State v. S.J.C.

• Decision Date: 11 June 2015
• Docket Number: No. 90355–7.,90355–7.
• Citation: 352 P.3d 749,183 Wash. 2d 408
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. S.J.C., Respondent.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

183 Wash.2d 408

352 P.3d 749

STATE of Washington, Appellant

v.S.J.C., Respondent.

No. 90355–7.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued Sept. 11, 2014.

Decided June 11, 2015.

James Morrissey Whisman, King County Prosecutor's Office, Seattle, WA, for Appellant.

Gregory Charles Link, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Travis Stearns, Washington Appellate Project, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington Defender Association.

George Yeannakis, Office of Public Defense, Olympia, WA, amicus counsel for Teamchild.

Lisa Michelle Gouldy, Attorney at Law, Sarah A. Dunne, Attorney at Law, Vanessa Torres Hernandez, ACLU of Washington, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Aclu.

Serena E. Holthe, Center for Children & Youth Justice, Marsha L. Levick, Jessica Feierman, Riya Saha Shah, Catherine Feeley, Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, PA, amicus counsel for Center for Children & Youth Justice.

Serena E. Holthe, Center for Children & Youth Justice, Marsha L. Levick, Jessica Feierman, Riya Saha Shah, Catherine Feeley, Juvenile Law Center, Philadelphia, PA, amicus counsel for Juvenile Law Center.

Katherine George, Harrison–Benis LLP, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Allied Daily Newspapers of Washington.

Katherine George, Harrison–Benis LLP, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Washington COAlition for Open Government.

Katara J. Jordan, Casey Trupin, Columbia Legal Services, Ann Marie Logerfo, Attorney at Law, Seattle, WA, amicus counsel for Columbia Legal Services.

Opinion

YU, J.

¶ 1This case presents the question of whether article I, section 10¹ of the Washington Constitution requires the court to apply the Ishikawa factors when a former juvenile offender has satisfied the statutory requirements of former RCW 13.50.050(2011) to seal his or her juvenile court record.SeeSeattle Times Co. v. Ishikawa,97 Wash.2d 30, 37–39, 640 P.2d 716(1982).Based on experience and logic, we affirm the juvenile court's holding that it does not.SeeState v. Chen,178 Wash.2d 350, 356, 309 P.3d 410(2013);State v. Sublett,176 Wash.2d 58, 73, 292 P.3d 715(2012)(C. Johnson, J., lead opinion);id. at 94, 292 P.3d 715(Madsen, C.J., concurring).Because it is undisputed that S.J.C. met all the statutory requirements, we affirm the juvenile court's order sealing his juvenile court record.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 In January 2008, S.J.C. pleaded guilty to two counts of fourth degree assault with sexual motivation for offenses he committed at age 13.At S.J.C.'s disposition hearing in February 2008, the juvenile court ordered two years of community supervision and imposed other conditions such as regular school attendance, sexual deviancy treatment, and payment of a victim penalty assessment.

¶ 3 After completing all of his conditions, in December 2011, S.J.C. moved to vacate his adjudication and seal his juvenile record under former RCW 13.50.050.Under the statute, “[t]he official juvenile court file of any alleged or proven juvenile offender shall be open to public inspection, unless sealed pursuant to subsection (12) of this section.”FormerRCW 13.50.050(2).The relevant portion of subsection (12) provided:

(b)The court shall not grant any motion to seal records for class B, C, gross misdemeanor and misdemeanor offenses and diversions made under subsection (11) of this section unless:

(i) Since the date of last release from confinement, including full-time residential treatment, if any, entry of disposition, or completion of the diversion agreement, the person has spent two consecutive years in the community without being convicted of any offense or crime;

(ii)No proceeding is pending against the moving party seeking the conviction of a juvenile offense or a criminal offense;

(iii)No proceeding is pending seeking the formation of a diversion agreement with that person;

(iv)The person is no longer required to register as a sex offender under RCW 9A.44.130 or has been relieved of the duty to register under RCW 9A.44.143 if the person was convicted of a sex offense; and

(v) Full restitution has been paid.

Id.

¶ 4The State opposed the motion, conceding that S.J.C. met the statutory requirements but arguing that article I, section 10 also required S.J.C. to show that sealing was justified under an Ishikawa analysis.The juvenile court granted S.J.C.'s motion and held that Ishikawa did not apply.We accepted direct review.

ISSUE

¶ 5 When sealing juvenile court records pursuant to former RCW 13.50.050, does article I, section 10 require the juvenile court to conduct an Ishikawa analysis in addition to finding the statutory requirements are met?

