Independent School Dist. No. 89 of Oklahoma County v. City of Oklahoma City

• Decision Date: 22 July 1986
• Docket Number: 61437,Nos. 61442,s. 61442
• Parties: 34 Ed. Law Rep. 307, 1986 OK 47 INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 89 OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, Oklahoma, et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, Appellee. OKLAHOMA CITY AREA VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 22, Appellant, v. The CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1212

722 P.2d 1212

34 Ed. Law Rep. 307, 1986 OK 47

INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 89 OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, Oklahoma, et al., Appellants, v. The CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, Oklahoma, a municipal

corporation, Appellee.

OKLAHOMA CITY AREA VOCATIONAL TECHNICAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.

22, Appellant,

v.

The CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, Oklahoma, a municipal

corporation, Appellee.

Nos. 61442, 61437.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

July 22, 1986.

Fenton, Fenton, Smith, Reneau & Moon by Ronald L. Day, Oklahoma City, for appellants.

Jerry L. Steward & Associates by Jerry L. Steward, Oklahoma City, for appellant Oklahoma City Area Vocational-Technical School Dist. Number 22.

Walter M. Powell, Mun. Counselor and Kenneth D. Jordan, Asst. Mun. Counselor, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

HODGES, Justice.

This case presents an issue of first impression for our decision: Whether a public school district, lying within the city limits of an incorporated city, is automatically immune from the local zoning ordinance of that municipality insofar as such ordinance purports to control the district's location and use of its school facilities. We answer in the negative. In the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent, we find a school district is not automatically immune from a local zoning ordinance, and whether it is subject to such zoning ordinance of a municipality depends on an inference of legislative intent derived from an overall evaluation of all relevant factors.

On October 21, 1980, the City Council of the City of Oklahoma City adopted Ordinance No. 16,002, which substantially modified Chapter 25 of the Oklahoma City Code, Revised 1970, pursuant to the statutory authority contained in 11 O.S. 1981 § 43-101 through § 47-124. Ordinance No. 16,002 constitutes City's Planning and Zoning Code (Zoning Code) and purports to regulate the location of buildings and structures of any public or governmental body or agency,¹ which City maintains as including public school districts. The Zoning Code classifies the different types of schools involved and then delegates which schools are permitted in which zoning districts. For example, kindergartens and elementary schools are classified as Low Impact Institutional Neighborhood Related² and, as such, must be located in designated zones or meet specific conditions required for a Conditional Use Permit. High schools, middle schools and vocational-technical schools are classified as Moderate Impact Institutional³ and are limited to the Central Business District unless they meet the necessary requirements to obtain a Special Exception Use Permit from City's Board of Adjustment.

Following the adoption of the Zoning Code, Independent School District Nos. 3, 6, 12, 37, 53 and 89 of Oklahoma County; Oklahoma City Area Vocational-Technical School District No. 22; Eastern Oklahoma County Vocational Technical School District No. 23; and Oklahoma School Boards Association, Inc. (collectively School Districts or appellants) located partially or totally within the boundaries of Oklahoma City brought this action in the District Court of Oklahoma County seeking a declaratory judgment, pursuant to 12 O.S. 1981 § 1651, that the City of Oklahoma City (City or appellee) was without authority to regulate the location and use of public schools through its Zoning Code and that School Districts, are entitled to exercise their powers and duties to provide public education to the citizens they serve without interference by City through the enforcement of its Zoning Code.

City responded and requested the trial court to uphold the Zoning Code as a lawful exercise of its police power and urged that the issue of the immunity of school districts from local zoning regulations should be decided on a case-by-case basis under the balancing of interests test adopted by other jurisdictions. Both appellants and appellee filed respective motions for summary judgment, agreeing that the litigation presents disputed legal issues without involving a substantial controversy as to any material fact. The trial court sustained the motion for summary judgment on behalf of City, holding Ordinance No. 16,002 was a lawful and authorized exercise of City's police power and; "therefore, pursuant to various sections of the Zoning Code schools are allowed to be located only in certain specified districts, upon meeting specific conditions or upon the grant of a special exceptions by the Oklahoma City Board of Adjustment." From that decision School Districts appeal.

