INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM W. OF NJ v. Esso Stand. Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 26 June 1956 |
| Docket Number | No. 11791.,11791. |
| Parties | INDEPENDENT PETROLEUM WORKERS OF NEW JERSEY, Appellant, v. ESSO STANDARD OIL COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation Licensed to do Business in New Jersey. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
John J. Bracken, Newark, N. J. (Bracken & Walsh, Newark, N. J., on the brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
William J. Dill, Jr., Newark, N. J. (Stryker, Tams & Horner, Newark, N. J., on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before GOODRICH, KALODNER and STALEY, Circuit Judges.
Does a federal district court have jurisdiction, under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)1 to decree specific performance of a provision in a collective bargaining agreement between a union and an employer which requires them, when a new job classification is established, to negotiate on the salary rate for such classification?
That is the primary issue presented in this appeal by the plaintiff union from an Order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing, for want of jurisdiction, Count 1 of its Complaint against the defendant employer seeking specific performance as above stated. The defendant's alleged refusal to negotiate, the District Court held, was "a refusal to bargain collectively and an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 101 of the National Labor Relations Act" and, accordingly, "the dispute and the parties thereto are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board."
The District Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss Count 2 in the Complaint which demanded money damages for the alleged breach of contract. In doing so it held that it "has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the second count which states a claim for damages."
The plaintiff is an unincorporated labor organization certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the collective bargaining agent of certain of defendant's employees. The defendant is a Delaware corporation engaged in industry affecting interstate commerce.
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement on February 15, 1952. On November 10, 1954, they amended their contract by changing Article V, Section II to read as follows:
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contains the following allegations: In July, 1953, the defendant added certain procedures to the job descriptions sheets defining the duties of its laboratory technicians; at various times between July, 1953 and December, 1954, the parties discussed the problem of pay rates for the expanded job; on December 2, 1954, plaintiff presented a proposal for new pay rates; on January 28 and February 11, 1955, meetings of the parties were held at which the plaintiff elaborated on its new pay rate proposals; at all three of these meetings specific salary proposals as defined in Section II of the contract were made by the plaintiff; despite the passage of 60 days and more the defendant failed and refused to give the answer called for in Section II of the contract.
The contentions of the parties may be stated as follows:
Plaintiff:
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act confers jurisdiction on federal district courts to compel specific performance where there is a breach of a collective bargaining contract.
Defendant:
The Taft-Hartley Act does not confer jurisdiction on federal district courts to grant equitable relief; Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act2 has withdrawn the jurisdiction of federal courts to grant injunctions in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute and the Taft-Hartley Act did not provide otherwise; the National Labor Board has exclusive jurisdiction in this case because it involved a refusal to bargain.
We are of the opinion that the view of the plaintiff is the correct one and that the District Court erred in dismissing Count 1 of the plaintiff's Complaint.
In Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 1955, 348 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 489, 99 L.Ed. 510, the Supreme Court specifically noted that Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act confers jurisdiction on federal courts in cases involving breach of collective bargaining contracts.3 In Note 2, at page 443, of 348 U.S. at page 492 of 75 S.Ct. it said:
"It is significant, however, that breach of contract is not an `unfair labor practice.\' A proposal to that end was contained in the Senate bill, but was deleted in conference with the observation: `Once parties have made a collective bargaining contract the enforcement of that contract should be left to the usual processes of the law and not to the National Labor Relations Board.\' H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1 Sess. 42."
That such jurisdiction belongs exclusively to the courts was held by the National Labor Relations Board in United Telephone Company of the West, 112 N. L.R.B. 779 (1955).
"The Board is not the proper forum for parties seeking to remedy an alleged breach of contract or to obtain specific enforcement of its terms."4
The Board, citing prior rulings, stated (page 781):
"As the Board has held for many years, with the approval of the courts: `* * * it will not effectuate the statutory policy * * * for the Board to assume the role of policing collective contracts between employers and labor organizations by attempting to decide whether disputes as to the meaning and administration of such contracts constitute unfair labor practices under the Act.\'"
It is pertinent to note that in United Telephone Company of the West, supra, the union and employer gave conflicting interpretations to overtime provisions in their collective bargaining contract and when they were unable to agree the employer filed a suit for declaratory judgment. The union thereupon filed a Complaint with the Board charging unfair labor practices. The Trial Examiner in his Intermediate Report found against the employer. The latter filed exceptions to the Report contending that it had a right to submit the dispute as to the correct interpretation of their contract to the courts rather than to the Board. The Board agreed, stating (page 780):
"Inasmuch as the issue of the construction of the contract is now pending before a court of apparent jurisdiction no valid reason exists for the Board to enter this controversy."
That the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes federal district courts to grant a union injunctive relief for the enforcement of its collective bargaining contract and the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not a bar was squarely held by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Milk and Ice Cream Drivers v. Gillespie Milk Products Corp., 1953, 203 F.2d 650, 651.
In that case the union sought an injunction against the employer for violating a collective bargaining agreement in refusing to abide by the award of an arbitrator which directed reinstatement with back pay of certain employees. The District Court sustained the employer's motion to dismiss upon the ground that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 et seq., prohibited a federal district court from enjoining an employer for violating a labor contract. On appeal the employer further contended that the Taft-Hartley Act does not authorize a federal district court to grant injunctive relief.5
In reversing the order of dismissal the Court of Appeals held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act did not bar the injunctive relief sought and that "* * * the unqualified use of the word `suits' in the Labor Management Relations Act authorizes injunctive process for the full enforcement of the substantive rights created by section 301 (a), * * *." (Emphasis supplied.)6
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be construed as an immutable and inflexible bar against injunctive relief because of the circumstance that a union is one of the parties in the litigation: Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 1937, 300 U. S. 515, 563, 57 S.Ct. 592, 81 L.Ed. 789; Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 1949, 338 U.S. 232, 237, 238, 239, 240, 70 S.Ct. 14, 94 L.Ed. 22; Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Howard, 1952, 343 U.S. 768, 774, 72 S. Ct. 1022, 96 L.Ed. 1283.
Time and again it has been held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not a bar in cases where injunctions are sought under the Taft-Hartley Act to enforce a contractual provision in labor contracts to submit...
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