ANALYSIS

¶ 6 Whether an Ishikawa analysis is necessary depends on whether article I, section 10 applies to the statutory sealing of juvenile court records.Whether article I, section 10 applies depends on application of the experience and logic test.

In re Det. of Morgan,180 Wash.2d 312, 325, 330 P.3d 774(2014).Neither experience nor logic indicates that article I, section 10 applies when sealing juvenile court records pursuant to a specific statutory provision.

A.A brief history of juvenile justice

¶ 7We must first take into account the history of juvenile justice.We do not presume to set forth an authoritative historical treatise, but a brief discussion is needed to provide context for our analysis of the issue presented.This discussion reveals a centuries-old effort to balance the competing concerns where a juvenile is viewed as needing reformation and rehabilitation, but is not appropriately subjected to adult criminal proceedings and punishments.To balance these unique concerns, the law has constructed a constitutional wall around juveniles, maintaining its integrity through a continuous process of refining its contours and repairing its cracks.

¶ 8 Within the English common law tradition, juvenile law did not begin to take shape until juveniles began to be viewed as a distinct class of individuals, rather than chattels incident to adult domestic relations or as simply members of the general population.Prior to the 1600s, juveniles were not viewed as having an identity separate from their parents until they were between five and seven years old.Thomas J. Bernard, The Cycle of Juvenile Justice 50–52 (1992).Between 1600 and 1800, the basic contours of the modern concept of juvenility solidified—the juvenile is a “potential adult” but not yet fully formed.Id. at 52, 54.

¶ 9Some early examples of juvenile-specific law may be found in the English Chancery Courts.In cases of orphaned juveniles with inherited estates, the Chancery Court would exercise equitable authority to manage both the person and the estate of the juvenile in the name of the sovereign.Id. at 69;Weber v. Doust,84 Wash. 330, 333, 146 P. 623(1915).Following the Revolutionary War, sovereignty shifted from the crown to the people, but the idea that the sovereign had inherent equitable authority over the persons and estates of juveniles continued.Weber,84 Wash. at 333, 146 P. 623.This authority was justified by the belief that “ ‘it is indispensably necessary to protect the persons and preserve the property of those who are unable to protect and take care of themselves.’ ”Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L.Rev. 104, 105(1909)(quotingCowles v. Cowles,8 Ill. 435, 3 Gilman 435(1846) ).

¶ 10 While orphaned juveniles with substantial property interests were thus given special attention, juveniles charged with criminal offenses were tried in ordinary criminal courts.The age of the offender, however, was still a relevant factor in both law and fact.Under English common law, juveniles under seven years old were legally incapable of committing a crime; there was a rebuttable presumption that those between 7 and 14 years old were not criminally responsible and a rebuttable presumption that those between 14 and 21 years old were.Bernard, supra, at 29(citing 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *23).Moreover, prosecutors, juries, and judges were sometimes reluctant to apply the letter of the law to juvenile offenders and sought to mitigate the harshness of adult criminal justice with charging, conviction, and sentencing decisions.Id. at 35, 61;Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers 186 (1969).The options were often extreme—either release the juvenile and risk the possibility that the juvenile will recidivate due to the lack of meaningful consequences, or confine the juvenile to the penitentiary with adult offenders and risk the possibility that the juvenile will be trained and encouraged to become an adult criminal due to the influence of fellow prisoners.Bernard,supra, at 34–35, 61, 63.

¶ 11 Beginning in the 19th century, many jurisdictions sought to create other options.In an effort to separate juvenile offenders from the corrupting influence of adult criminals, some states provided that juveniles charged with crimes could be tried on a separate docket from adult criminal cases.Platt,supra, at 9.Some states also established separate institutions for juveniles who were found to have violated the criminal laws or were expected to do so if not institutionalized and reformed, so the juvenile might be “snatched from a course which must have ended in confirmed depravity.”Ex Parte Crouse,4 Whart. 9, 11(Pa.1839);seeLaws of 1891, ch. 103, §§ 1–2, at 195–96;In re Habeas Corpus of Mason,3 Wash. 609, 612–13, 28 P. 1025(1892).Such institutionalization was sometimes held unconstitutional as depriving juveniles of their liberty without due process of law, People v. Turner,55 Ill. 280, 287–88(1870), but carefully drafted legislation that consciously avoided the approach of the criminal law was held to remedy the problem, In re Petition of Ferrier,103 Ill. 367, 370–71(1882).The intention, though not always the actual practice, was to protect the interests of all juveniles and not merely those with large estates as the Chancery Courts did.

¶ 12 The combination of separate trials and separate institutions led...