IND. STATE EMPLOYEES APPEAL COM'N v. Bishop
| Decision Date | 19 October 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A02-9810-CV-818.,49A02-9810-CV-818. |
| Citation | 721 N.E.2d 881 |
| Parties | INDIANA STATE EMPLOYEES APPEAL COMMISSION, Indiana State Personnel Department and Rockville Training Center, Appellants-Respondents, v. Judith BISHOP and Sara Harpold, Appellees-Petitioners. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, James A. Garrard, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellants.
Barbara J. Baird, Macey, Macey and Swanson, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorney for Appellees.
Appellants-Respondents the Indiana State Employees' Appeals Commission ("Commission"), State Personnel Department and Rockville Training Center (collectively "State"), appeal the judgment of the trial court awarding Appellees-Petitioners, Judith Bishop ("Bishop") and Sara Harpold ("Harpold") (collectively "Petitioners"), back pay from their respective dates of hire and reversing the findings of the Commission.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
The State raises three issues on appeal which we consolidate and restate as:
Bishop was hired as a Clerk-Typist on June 18, 1990, at the Rockville Training Center. She completed her working test period and obtained regular employee status in the state merit service on December 18, 1990. On January 12, 1992, Bishop filed her complaint pursuant to Ind.Code § 4-15-2-35.
Harpold was hired as a store clerk on January 21, 1992, at the Rockville Training Center. She completed her working test period and obtained regular employee status in the state merit service on July 21, 1992. On March 8, 1993, Harpold filed her complaint pursuant to Ind.Code § 4-15-2-35.
In their complaints, the Petitioners alleged that the State's compensation plan was discriminatory because Petitioners were required to work forty (40) hours per week while similarly situated employees were only required to work thirty-seven an one half (37.5) hours per week for the same weekly salary.
On October 31, 1995, the Commission ruled on Petitioners' complaints. The Commission found the following:
(R. 287-290).
The Commission found that Harpold did not timely file her complaint. Because Harpold's complaint was not timely filed, the Commission did not award Harpold any back pay. However, the Commission found that Bishop's complaint was timely filed and awarded Bishop back pay at a rate of .0667 times her weekly salary from January 7, 1992, ten days before she filed her complaint, to September 12, 1993, the date the State abandoned its discriminatory pay practices.
The trial court subsequently ruled that the Commission's findings were arbitrary, capricious, contrary to law and not supported by substantial evidence. The trial court found that Harpold's complaint was timely filed and that the award of back pay to Petitioners should extend to the date of their respective hiring.
When reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, both the trial court and the appellate court are bound by the agency's findings of fact. Taylor v. Indiana Family and Social Services Admin., 699 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998). Therefore, we may not retry the facts or substitute our judgment on factual matters for that of the agency. Id. This court's review of an agency's decision may go no further than to examine the propriety of the facts as the agency found them and the propriety of the agency's order in light of the facts found. Id. Questions of law are questions for the courts, therefore we review them de novo. Indiana State Employees' Appeals Commission v. Greene, 716 N.E.2d 54 (Ind.Ct.App.1999)
.
The State argues that Harpold's complaint, initiating the administrative action, was not timely filed. State Personnel Department Rule 13-1(A) provides:
[T]he complaint procedure shall be initiated as soon as possible after the occurrence of the act or condition complained of and in no event shall be initiated more than ten (10) calendar days after the employee is notified of a change in his status of employment or after an unsatisfactory condition of employment is created. Failure to initiate the complaint procedure within such time period shall render the complaint procedure unavailable to the employee.
Ind. Admin. Code tit. 31 r. 2-13-1(A).2 The State argues that the condition complained of, the requirement that Harpold work forty hours per week, was the result of a one time event that began with Harpold's employment at the Rockville Training Center. The State contends that because Harpold did not file her complaint within ten days of the condition or occurrence, her claim is waived. We disagree.
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, an employee was dismissed pursuant to company policy, when she married. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 555, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). The company policy that resulted in the Evans employee's termination was found to be in violation of Title VII, in Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971). Id. The Evans employee was not a party to Sprogis. Id. Further, the Evans employee did not initiate a Title VII claim for discriminatory termination within the ninety (90) day limitations period after she was terminated. Id. The Evans employee was subsequently rehired without seniority and initiated an action alleging that she should be credited for prior employment. Id. In determining whether the Evans employee had waived her claim, the Court stated that the critical question is whether there was a present violation of her Title VII rights. Id. at 559, 97 S.Ct. 1885. The Court found that United Air Lines, Inc., was not presently in violation of Title VII after changing its company policy and determined that because there was no present violation, the limitations period was not tolled. Id.
In Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 106 S.Ct. 3000, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986), the Court elaborated on its Evans ruling, stating that each week's paycheck which discriminates between employees based on color is a separate wrong actionable under Title VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to the effective date of Title VII. Id. at 396, 106 S.Ct. 3000. We find that Evans is distinguishable from Bazemore, because in Bazemore there was a continuing violation of Title VII while in Evans there was not. The above noted line of cases clarifies that the controlling issue is whether there was, at the time of filing the complaint, a present and continuing violation of law.
State Personnel Department Rule 2-4 provides: "All regulations affecting administration of the pay plan shall be designed... to guarantee equal opportunity and equal incentives for entrance to the service..." Ind. Admin. Code tit. 31 r. 2-4-2. At the time the Harpold filed her complaint she was required to work forty (40) hours per week for the same pay as similarly situated State employees who were only required to work thirty-seven and one-half (37.5) hours per week. This practice was in violation of Ind. Admin. Code tit. 31 r. 2-4-2. Arden, 578 N.E.2d at 773. The State had not yet abandoned the discriminatory pay practice when Harpold filed her complaint. Therefore, Harpold timely filed her complaint because the State's pay practice was a present and continuing violation of law.
This conclusion parallels Greene, decided September 9, 1999. Greene, 716 N.E.2d 54. Greene, involved a group of employees and the same state institution, the Rockville Training Center. In Greene, we held that Ind. Admin. Code tit. 31 r. 2-4-2 required equal pay for comparable work in the several agencies of state services. Id. Equal pay for comparable work is required by law, therefore, every paycheck reflecting discriminatory pay practices is a new violation of law. Id. A new violation of law creates a new cause of action and with that a new limitations period.
In the present case the State violated Ind. Admin. Code. tit. 31 r. 2-4-2 with each paycheck, and with each violation Harpold had independent grounds upon which to protest....
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