In The Matter Of The Valuation Of Bell Atlantic Mobile Of Massachusetts Corporation

• Citation: 926 N.E.2d 133,456 Mass. 728
• Decision Date: 12 May 2010
• Docket Number: SJC-10509.
• Parties: In the Matter of the Valuation of BELL ATLANTIC MOBILE OF MASSACHUSETTS CORPORATION, LTD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

456 Mass. 728

926 N.E.2d 133

In the Matter of the Valuation of BELL ATLANTIC MOBILE OF MASSACHUSETTS CORPORATION, LTD.

SJC-10509.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Submitted Jan. 7, 2010.

Decided May 12, 2010.

Anthony M. Ambriano, Boston, for board of assessors of Boston & another.

Richard G. Chmielinski, Assistant City Solicitor, for board of assessors of Newton.

Douglas M. Reeves, New Jersey (Kathleen King Parker with him) for the taxpayer.

Martha Coakley, Attorney General, & Daniel A. Shapiro & Daniel J. Hammond, Assistant Attorneys General, for Commissioner of Revenue, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: MARSHALL, C.J., IRELAND, SPINA, COWIN, CORDY, BOTSFORD, & GANTS, JJ.

BOTSFORD, J.

The present case is a sequel to this court's decision in Bell Atl. Mobile of Mass. Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 451 Mass. 280, 884 N.E.2d 978 (2008) ( Bell Atl. Mobile I ). In that case, we reviewed appeals brought before the Appellate Tax Board (board) under G.L. c. 59, § 39 (§ 39), in which Bell Atlantic Mobile of Massachusetts Corporation, Ltd. (Bell Atlantic Mobile, or the taxpayer) and the board of assessors of Newton had each appealed from the Commissioner of Revenue's (commissioner's) central valuation of Bell Atlantic Mobile's personal property for fiscal year (FY) 2004. We affirmed the board's determination that Bell Atlantic Mobile was not a “telephone company” within the meaning of § 39 and therefore not entitled to central valuation. Bell Atl. Mobile I, supra at 282-283, 884 N.E.2d 978. Before the date of our decision, however, the commissioner had continued to certify central valuations of Bell Atlantic Mobile's property for years before and after 2004. In the present case, we must decide whether the board has jurisdiction under § 39 to hear appeals, timely filed with the board pursuant to that statute by certain municipal boards of assessors, to challenge the commissioner's certified central valuations for those additional years, even though, as Bell Atl. Mobile I indicates, the central valuations were made in error. We conclude that the statute confers jurisdiction on the board to hear the assessors' appeals.¹

1. Background. Pursuant to § 39, on or before May 15 of each year, the commissioner must value centrally “machinery, poles, wires and underground conduits, wires and pipes” (§ 39 property) of all telephone and telegraph companies. The valuations must be certified to the owners of the § 39 property and to the assessors of the cities and towns where the § 39 property is located and therefore subject to taxation. See G.L. c. 59, § 39. See also RCN-BecoCom, LLC v. Commissioner of Revenue, 443 Mass. 198, 199, 820 N.E.2d 208 (2005). The assessors of the cities and towns must use the commissioner's certified valuations for tax assessment purposes. See Assessors of Springfield v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 330 Mass. 198, 200-201, 112 N.E.2d 260 (1953). However, § 39 gives the assessors, as well as the taxpayer-owner of the § 39 property, the right to appeal from the commissioner's value determinations to the board on or before June 15 of the taxable year.²

At all relevant times, Bell Atlantic Mobile ³ provided wireless cellular telecommunications services, or what is generally known as “cell phone” service. For FY 2003 through FY 2008, the commissioner determined that Bell Atlantic Mobile was a “telephone company” within the meaning of § 39, and accordingly certified a central valuation of its § 39 property for each of these years. In addition, for FY 2003, and for FY 2005 through FY 2007, the commissioner determined that Bell Atlantic Mobile was eligible for the property tax exemption granted to certain foreign utility corporations under G.L. c. 59, § 5, Sixteenth (1) ( d ), as incorporating G.L. c. 63, § 52A (1) ( a ) (iii) (corporate utility exemption).⁴ The commissioner ruled that Bell Atlantic Mobile was not eligible for the corporate utility exemption in FY 2004, or in FY 2008.⁵ The difference in the valuations when Bell Atlantic Mobile was granted the corporate utility exemption compared to when it was not is significant. For example, for Bell Atlantic Mobile's personal property situated in Newton, the commissioner's certified values exceeded $6,000,000 in the years Bell Atlantic Mobile was denied the corporate utility exemption; comparatively, in the years the corporate utility exemption was applied, the commissioner's valuation was under $30,000.⁶

