Industrial Commission v. Bysom
| Decision Date | 03 September 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 22586,22586 |
| Citation | 166 Colo. 502,444 P.2d 627 |
| Parties | INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Colorado, Labco Construction Company, and State Compensation Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Veneta I. BYSOM (Claimant in the Matter of the Death of Ralph W. Bysom), Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Alious Rockett, Francis L. Bury, Feay Burton Smith, Jr., Denver, for Labco Construction Co. and State Compensation Ins. Fund.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiffs in error.
Kripke, Hoffman & Friedman and Thomas L. Ford, Denver, for defendant in error.
This is a workmen's compensation case involving two heart attacks suffered by claimant's husband. The second heart attack which occurred during convalescence was fatal. The Industrial Commission denied compensation for both and on review, this denial was reversed by the trial court which ordered the Commission to compensate the claimant, who is the widow of the deceased employee. From this reversal, the Commission brings this writ of error.
On July 11, 1963, the claimant's husband sustained an occlusion of the right coronary artery causing a myocardial infarction. This heart attack occurred while claimant's husband was helping to move two 1,000-pound safes in the course of his employment as a carpenter. On September 30, 1963, without having returned to work because of his convalescence, the claimant's husband sustained a second and fatal coronary occlusion while at his home. The second heart attack involved the left coronary artery. The autopsy report discloses that the decedent's entire heart had developed coronary artery disease, with the left ventricle showing recent myocardial infarction, whereas, the right ventricle showed an old myocardial infarction.
The Commission found that: (1) the first coronary occlusion was not compensable because it was neither an 'accident' nor an 'injury' within the meaning of C.R.S.1963, 81--2--9(1), (2); and (2) the second and fatal heart attack was not proximately caused by the events of July 11, 1963 nor by any other work connected incident. With reference to its first finding, the Commission overruled the referee who had found from the evidence that the first heart attack on July 11, 1963 was an accident and that the injury was compensable. In reversing the Commission, the trial court found both coronary occlusions to be compensable, and entered its judgment to that effect.
The record before us reflects that the Attorney General on behalf of the Commission concedes in effect the first heart attack is compensable and that the Commission misapprehended the meaning of C.R.S.1963, 81--2--9(1) which defines 'accident'. This definition was an amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act passed during the 1963 session of our legislature and this amendment was the basis for the misapprehension. In Industrial Commission of Colo. v. Milka, 159 Colo. 114, 410 P.2d 181, announced after the date of the commission's order, this court held that the amendment did not alter out prior pronouncements interpreting the word 'accident' as meaning an unexpected incident or event during the course of the employee's work from which an injury flows, which injury is the unexpected result of an employee's normal activities. Keating v. Industrial Commission, 105 Colo. 155, 95 P.2d 821; Central Surety & Insurance Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 84 Colo. 481, 271 P. 617; Carroll v. Industrial Commission, 69 Colo. 473, 195 P. 1097; Annot., 19 A.L.R. 107.
Where the Commission has misconstrued or misapplied the law, the courts are in no way bound by its decision. Industrial Commission v. Rowe, Colo., 425 P.2d 274. In our view, this record supports the referee's finding that the first heart attack suffered by claimant's husband...
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