In the Matter of The Det. of D.F.F.†

• Decision Date: 14 July 2011
• Docket Number: No. 81687–5.,81687–5.
• Citation: 256 P.3d 357,172 Wash.2d 37
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: In the Matter of the DETENTION OF D.F.F.†

172 Wash.2d 37

256 P.3d 357

In the Matter of the DETENTION OF D.F.F.†

No. 81687–5.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Sept. 15, 2009.Decided July 14, 2011.

Anne Elizabeth Egeler, Robert Andrew Antanaitis, Office of the Attorney General, Olympia, WA, for Petitioner.Nancy P. Collins, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.Michele Lynn Earl–Hubbard, Christopher Roslaniec, Allied Law Group LLC, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington, Washington Coalition for Open Government and Washington Newspaper Publishers Association.Richard Bennett Levenson, Attorney at Law, Tacoma, WA, amicus counsel for Behavioral Health Resources, et al., Cascade Mental Health and Central Washington Comprehensive Mental Health.SANDERS, J.^*

[172 Wash.2d 38] ¶ 1 We are asked to decide whether Superior Court Mental Proceedings Rules ( MPR) 1.3, which provides involuntary commitment proceedings “shall not be open to the public, unless the person who is the subject of the proceedings or his attorney files with the court a written request that the proceedings be public,” violates the right to open administration of justice under article I, section 10 of the Washington Constitution. As a preliminary issue, we must first determine whether respondent D.F.F. has standing to challenge MPR 1.3 under article I, section 10.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Respondent D.F.F. was involuntarily committed for psychiatric treatment under chapter 71.05 RCW. The trial judge closed her proceedings to the public as a matter of course pursuant to MPR 1.3.

¶ 3 D.F.F. challenged her commitment on appeal, arguing mandatory closure under MPR 1.3 violated her rights under article I, section 10's open administration of justice. The Court of Appeals held MPR 1.3 was unconstitutional, reversed D.F.F.'s commitment order, and remanded for further proceedings. See In re Det. of D.F.F., 144 Wash.App. 214, 226–27, 183 P.3d 302 (2008).¹ We granted the State's petition for review. 164 Wash.2d 1034, 197 P.3d 1185 (2008).

ANALYSIS

I. Standing

¶ 4 We first address whether D.F.F. has rights under article I, section 10, which afford her standing to challenge the constitutionality of MPR 1.3. Article I, section 10 pronounces: “Justice in all cases shall be administered openly....” The State does not dispute that D.F.F. has rights under article I, section 10 as a member of the public. But the State argues that open justice under article I, section 10 merely protects her right to attend her own commitment proceedings, and thus there was no violation since she did attend her own commitment proceedings. The State reasons D.F.F. has no standing to claim a violation based upon the general public's inability to attend.

¶ 5 The State misconstrues and minimizes D.F.F.'s rights under article I, section 10. Our constitution mandates that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly....” Const. art. I, § 10. The open administration of justice assures the structural fairness of the proceedings, affirms their legitimacy, and promotes confidence in the judiciary. See State v. Momah, 167 Wash.2d 140, 148, 217 P.3d 321 (2009); In re Pers. Restraint of Orange, 152 Wash.2d 795, 812, 100 P.3d 291 (2004). D.F.F. is a member of the public and the target of a civil action to involuntarily confine her.² Article I, section 10 provides for her right as a member of the public to attend the proceedings, but also her individual right to have the proceedings open to the observation and scrutiny of the general public. This court observed in John Doe v. Puget Sound Blood Center, 117 Wash.2d 772, 780–81, 819 P.2d 370 (1991), that open justice under article I, section 10 “is not an abstract theory of constitutional law, but rather is the bedrock foundation upon which rest all the people's rights and obligations. In the course of administering justice the courts protect those rights and enforce those obligations. Indeed, the very first enactment of our state constitution is the declaration that governments are established to protect and maintain individual rights. Const. art. 1, § 1. Const. art. 1, §§ 1– 31 catalog those fundamental rights of our citizens.” The public monitors the fairness of the proceedings and the appropriateness of the result—and article I, section 10 grants D.F.F. the right to demand that protection. See Momah, 167 Wash.2d at 148, 217 P.3d 321.³ D.F.F. also has a right to open proceedings to permit family, friends, and other interested individuals to be present at the proceedings .⁴ See Orange, 152 Wash.2d at 812, 100 P.3d 291. Not only can those individuals monitor the case and publicly disseminate information about it, but also they may possess specialized or personal knowledge that they can provide to assist D.F.F. If D.F.F.'s rights under article I, section 10 are limited to assuring her presence at her own proceedings, she is robbed of any of the actual benefits of the open administration of justice. D.F.F. has standing to assert an open administration of justice challenge under article I, section 10 based upon the exclusion of the general public from her commitment proceedings.

