Industrial Acc. Bd. v. O'Dowd
Decision Date | 12 June 1957 |
Docket Number | No. A-6264,A-6264 |
Citation | 157 Tex. 432,303 S.W.2d 763 |
Parties | INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARD, Petitioner, v. E. H. O'DOWD et al., Respondents. |
Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Will Wilson, Atty. Gen., John H. Minton, Jr., and John Reeves, Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner.
Richard Critz, F. L. Kuykendall, Austin, for respondents.
The Court of Civil Appeals held on authority of Francisco v. Board of Dental Examiners, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W.2d 619, wr. ref., that that portion of Article 8307, § 4, Vernon's Ann.Tex.Stats. purporting to authorize the barring of persons guilty of unethical of fraudulent conduct from practicing before the Industrial Accident Board was unconstitutional and void for failure to provide for notice and hearing as required by the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Article 1, § 19, Texas Constitution, Vernon's Ann.St. Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See Industrial Accident Board v. O'Dowd, Tex.Civ.App., 298 S.W.2d 657.
Being of the tentative opinion (which has since been confirmed) that the Francisco case does not control this appeal, we granted the writ of error. In their reply to the application for the writ, respondents say that the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals does not discuss all the grounds urged by them in support of the trial court's order enjoining the Board from enforcing its suspension order. Under the view taken by the Court of Civil Appeals a discussion of additional bases to support its decision was patently unnecessary. However, being of the opinion that the order cannot be supported upon the grounds considered by the Court of Civil Appeals it becomes our duty to examine all contentions properly brought forward by respondents as the prevailing parties in the Court of Civil Appeals which they say would support the trial court's judgment. Vanover v. Henwood, 136 Tex. 348, 150 S.W.2d 785.
We shall first consider the holding of the Court of Civil Appeals. That portion of Article 8307, § 4 now under attack reads as follows:
The Court of Civil Appeals has held that this statutory provision is invalid because of a failure to provide for a notice of hearing as required by the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions.
The essential facts may be briefly stated. Respondents E. H. O'Dowd and M. M. O'Dowd are practicing attorneys residing in Waco, McLennan County, Texas. On April 30, 1955, the Board notified respondents that on May 16, 1955, a hearing would be held pursuant to complaints received as to their alleged unethical and fraudulent conduct in connection with workmen's compensation cases before the Industrial Accident Board. Such hearing was held on the date set and on May 20, 1955, the Board entered an order finding respondents guilty of unethical conduct in seven cases and guilty of fraudulent conduct in fourteen cases pending before the Board and suspended them from practicing before the Board for a period of three years from and after May 20, 1955.
The trial court by temporary injunction restrained the Board from enforcing this order and this action was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals.
It seems that under the statute it is contemplated that a hearing be had before action is taken. We have provisions relating to process and procedure, the subpoenaing of witnesses, inquiries into facts and the like, all of which are pertinent to a hearing or examination. The statute does not explicitly provide for a notice of hearing. Does this render the statute void?
To our minds, Francisco v. Board of Dental Examiners, Tex.Civ.App., 149 S.W.2d 619, 622, wr. ref. does not reach the point. There the statute provided that the Board of Dental Examiners should revoke a dental license upon receipt of a certified copy of the record showing that a licensee had been convicted of insanity or a felony involving moral turpitude. There was no requirement for a hearing and hence none for notice. In fact the statutory direction to the Board was to proceed without hearing and without notice. As pointed out by the Court, 'the order operates instanter, and the licensee is at once deprived of the right lawfully to practice his profession.'
There is language in Stuart v. Palmer 74 N.Y. 183, 30 Am.Rep. 289, 1 decided in 1878 which lends some support to the proposition that a statute of the species now before us must contain an express provision for notice otherwise it will be held invalid, viz.: A holding that a statute must expressly provide for notice or it is invalid is patently unsound. It is a common thing for a court to recognize and enforce implied or implicit clauses in both statutes and contracts. To hold that implied provisions could not be afforded validity when a constitutional due process clause is involved would be to reverse the general rule of construction that a statute must be construed so that it will be constitutional and hence valid if the language thereof is reasonably susceptible to such construction.
Obviously if the explicit provisions of a statute direct and administrative board to proceed without notice in contravention of the constitutional due process requirements (as in the Francisco case) there would be no room for a presumption that the Legislature intended that a notice be given. However, on the other hand, we must assume that the Legislature intended to enact a valid law, and in the absence of express language to the contrary, intended that the administrative board should proceed in accordance with constitutional requirements. The Board here construed the statute as requiring notice and notice was actually given. Under these circumstances the following language from American Power & Light Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 329 U.S. 90, 67 S.Ct. 133, 143, 91 L.Ed. 103, seems applicable:
Another statement of the prevailing rule upon the subject is found in Caughman v. Columbia, Newberry & Laurens Ry. Co., 82 S.C. 418, 64 S.E. 240, 242, viz.:
Likewise in McManus v. Industrial Commission, 53 Ariz. 22, 85 P.2d 54, 56, the Supreme Court of Arizona said:
See, also, Kennard v. Louisiana, ex rel. Morgan, 92 U.S. 480, 23 L.Ed. 478; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases (Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific R. Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky), 115 U.S. 321, 6 SCt. 57, 29 L.Ed. 414; Shealey v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 131 S.C. 144, 126 S.E. 622; Smith v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 140 Iowa 66, 117 N.W. 1116; Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N.Y. 461, 121 N.E.2d 421; Tatlow v....
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