two issues:

Did the Court of Appeals err by holding that the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1703 are jurisdictional prerequisites in juvenile delinquency cases?

Even if N.C.G.S. § 7B-1703 is a jurisdictional statute, did the Court of Appeals err by holding the trial court had no jurisdiction

where the complaint alleging sexual battery was received by the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention one day prior to the filing of the juvenile petition?

We allowed the State's petition for discretionary review.

The State argues that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that: (1) The N.C.G.S. § 7B-1703 timing requirements are prerequisites for the district court to obtain subject matter jurisdiction in a juvenile delinquency case; and (2) Mr. Britt did not comply with these requirements. We agree, although we address these issues in reverse order.

Our principal task here is to interpret the statute. In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court follows traditional rules of statutory construction.

Legislative intent controls the meaning of a statute; and in ascertaining this intent, a court must consider the act as a whole, weighing the language of the statute, its spirit, and that which the statute seeks to accomplish. The statute's words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires them to be construed differently.

Shelton v. Morehead Mem'l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 81-82, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986) (citations omitted). Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law and are reviewed de novo. E.g.,

Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998) (citation omitted).

The statutory timeline for juvenile delinquency petitions is set forth in section 7B-1703, which provides in pertinent part:

(a) The juvenile court counselor shall complete evaluation of a complaint within 15 days of receipt of the complaint, with an extension for a maximum of 15 additional days at the discretion of the chief court counselor. The juvenile court counselor shall decide within this time period whether a complaint shall be filed as a juvenile petition.

(b) Except as provided in G.S. 7B-1706, if the juvenile court counselor determines that a complaint should be filed as a petition, the counselor shall file the petition as soon as practicable, but in any event within 15 days after the complaint is received, with an extension for a maximum of 15 additional days at the discretion of the chief court counselor. The juvenile court counselor shall assist the complainant when necessary with the preparation

and filing of the petition, shall include on it the date and the words “Approved for Filing”, shall sign it, and shall transmit it to the clerk of superior court.

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1703(a), (b) (2007).

Here we first hold that the JCC, Mr. Britt, complied with the statute. Section 7B-1703 states that a JCC has “15 days after the complaint is received, with an extension for a maximum of 15 additional days at the discretion of the chief court counselor,” to file a complaint as a juvenile petition. Id. § 7B-1703(b). Thus, we look for the meaning of the phrase “after the complaint is received.” Id.

The State argues that the Court of Appeals interpreted the term “complaint” in a manner that completely contravenes the plain language of section 7B-1703. Specifically, the State contends that (1) a “complaint” is a written, sworn document that contains the allegation(s) against the juvenile; (2) as evidenced by Chapter 7B, Article 17, the JCC's role in screening and evaluating a complaint is largely ministerial and limited to considering the specific charge(s) alleged therein; (3) Mr. Britt could not have filed a petition alleging sexual battery based upon the first complaint, which did not allege that D.S. had committed sexual battery; (4) because the second complaint contained new allegations, that complaint was “received” by Mr. Britt on 15 November 2007; and (5) therefore, Mr. Britt complied with section 7B-1703 by filing the petition alleging sexual battery the next day, 16 November 2007.

The juvenile responds that 15 November 2007 could only qualify as the date Mr. Britt “received” the second complaint if the second complaint was based on new information or evidence, not merely new allegations. Further, he contends that Mr. Britt essentially “bur[ied] his head in the sand and ignore[d] the facts” behind the first complaint and that Mr. Britt should have conducted a “reasonable investigation based on the facts [that were] readily available” at the time. Had Mr. Britt done so, the juvenile maintains, Mr. Britt would or should have known to include the sexual battery allegation in the first petition.

The Court of Appeals explicitly acknowledged that two complaints were filed here. In re D.S., 197 N.C.App. at ----, 682 S.E.2d at 711. Despite this finding, the court appeared to conclude that because both petitions apparently arose from the same incident, and because Mr. Britt learned of these facts when he received the first complaint, the date he “received” the complaint alleging sexual battery was 25 September 2007, not 15 November 2007. Id. at ----, 682 S.E.2d at 711. In reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals treated the underlying allegations, rather...