Indiana Ed. Employment Relations Bd. v. Board of School Trustees of Worthington-Jefferson Consolidated School Corp.

• Citation: 355 N.E.2d 269,171 Ind.App. 79
• Decision Date: 05 October 1976
• Docket Number: WORTHINGTON-JEFFERSON,No. 1--376A43,1--376A43
• Parties: , 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2490, 80 Lab.Cas. P 53,886 INDIANA EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF theCONSOLIDATED SCHOOLCORPORATION, Petitioner-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

Page 269

355 N.E.2d 269

171 Ind.App. 79, 93 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2490,

80 Lab.Cas. P 53,886

INDIANA EDUCATION EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD et al., Respondents-Appellant, v. The BOARD OF SCHOOL TRUSTEES OF the WORTHINGTON-JEFFERSON

CONSOLIDATED SCHOOLCORPORATION, Petitioner-Appellee.

No. 1--376A43.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

Oct. 5, 1976.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 1, 1976.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Daniel Lee Pflum, Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard J. Darko and Jonathan L. Birge of Bingham, Summrs, Welsh & Spilman, Indianapolis, for respondents-appellant.

William M. Evans, Bose, McKinney & Evans, Indianapolis, for petitioner-appellee.

ROBERTSON, Chief Judge.

The Indiana Education Employment Relations Board (IEERB) brings this appeal from the judgment of the circuit court which reversed an order of the IEERB directing the Worthington-Jefferson School Corporation to reinstate three school teachers.

The issues upon appeal are whether the circuit court applied the correct standard of review to the findings of fact and order of the IEERB and whether the findings of fact and order of the IEERB were supported by substantial evidence in the record. We reverse and remand.

On May 8, 1974, three school teachers in the Worthington-Jefferson School Corporation filed a complaint with the IEERB alleging that the School Board had committed an unfair practice by refusing to renew their teaching contracts solely because of their exercise of rights conferred upon them by the Educational Employee Bargaining Act. IC 1971, 20--7.5--1--1 et seq. (Burns Code Ed.). The IEERB gave notice to the School Board which filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint. On July 3, 1974, a hearing examiner employed by the IEERB conducted an evidentiary hearing on the unfair practice complaint, and on August 27, 1974, the hearing examiner submitted his findings and conclusions resulting from that hearing. The hearing officer found that the teachers were discharged because of their collective bargaining activities, and thus determined that the School Board had committed an unfair practice as defined in IC 1971, 20--7.5--1--7(a)(1) and (3). ¹ The hearing officer recommended that the IEERB enter an order directing the School Board to reinstate the three teachers. On March 3, 1975, the IEERB issued its final order adopting the hearing examiner's decision and ordering the School Board to reinstate the teachers.

On March 12, 1975, the School Board filed a petition for review of the IEERB order with the circuit court pursuant to the Administrative Adjudication Act. IC 1971, 4--22--1--1 et seq. (Burns Code Ed.). On September 17, 1975, the circuit court entered judgment ordering that the order of the IEERB requiring the reinstatement of the three teachers be set aside. The sole basis for the court's judgment was its finding that the order of the IEERB was not supported by substantial evidence.

The IEERB brings this appeal contending that the circuit court did not apply the correct standard of review in considering the decision of the IEERB and that the court erred in determining that the decision of the IEERB was not supported by substantial evidence.

IC 1971, 20--7.5--1--11 provides that a school employer or school employee, both defined within the Certificated Education Employee Bargaining Act, IC 1971, 20--7.5--1--1 et seq. (Burns Code Ed.), may file an unfair practice complaint with the IEERB. The IEERB, after giving notice to the party against whom the complaint is directed, then determines whether an unfair practice has in fact been committed. The section further provides that the IEERB's decision may be appealed in accordance with the Administrative Adjudication Act. IC 1971, 4--22--1--1 et seq. (Burns Code Ed.). IC 1971, 4--22--1--18 (Burns Code Ed.) provides as follows:

'Judicial review--Procedure.--On such judicial review such court shall not try or determine said cause de novo, but the facts shall be considered and determined exclusively upon the record filed with said court pursuant to this act.

On such judicial review, if the agency has complied with the procedural requirements of this act, and its finding, decision or determination is supported by substantial, reliable and probative evidence, such agency's finding, decision or determination shall not be set aside or disturbed.

If such court finds such finding, decision or determination of such agency is:

1. Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; or

2. Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; or

3. In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations, or short of statutory right; or

4. Without observance of procedure required by law; or 5. Unsupported by substantial evidence the court may order the decision or determination of the agency set aside. The court may remand the case to the agency for further proceedings and may compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.

'Said court in affirming or setting aside the decision or determination of the agency shall enter its written finding of fact, which may be informal but which shall encompass the relevant facts shown by the record, and enter of record its written decision and order or judgment.'

The circuit court set aside the IEERB order solely upon the ground that the order was not supported by substantial evidence. IC 1971, 4--22--1--18(5).

As stated in the Administrative Adjudication Act, the review by the court of actions of an administrative agency is not a trial de novo, but is a review of the evidence appearing in the record made during the agency's proceedings which led to its determination. The proper scope of judicial review of an agency's decision has been consistently stated as follows:

'The board, not the court, determines the issues of fact. The court cannot weigh conflicting evidence which appears in the record of the board's hearing for the purpose of determining for whom it preponderates.'

'If there is any substantial evidence to support the finding of the board, the court may not disturb the board's decision.' Walden v. Indiana State Personnel Board (1968), 250 Ind. 93, 103, 235 N.E.2d 191, 197; See also: Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Johnson (1973), Ind.App., 303 N.E.2d 64; Pendleton Banking Co. v. Dept. of Financial Institutions (1971), 257 Ind. 363, 274 N.E.2d 705; Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission v. Lamb (1971), 256 Ind. 65, 267 N.E.2d 161; Uhlir v. Ritz (1970), 255 Ind. 342, 264 N.E.2d 312; Board of Pharmacy v. Horner (1961), 241 Ind. 326, 172 N.E.2d 62; Board of Medical Registration & Examination v. Armington (1962), 242 Ind. 436, 178 N.E.2d 741.

The decisions leave no doubt that the reviewing court is forbidden to reweigh the evidence presented to the administrative agency.

'The record shows that the trial court reached its own conclusions as to the merits determined from the evidence presented and made its own special findings of fact, contrary to the decision of the administrative body. This the trial court has no right to do unless the evidence and finding of the administrative body is undisputed and uncontradicted and only one decision can follow. The trial court, in reviewing the administrative action, has no right to weigh conflicting evidence and choose that which it sees fit to rely upon. The statute gives this fact finding function to the administrative body.' Dept. of Financial Institutions v. State Bank of Lizton (1969), 253 Ind. 172, 177, 252 N.E.2d 248, 251.

Several of the conclusions of law entered by the trial court in this case demonstrate that the court did not examine the record to determine if there was any substantial evidence to support the IEERB's order, but instead weighed the evidence and substituted its judgment for that of the IEERB. Two of...