Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Clarke

• Decision Date: 15 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 89-4027-CV-C-9,89-4029-CV-C-9.,89-4027-CV-C-9
• Citation: 743 F. Supp. 687
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri
• Parties: INDEPENDENT BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Missouri Independent Bankers Association and The Callaway Bank, Plaintiffs, v. Robert L. CLARKE, Comptroller of the Currency of the United States and First National Bank & Trust Company, Columbia, Missouri, Defendants. STATE OF MISSOURI, EX REL., Thomas B. FITZSIMMONS, Commissioner of Finance, Plaintiff, v. Robert L. CLARKE, Comptroller of the Currency of the United States and First National Bank & Trust Company, Columbia, Missouri, Defendants.

743 F. Supp. 687

INDEPENDENT BANKERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, Missouri Independent Bankers Association and The Callaway Bank, Plaintiffs, v. Robert L. CLARKE, Comptroller of the Currency of the United States and First National Bank & Trust Company, Columbia, Missouri, Defendants.

STATE OF MISSOURI, EX REL., Thomas B. FITZSIMMONS, Commissioner of Finance, Plaintiff, v. Robert L. CLARKE, Comptroller of the Currency of the United States and First National Bank & Trust Company, Columbia, Missouri, Defendants.

Nos. 89-4027-CV-C-9, 89-4029-CV-C-9.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, C.D.

November 15, 1989.

Michael L. Boicourt, Missouri Atty. Gen.'s Office, Jefferson City, Mo., for plaintiffs.

Frances E. Reddis, U.S. Atty's Office, Kansas City, Mo., for Robert L. Clarke.

Bruce H. Beckett, Smith, Lewis, Beckett & Powell, Columbia, Mo., for First Natl. Bank.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BARTLETT, District Judge.

I. Background

On July 1, 1987, defendant First National Bank & Trust Company (FNB) filed with the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States (Comptroller) an application to establish a domestic branch office in a Jefferson City supermarket. FNB filed a similar application on July 8, 1987, to open a second domestic branch office in a Fulton, Missouri, grocery store. Both proposed branch offices would be located outside FNB's county. The Commissioner of Finance of the State of Missouri, who is charged with execution of the laws related to banks, trust companies and the conduct of banking business in Missouri pursuant to Mo.Rev.Stat. § 361.020, filed comments in opposition to FNB's branch applications on October 28, 1987. On January 26, 1989, the Comptroller approved FNB's applications to establish the two branch offices.

On January 27, 1989, plaintiffs Independent Bankers Association of America (IBAA), Missouri Independent Bankers and The Callaway Bank filed a complaint in this court challenging the Comptroller's action naming as defendants Robert L. Clarke in his capacity as Comptroller and FNB (case No. 89-4027-CV-C-9). Also on January 27, 1989, the State of Missouri filed a complaint in case No. 89-4029-CV-C-5 for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against Clarke as Comptroller and FNB. Plaintiffs in both cases assert that the Comptroller's approval of FNB's branch applications was without authority and in violation of § 36(c) of the National Bank (McFadden) Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36. The cases were consolidated for all purposes on February 28, 1989.

Plaintiffs and defendants subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment discussing whether 1) FNB should be enjoined from opening the branches at issue; and 2) the Comptroller should be enjoined from using his functional definition of "state bank" in applying 12 U.S.C. § 36(h). A hearing was held on March 23, 1989, on the parties' motions.

On June 30, 1989, 716 F.Supp. 1238, I issued a memorandum opinion upholding the Comptroller's use of a functional definition of "state bank" that includes state savings and loan associations. In addition, I requested additional briefing on whether the Comptroller properly determined that Missouri savings and loan associations are authorized to establish branches within the State of Missouri "by the statute law" of Missouri "by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition...."

Section 36(c)(2) of the National Bank Act allows a national bank to establish a branch "at any point within the state in which said association is situated, if such establishment and operation are at the time authorized to state banks by the statute law of the state in question by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition...." The Missouri statute governing branching by state savings and loan associations provides in part that "no association may establish or maintain a branch office or agency without the prior written approval of the director of the division of savings and loan supervision...." Mo.Rev.Stat. § 369.329 (Supp.1989).¹

Plaintiffs argue that the Missouri statute does not affirmatively grant state savings and loans the right to branch statewide. The analysis of this issue was limited in the Comptroller's decision, administrative record at 17-18, and in defendants' briefs.

II. Standard for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that summary judgment shall be rendered if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is the Court's obligation to view the facts in the light most favorable to the adverse party and to allow the adverse party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Inland Oil and Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991, 100 S.Ct. 522, 62 L.Ed.2d 420 (1979).

If there is no genuine issue about any material fact, summary judgment is proper because it avoids needless and costly litigation and promotes judicial efficiency. Roberts v. Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir.1979); United States v. Porter, 581 F.2d 698, 703 (8th Cir.1978). The summary judgment procedure is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut." Rather, it is "an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See also City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial about an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating by reference to portions of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, the absence of genuine issues of material fact. However, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. (emphasis added).

The nonmoving party is then required to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment cannot simply rest on allegations and denials in his pleading to get to a jury without any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. The evidence favoring the nonmoving party must be more than "merely colorable." Id. at 2511. When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (footnote omitted).

The inquiry to be made mirrors the standard for a directed verdict: whether the evidence presented by the party with the onus of proof is sufficient that a jury could properly proceed to return a verdict for that party. Id. Essentially, the question in ruling on a motion for summary judgment and on a motion for directed verdict is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

III. Missouri Savings and Loan Associations Have Been Granted Affirmatively the Right to Branch Statewide

A. Standard of Review

Courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that statute. Clarke v. Securities Industry Association, 479 U.S. 388, 107 S.Ct. 750, 754, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). "The Comptroller of the Currency is charged with the enforcement of banking laws to an extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to his deliberative conclusions as to the meaning of these laws." Id. 107 S.Ct. at 759-60 (emphasis added). See also Department of Banking and Consumer Finance of Mississippi v. Clarke, 809 F.2d 266, 269 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 483 U.S. 1010, 107 S.Ct. 3240, 97 L.Ed.2d 745 (1987) (hereafter Deposit Guaranty) ("we are charged to uphold the Comptroller's determination if we find it to be a `permissible construction' of the National Bank Act."). The Comptroller concluded that the requirement in § 36(c)(2) for a specific, affirmative grant of authority to branch statewide was satisfied by the Missouri law regarding state savings and loan associations. The Comptroller's determination is reasonable because it is consistent with 1) the wording of 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) and Mo.Rev.Stat. § 369.329; 2) the relevant Missouri administrative regulations; 3) the legislative history of § 36(c); 4) the legislative purpose of § 36(c); and 5) federal case law.

B. Statutory Language

Section 36(c)(2) provides that a national bank in Missouri may operate a new branch if Missouri state banks, including savings and loan associations, are authorized "by language specifically granting such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition...." Plaintiffs argue that Mo.Rev.Stat. § 369.329 does not...