II. Constitutionality of MPR 1.3

¶ 6 The constitutionality of a court rule is a question of law. We review questions of law de novo. State v. Robinson, 153 Wash.2d 689, 693, 107 P.3d 90 (2005). We now consider whether MPR 1.3 is unconstitutional in light of article I, section 10. We hold that it is unconstitutional. This court has clearly and consistently held that the open administration of justice is a vital constitutional safeguard and, although not without exception, such an exception is appropriate only under the most unusual circumstances and must satisfy the five requirements as set forth in Seattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa, 97 Wash.2d 30, 38–39, 640 P.2d 716 (1982), and elsewhere, see, e.g., Momah, 167 Wash.2d at 149, 217 P.3d 321; State v. Bone–Club, 128 Wash.2d 254, 258–59, 906 P.2d 325(1995).⁵ Since the open administration of justice assures the structural fairness of proceedings, a court's failure to consider whether a closure is necessary is a structural error. MPR 1.3 automatically closes the proceedings from the public without requiring or even permitting the trial court to make its constitutionally mandated determination whether those five requirements are met. Thus, the procedure set forth in MPR 1.3 violates article I, section 10.

¶ 7 As a remedy for violation of her article I, section 10 rights, D.F.F. seeks new, open proceedings. This is an appropriate remedy because courtroom closures affect the very integrity of a proceeding, regardless of whether the complaining party can show prejudice. State v. Easterling, 157 Wash.2d 167, 181, 137 P.3d 825 (2006); accord Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). In this vein, we have recognized in criminal cases that a courtroom closure bears the hallmarks of structural error. See Momah, 167 Wash.2d at 149, 217 P.3d 321 (in the context of a criminal trial, “[a]n error is structural when it ‘necessarily render[s] a criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence.’ ” (second alteration in original) (quoting Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218–19, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted))).

¶ 8 In Momah we listed some of the hallmarks of closures resulting in structural errors:

[1] the trial court closed the courtroom based on interests other than the defendant's; [2] the closures impacted the fairness of the defendant's proceedings; [3] the court closed the courtroom without seeking objection, input, or assent from the defendant; and ... [4] the record lacked any hint that the trial court considered the defendant's right to a public trial when it closed the courtroom.

167 Wash.2d at 151, 217 P.3d 321.

¶ 9 Here, all four hallmarks exist. The first, third, and fourth are evident: (1) the trial court closed the courtroom based upon the mandate in MPR 1.3, without considering the interests involved; (3) the court sought no input from D.F.F. concerning the closure; and (4) there is nothing in the record to indicate the trial court considered D.F.F.'s right to the open administration of justice.

¶ 10 The second hallmark questions whether the closure impacted the fairness of D.F.F.'s proceeding. See Momah, 167 Wash.2d at 151, 217 P.3d 321. Article I, section 10 protects more than merely a given individual's right to personally attend a trial or proceedings. It protects D.F.F.'s right to have the proceedings open to the watchful eye of the public, to permit the public to scrutinize the proceedings. Such open access to the courts assures the structural fairness of the proceedings and affirms their legitimacy. It is fundamental to the operation and legitimacy of the courts and protection of all other rights and liberties. “Prejudice is necessarily presumed where a violation of the public trial right occurs.” Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 181, 137 P.3d 825. Since the “benefits of a public trial are frequently intangible, difficult to prove, or a matter of chance,” though “nonetheless real,” a defendant is not required to prove specific prejudice to obtain relief for a public trial violation. Waller, 467 U.S. at 49, 50 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210.

¶ 11 The closure of D.F.F.'s proceedings satisfies all the Momah hallmarks for a structural error. Structural error entitles D.F.F. to new commitment proceedings.⁶

[172 Wash.2d 44] ¶ 12 This is not the first case where this court has granted a new trial when a trial court closed proceedings without considering the five requirements to permit an exception to the open administration of justice right under article I, section 10 or the right to a public trial under article I, section 22. See Easterling, 157 Wash.2d at 171, 137 P.3d 825 (“We conclude that the trial court committed an error of constitutional magnitude when it directed...