Of relevance to this case is the fact that for FY 2003 and FY 2004, the board of assessors of Newton (Newton assessors) filed appeals with the board under § 39 (§ 39 appeals), and for FY 2005 through FY 2008, the assessors of various cities and towns, including Newton, Boston, Springfield, and Cambridge, filed additional § 39 appeals, challenging the commissioner's valuations. Some or all of these appeals argued that Bell Atlantic Mobile was not a “telephone company” for purposes of § 39, and therefore not entitled to central valuation of its personal property by the commissioner; some or all argued in addition that the company was not entitled to the corporate utility exemption, and therefore its machinery (see note 8 infra ) constituted taxable property.⁷ For FY 2004 and FY 2008, Bell Atlantic Mobile filed its own appeals-under both § 39 and G.L. c. 59, § 65 (§ 65); see note 2 supra-from the taxes assessed by the 220 cities and towns where its property was located. These appeals claimed that the taxpayer's property had been overvalued by the local assessors, and sought as relief the abatement of the property taxes it had paid.

The board dealt first with the various FY 2004 appeals. As we described in Bell Atl. Mobile I, 451 Mass. at 281-283, 884 N.E.2d 978, the board consolidated the Newton assessors' § 39 appeal with Bell Atlantic Mobile's §§ 39 and 65 appeals but then bifurcated the issues for trial. The board held hearings on the issue of Bell Atlantic Mobile's eligibility for (1) central valuation-in other words, whether Bell Atlantic Mobile was in fact a “telephone company” within the meaning of § 39-and (2) the corporate utility exemption⁸; it deferred all questions of the correct value of the taxable property. On May 15, 2006, the board issued a decision in which it concluded that Bell Atlantic Mobile was not a telephone company and therefore not entitled to central valuation under § 39 (2006 decision). On that same date, the board issued a separate order with respect to Bell Atlantic Mobile's appeals under § 65; it ruled that the company was not entitled to the corporate utility exemption but stayed any further action in relation to the § 65 appeals pending appellate review of its 2006 decision under § 39. Bell Atlantic Mobile duly filed an appeal from the 2006 decision. After granting direct appellate review, we affirmed the board's determination. See Bell Atl. Mobile I, supra at 283, 884 N.E.2d 978.

Following the issuance of our decision in Bell Atl. Mobile I, the Newton assessors and the board of assessors of Boston (Boston assessors) filed motions to consolidate their § 39 appeals-appeals for FY 2003 through FY 2008 in the case of the Newton assessors, and for FY 2005 through FY 2008 in the case of the Boston assessors-with Bell Atlantic Mobile's § 65 appeals. At the hearing on the motions to consolidate, the board advised the parties that as a result of this court's decision in Bell Atl. Mobile I, the board intended to dismiss all the remaining § 39 appeals filed by the various boards of assessors and by Bell Atlantic Mobile for lack of jurisdiction. Thereafter, on June 19, 2008, the board sua sponte issued a decision ordering the dismissal of all § 39 appeals,⁹ and at the request of the commissioner and several boards of assessors, on December 3, 2008, the board issued its findings of fact and report. The board concluded that its 2006 decision and this court's decision in Bell Atl. Mobile I, supra, were “dispositive” as to the remaining § 39 appeals and, in the case of the Newton assessors, that principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and issue preclusion independently prevented them from relitigating the undervaluation claim because the Newton assessors had been a party to Bell Atl. Mobile I. The board further observed that the assessors had not pursued alternative avenues to challenge the commissioner's valuations of Bell Atlantic Mobile's property, such as a declaratory judgment action or an action in the nature of mandamus. The Newton assessors, the Boston assessors, and the boards of assessors of Cambridge and Springfield (collectively, assessors) filed appeals from the board's decision dismissing their § 39 appeals (2008 decision).¹⁰ We granted the assessors' joint application for direct appellate review and now reverse the decision of the board.

2. Discussion. The question presented by this appeal is one of statutory construction. It concerns the scope of the board's authority under § 39 to decide appeals that were, at the time of filing, properly before the board pursuant to that statute. The board interpreted § 39 to mean that once the board determined Bell Atlantic Mobile was not a telephone company, the board was without jurisdiction to continue to entertain the pending appeals and therefore could not consider the challenges to the commissioner's valuation determinations.

The board is an agency charged with the administration of tax laws and has expertise in tax matters, and therefore we may give weight to the board's interpretation of a tax statute. Bell Atl. Mobile I, 451 Mass. at 283, 884 N.E.2d 978, quoting Commissioner of Revenue v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 383 Mass. 397, 401, 420 N.E.2d 293 (1981). See Matter of the Valuation of MCI WorldCom Network Servs., Inc., 454 Mass. 635, 641, 912 N.E.2d 920 (2009). Ultimately, however, a question of statutory interpretation is a question of law for the court to resolve. See AA Transp. Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 454 Mass. 114, 118-119, 907...