Infinity Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Town of Huntington
| Decision Date | 24 July 2006 |
| Docket Number | INDEX NO.: 03-6956 |
| Citation | 2006 NY Slip Op 30695 |
| Parties | INFINITY CONSULTING GROUP, INC., Plaintiff, v. THE TOWN OF HUNTINGTON, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Memrandum Decision
PRESENT:
HON. JAMES HUDSON
CDISPSJ
GOLDSTEIN, RUBINTON, GOLDSTEIN & DIFAZIO
By: ARTHUR GOLDSTEIN, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
JOHN J. LEO, ESQ.
HUNTINGTON TOWN ATTORNEY
By: JOHANNA STEWART-SUCHOW, ESQ.
The case at bar requires the Court to reconcile two dynamic impulses namely, the individual right of property and the collective right of society to regulate the use of land for the public good. The former sentiment is best contained in the immortal declaration of Sir William Blackstone, "There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominium which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe." (Commentaries On The Laws of England, Book 2, Chpt. 1, p. 2). The latter principle finds voice in environmental and zoning laws, from the sweeping "forever wild" clause of Article 14 of the State Constitution of over a century ago, to the more prosaic, yet still essential, town ordinances which attempt to maintain quality of life in the face of what would otherwise be unbridled development.
Plaintiff is the owner of a certain parcel of realty in the Town of Huntington. The locus in quo is presently zoned R-40 which limits its use to one-acre residential. Plaintiff, however, desires to use the realty as a business and sought a rezoning of same from the Town. This was ultimately refused. Plaintiff claimed that this was violative of its equal protection rights under our State and Federal Constitutions (NYS Const. Art. 1, Sec. 11 and the 14th Amendment, respectively). Additionally, plaintiff asserts that the present zoning of its property is in violation of Town Law Sees. 263 and 272-a. The instant lawsuit for declaratory judgment was filed, which includes claims pursuant to 42 USC Sees. 1983 and 1988.
A nonjury trial (on November 14th and December 16th of 2005) was held before the Court and both sides presented evidence. Mr. Richard Machtay, the Director of Planning of the Town of Huntington, was called by the plaintiff. After listening to Mr. Machtay and observing his demeanor, the Court found him to be a forthright and credible witness. He described the history of the Town's master plans over the past forty years. These plans, in addition to their stated purpose of regulating development, chronicle the evolution of a rural community into a suburban one. Route 110, once the site of homes and farms, has become, in Mr. Machtay's words, "...one of the most trafficked roads in the town of Huntington." Its principal uses are now "mostly retail" to the north of the locus in quo, and "principally...office buildings" to the south. Set in the midst of this area, the plaintiff's property is zoned one-acre residential. The witness effectively conceded that this treatment was an anomaly and it was shown on a map depicting the comprehensive plan (plaintiff's Exhibit 1) that the subject parcel had been designated for a zoning change to a mixture of commercial use (the front portion along Route 110) and moderate density residential use (to the rear). This rezoning was admittedly not done and Mr. Machtay stated, "I don't think there are any other one-acre-zoned properties along Route 110" (tran-script p. 10). The witness also described that the easterly side of Route 110, across from the locus in quo, is (with one exception) zoned for office buildings and shopping. To provide for uniform development pursuant to its comprehensive plan, the Planning Board offered resolutions (in 1997 and 2001) for the Town Board's review (plaintiff's Exhibits 2 and 3). One of these documents states in pertinent part "...rezoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan" (plaintiff's 2). Although there is some difference between these resolutions, they have a common theme. Both recommend a commercial rezoning of the subject parcel to C-1 (Office Residence District).
Ms. Stewart-Suchow then cross-examined the witness. She established that there were residentially-zoned properties abutting the locus in quo. All her skill, however, could not change the salient fact which was established on direct examination (i.e., the Planning Board's dispassionate opinion that a zone change was in accordance with the comprehensive master plan).
Plaintiff having rested, the defendant called Ms. Marion Siess, a New York State Certified Residential Appraiser. Ms. Siess conducted an appraisal of the premises in question (defendant's Exhibit "C") and gave her opinion that it is worth $575,000.00.