Appellants assert the trial court erred in finding School Districts are subject to the local zoning regulations of City. In support of this argument appellants maintain (1) School Districts, subdivisions of the State, are not subject to local zoning regulations; (2) the location of school facilities is a governmental function, and is not a matter of local zoning; (3) School Districts have the power of eminent domain and are therefore immune from local zoning regulations; (4) School Districts, as a subdivision and arm of the State, are the superior sovereign to municipalities and thus not subject to their local zoning regulations; (5) School Districts are not subject to local zoning regulations under the balancing test; and (6) there is an absence of statutory authority allowing municipalities to subject School Districts to their local zoning regulations.

In determining the question whether a political subdivision is immune from municipal zoning regulations, the courts have relied on various tests to resolve the issue absent a specific statutory exemption. These include the governmental proprietary, superior sovereign, eminent domain and balancing of interests tests.⁴

It has been judicially determined that a school district is a subordinate agency of the state.⁵ Although this Court has not addressed the precise issue raised in this case, we have addressed an analogous issue in the context of a conflict between the Department of Corrections and a municipality. In In Matter of Suntide Inn Motel, 563 P.2d 125 (Okla.1977), the general issue of whether a state governmental agency is subject to municipal zoning regulations was considered. There, the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, purchased the Suntide Inn Motel property to use for a community treatment center. The City of Oklahoma City informed the State and its agencies that they must submit the proposed site to the Oklahoma City Planning Commission for approval pursuant to 11 O.S. 1971 § 1420 (current version at 11 O.S. 1981 § 47-109) or the City would institute proceedings to enjoin such use. Because of the public importance and the necessity of an early decision, this Court assumed original jurisdiction and held "that 11 O.S. 1971, § 1420, does not require the State of Oklahoma to submit its selection of a site for a community treatment center for approval of the Oklahoma City Planning Commission."

While the majority of the Court holds the Department of Corrections is immune from the zoning regulations, it does so under two completely different rationales. The majority opinion is based on the general rule that "a State governmental body is not subject to local zoning regulations or restrictions."⁶ It then adopts the holding of Davidson County v. Harmon, 200 Tenn. 575, 292 S.W.2d 777 (1956), that the State and its agencies are immune from local zoning regulations solely upon its superior position in the governmental hierarchy unless there is express statutory language. This approach is often referred to as the superior sovereign test.⁷

The specially concurring opinion rejects the majority's apparent adoption of absolute sovereign immunity, and states "[t]o hold a State is never subject to local zoning restrictions is to emasculate in perpetuum, the very power the State has granted to municipalities, to zone and regulate its orderly growth."⁸ It further states the dissent reflects the more enlightened view concerning the concept of sovereign immunity, and espouses the balancing of interests test as the more valid test to be used for resolving intergovernmental conflict over land use.

As noted in the dissenting opinion in Suntide, the traditional concept of immunity adopted by the majority is being rejected by appellate courts of other jurisdictions as being "too simplistic" and such courts are placing the balancing of interests test in its stead.⁹ Sovereign immunity has consistently had the result of upholding a state and its agencies when in conflict with municipal zoning regulations.¹⁰ However, as advocated in the dissent, the balancing of interests test provides the more reasonable approach which affords fairness and flexibility on a case-by-case basis.

Rutgers, supra, is the leading case rejecting a mechanical finding of immunity and adopting the balancing methodology as a means to determine the existence and scope of immunity in intergovernmental conflicts concerning zoning. The Rutgers court states:

"The question of what governmental units or instrumentalities are immune from municipal land use regulations, and to what extent, is not one properly susceptible of absolute or ritualistic answer. Courts have, however, frequently resolved such conflicts in perhaps too simplistic terms and by the use of labels rather than through reasoned adjudication of the critical question of which governmental interest should prevail in the particular relationship or factual situation."¹¹

To establish the existence and scope of immunity Rutgers suggests the following criteria to be considered for the balancing of interests of the governmental body seeking immunity against the welfare of the municipality:

"The rationale which runs through our cases and which we are convinced should furnish the true test of immunity in the first instance, albeit a somewhat nebulous one, is the legislative intent in this regard with respect to the particular agency or function involved. That intent, rarely specifically expressed, is to be divined...