The parties subsequently submitted post trial memorandum of law. The Court wishes to offer it's praise both to Mr. Goldstein and Ms. Stewart-Suchow for the thorough and insightful arguments they have presented. Counsel do credit both to their clients and to the profession of law. The transcript in this proceeding was finally received by the Court in July of 2006 for its review. Based upon the forgoing, the Court finds as follows:
Initially, the Court notes how loathe it is to intervene in matters concerning other branches of government. We are not an alternative legislature, nor a "super" zoning board of appeals.The Court's succor is warranted only when it is manifest that a governmental entity has acted in derogation of the law, or our constitution. Accordingly, "[Z]oning determinations enjoy a strong presumption of validity, which can only be overcome by a showing that the decision to rezone was unreasonable and arbitrary" (Rayle v. Town of Cato Bd. 295 A.D.2d 978, 743 N.Y.S.2d 784 [4th Dept., 2002]; Matter of Save Our Forest Action Coalition v. City of Kingston, 246 A.D.2d 217, 221, 675 N.Y.S.2d 451 [3rd Dept., 1998]; see Matter of Boyles v. Town Bd. of Town of Bethlehem, 278 A.D.2d 688, 690, 718 N.Y.S.2d 430 [3rd Dept., 2000]; see also Pyne v. Knaisch, 159 A.D.2d 999, 1000, 552 N.Y.S.2d 477 [4th Dept., 1990]). An additional burden for those challenging the auctoritas of the municipality is the standard of proof. It is not a mere preponderance of the evidence but the most rigorous standard of beyond a reasonable doubt (Asian Ams for Equality v. Koch, 72 N.Y.2d 121, 531 N.Y.S.2d 782 [1988]).
Defendant's reliance on the holding in LoScalzo v. Town of Huntington (137 A.D.2d 660, 524 N.Y.S.2d 753 [2nd Dept., 1988]) is most telling. Although the Court upheld the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action in that instance, the decision contains the following passage:
(Id. at 661).
Unfortunately for the defendant, the risk alluded to in LoScalzo has been realized in the case before us.
The Court in LoScalzo also confined most of it's discussion to whether the subject parcel could produce a reasonable return as zoned, thus limiting it's constitutional analysis to the question ofconfiscation (Id. at 661 citing Northern Westchester Professional Park Associates v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350 [1983]).
By contrast, the instant case involves an allegation of disparate treatment in violation of the equal protection clause as well as deviation from a comprehensive plan. As the Court stated in Jurgens v. Town of Huntington (53 A.D.2d 661, 662, 384 N.Y.S.2d 870[2nd Dept., 1976]), "Allegations of confiscation are separate and distinct from allegations of discrimination or allegations that the zoning ordinance is not in accordance with a comprehensive plan." Once a zoning ordinance has been found to be discriminatory, the economic consequences of the regulation are of no moment Wall v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 477, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 900 [1968]). The Court will analyze the plaintiff's various claims ad seriatim.
We first address the plaintiff's constitutional claim sounding in discriminatory treatment in violation of the equal protection clause. In the case of Bower Associates v. Town of Pleasant Valley (2 N.Y.3d 617, 781 N.Y.S.2d 240, [2004]), the Court addressed an equal protection clause argument in a land-use case for the first time (Id. at 630). Bower imposed a two-part test for the viability of claims invoking this constitutional protection. First, the plaintiff must show selective treatment "compared with others similarly situated" (Id. at 631). This test is satisfied by asking "whether a prudent person, looking objectively at the incidents, would think them roughly equivalent" (Id. at 631 citing Penlyn Dev. Corp. v. Incorporated Vil. of Lloyd Harbor, 51 F.Supp.2d 255, 264 [EDNY, 1999]). After reviewing the evidence in the case before us, it has been overwhelmingly proven that its property is being treated differently than the parcels of other feeholders. Indeed, the comprehensive plan map (Exhibit 1) shows that the Planning Board anticipated the inclusion of the subject parcel within a business district.
If our analysis were to end here, plaintiff would prevail upon its equal protection claim. Indeed, the cases relied upon by Mr. Goldstein (Reuschenberg v. Town of Huntington, 143 A.D.2d 265, 532 N.Y.S.2d 148 [2nd Dept., 1988]; Walton v. Gozo and the Town of Huntington, 128 A.D.2d 609, 512 N.Y.S.2d 779 [2nd Dept., 1987]; and DeSena v. Guide, 24 A.D.2d 165, 265 N.Y.S.2d 239 [2nd Dept., 1965]) are more than analogous to the controversy before us. As counsel asserts, they're "on all fours" (Mr. Goldstein's memorandum of law, p. 19).
The...
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